Bringing order to the chaos caused by the off-the-cuff remarks of leaders and ministers, with some good news

We spent a whole day with a large group of mayors, governors, aspiring leaders, party leaders, ministers, former prime ministers, and current and former presidents of the Constitutional Court, and in the informal chats on the sidelines, just before and just after the interviews at our ‘Festa del Foglio’ event, we gathered some useful insights to attempt the most optimistic gesture one can make in a historical phase dominated by disorder: trying to bring order. Bringing order means seeking common threads capable of uniting distant people, but it also means trying to establish, on the playing field, some useful markers to help find one’s bearings. The common thread that, to our delight, is increasingly uniting a section of the majority and a section of the opposition is that concerning the defence of Ukraine, the defence of Europe, and the rejection of Trumpism.

Elly Schlein, leader of the PD, has told us – and reiterated – that the defence of Ukraine, including by military means, is an indispensable element of the PD’s identity: generous, but not naïve. Paolo Gentiloni, former Prime Minister, praised Elly Schlein for this stance and pointed out that the real divisions in politics, both in Italy and in Europe today, centre on this issue: who has the strength to stand up to Putin and who does not. Ignazio La Russa, of Fratelli d’Italia and President of the Senate, said he agreed with Gentiloni, and therefore with Schlein. Shortly afterwards, Matteo Renzi said he regarded Ukraine and its defence as an indispensable element in safeguarding the identity of the centre-left, whilst wishing to focus attention on the diplomatic aspect, which is lacking, at least in Europe. Luigi Di Maio, former leader of the M5S, praised the government’s pro-European stance and pointed out that Meloni holds a position of influence in the Persian Gulf that no other European leader possesses.

On the left, too, there are some interesting points of convergence. Schlein and Bonelli agree that, on energy, the centre-left must do more than it has done in regional councils: neither regards Sardinia’s approach – led by Alessandra Todde of the M5S – on renewables as a model, and the fact that 99 per cent of areas are deemed unsuitable, against which the centre-right government has lodged an appeal, still cries out for redress. In the centre, Renzi sends messages of affection to Occhiuto; Occhiuto reciprocates; Renzi invites him to join the centre-left, given that the centre-right does the exact opposite of what Occhiuto does; Occhiuto invites him to join the right, given that the centre-left is asking him for proof of residence in order to remain in the coalition; yet the points that unite the centrists, on both the right and the left, are more numerous than those that bind them to the more extreme parties within their respective coalitions, and one might reflect on this: how much influence would a united centre carry if all the centrist parties, rather than remaining divided, were to stand together?

At the same time, what sense can it make for a centrist party to break away from coalitions in a context that favours a two-party system, as provided for by the electoral law? Should one vote for the centre to throw everything into disarray, or vote for the centre to count for nothing? It remains uncertain. Cross-party alliances, threads that intertwine and converge with an interesting underlying theme: the PD is seeking a way to undermine the M5S’s crypto-Putinism by setting boundaries that must not be crossed, whilst Fratelli d’Italia is seeking a way to distance itself from Vannacci’s crypto-Putinism, stating clearly what La Russa has already made clear: as things stand, the probability of the centre-right forming an alliance with Vannacci is zero per cent.

A broad perspective, optimism, and surprises—such as when Giuliano Amato, former President of the Constitutional Court, states that no, there is no such thing; for the Constitutional Court to strike down the electoral law would be bizarre; and even the current President, Giovanni Amoroso, makes it clear, whilst discussing the electoral law, that yes, of course, the Constitutional Court will be called upon to rule, but there are no obvious signs of unconstitutionality; otherwise, Sergio Mattarella would not have signed the law. Behind the scenes, the general, though unspoken, impression is that if anything changes following the appeals to the Court, that change will be self-executing and is unlikely to concern the majority bonus (the signatures required to register a party? The name on the manifesto? Who knows).

Being optimistic, however – as we were saying – means setting certain boundaries, and it seems to us that, amidst all the chatter, a few such boundaries have been established. On the left, meanwhile: the programme will certainly be finalised by the end of the year. The primaries will not depend on what the Constitutional Court decides: they will go ahead, full stop. They will not take place now, but shortly before the elections. If the vote is in May, they will be in February. Will there be other candidates? Unlikely. More likely: Conte versus Schlein. Will there be any surprises on the left? Not within the ‘broad coalition’ – though nobody actually calls it that; Schlein says she doesn’t like the name, and neither does Renzi. The surprise – welcomed by Schlein, welcomed by Renzi, and welcomed too by the M5S – could be Silvia Salis. Not because she will be standing in the primaries, but because of her role in uniting all the centre-left factions currently in search of a leader. A possible scenario: a strong result for the centre and the centre-left, and a first step onto the national stage.

Right, but when will the election take place? A two-pronged strategy, as can be gleaned from the chatter. Fratelli d’Italia, the coalition’s leading party, is sending mixed signals. Giovanbattista Fazzolari, the Prime Minister’s right- and left-hand man, suggests he would like to hold the election in May. Ignazio La Russa, founder of Fratelli d’Italia, says that, in theory, it might even be possible to hold the election in November. Denying opponents any fixed points of reference is a legitimate strategy for forcing them to improvise. Yet certain guidelines can be discerned: ministers have been advised to note down two dates, one in May and one in June. One might ask: what advantage does the centre-right have in accepting the principle of an ‘election day’ – that is, holding the general election alongside the local elections, particularly in the major cities, an event that usually mobilises many centre-left voters? The reasoning, as explained by those who know Meloni well, is this: there is a risk involved, it is true, but there would be a greater risk in holding the general election after the local elections, because a potential landslide victory for the centre-left in the major cities could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. So: the spring deadline is set.

And what about the rest? The electoral law, criticised by many on the left, is popular with everyone – or nearly everyone. It appeals to the smaller parties, those who know how to play politics, because with a few clever, shrewd candidates capable of attracting preferential votes, their share of the vote can rise rapidly. It also appeals, to a limited extent, to Conte and Schlein, even if neither would ever acknowledge it under pressure, because with this electoral law – Constitutional Court or no Constitutional Court – it will be easier to hold primaries, a goal that anyone wishing to avoid the temptation of a third candidate must necessarily pursue.

However, it also appeals to centre-right voters who dream of draining Vannacci’s support base, because voting for Vannacci outside the coalition under an electoral law that provides for a majority bonus would be a huge risk and would give the centre-left an additional advantage – which is why even Giuseppe Cruciani, both on and off stage, says he would never vote for Vannacci outside the coalition. There are many divisions, but also many points of common ground; the right and the left are in the midst of an election campaign, yet despite this, some common ground does exist; one can make out a few markers staked out on the ground, and whilst the fact that parties are divided over Ukraine may be disheartening, seeing different and distant parties unite on this issue can be more reassuring. There is disorder, but a little order is gradually beginning to emerge, and perhaps it offers some hope for optimism, on the right and on the left alike – provided those fragile stakes are driven firmly into the equally fragile, though perhaps not entirely so, ground of future identities, of a political landscape in disarray, yes, one that is capable of dividing over everything but which perhaps knows how to unite on what really matters.