All the populist movements in the running for the mid-term elections (beyond Trump)

If this year’s US mid-term elections – in which all 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 of the 100 Senate seats are up for re-election – were normal elections – as one hopes they might be, though they might not – one would have to start with the opinion polls, which, of course, can be wrong. They suggest that the vote on 3 November will almost certainly see Trump and the Republican Party lose control of the House (where the Democrats, who currently hold 214 seats, are expected to secure between 220 and 240) and, in all likelihood, control of the Senate as well, where, together with their allies, they are expected to increase their number of seats from 47 to between 51 and 54. The Democrats are also expected to win a few more governorships among the thirty-six up for re-election.

Among the most frequently cited reasons for this shift – which, if it were to materialise, would make Trump a ‘lame duck’, reducing but not eliminating his power – are rising inflation, which is being poorly tolerated, and, more generally, the widespread belief that the President’s economic management has fallen short of expectations; the return to the Democratic camp of a section of the Hispanic vote that had swung heavily behind Trump in 2024 and is now disillusioned by ICE’s methods and deportations, and disapproves of the Administration’s conflict with the Catholic Church; disappointment with the wars in the Middle East, which Trump had promised not to wage; and, at least within the no longer large but still existing communities of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, hostility towards the pro-Putin shift.

The Republicans would also lose a large part of their substantial lead in the male vote, whilst retaining their lead amongst workers with only a school-leaving certificate. The majority of young people would also be opposed to Trump, but it is not known how many of them will actually turn out to vote. Above all, a significant majority of the politically unaffiliated – who are often moderates – and even some Republicans are now said to be opposed to him, blaming the president for his constant and drastic U-turns and his manner of conduct.

A process similar to what happened in Brazil would therefore be underway, where a small but significant proportion of conservatives and moderates first voted for their own parties and then either did not turn out to vote or ended up preferring Lula to the despised Bolsonaro. From this perspective, a vote against Trump would express – albeit paradoxically, given that it would overturn the existing majority – a desire for greater stability. If this were the case, it would confirm that in our troubled societies there are, on the one hand – on both the right and the left – powerful ‘populist’ forces that are dissatisfied and seeking an improvement they cannot find; but on the other hand, and for reasons that are easy to guess, there are also forces pulling in the opposite direction, willing to reward those who appear capable of ensuring order, security and stability.

If the current situation in the US were a normal one – as we must hope it is, and perhaps it is – prudence would suggest adding that it is advisable, in any case, to wait for the results. These results may not be as predicted by the polls, not only because of the different geographical distribution of voters – which can significantly alter a picture often based on general trends – but also because, whilst it is true that Trump’s popularity has recently hit an all-time low of 31–37 per cent, that of the Democratic Party as such is not much higher. Even the majority who now say they intend to vote for him hold a predominantly negative view of him, only a few percentage points higher than the proportion who disapprove of Trump.

The Democratic Party is also divided and is fielding candidates with even more diverse programmes, backgrounds and visions than those which characterised it in the past. One need only consider the gulf between the personality and statements of Abdul El-Sayed – the fiercely pro-Palestinian candidate (there has even been talk of his links to the Muslim Brotherhood) defending a Democratic seat in Michigan – and those of the militant Christian James Talarico, who is seeking to wrest a seat from the Republicans in Texas. El-Sayed, meanwhile, remains embroiled in a fierce row – not with the Republican candidate, but with his opponent in the Democratic primaries – highlighting the internal tension within a party that no longer has so much a programme as a shared general direction. This is reflected in recent debates over the merits of ‘wokeness’ on the one hand, and the rise of candidates who, whilst standing for the Democrats, belong to another party – such as Mamdani’s Democratic Socialists – or to radical groups like the Justice Democrats.

In addition to economic difficulties and Trump’s instability, the Republicans are paying the price for other divisions, such as religious ones, and have been hit by the death of their senator Lindsey Graham – a pro-Ukrainian figure who was nonetheless able to engage with Trump – upon his return from Kyiv, as well as by the weakness of his sister’s candidacy, which could allow the Democrats to gain an unexpected seat in South Carolina.

Surprises are therefore possible, but what many are wondering about – and what is truly impossible to predict – is how Trump will react to a defeat, whether he will accept it and how. A vote calling for greater stability would, in fact, lead to the opposite: greater tensions and perhaps even an institutional crisis that would not be easy to resolve. Of course, it is reassuring that, apart from the presidential election – which is a federal matter – elections in the United States are conducted and guaranteed by the states, whose populations elect their representatives to Congress. It would therefore be very difficult to challenge the results certified – with perhaps a few exceptions – by even Republican states, but Trump is Trump, even if it is true that he is now eighty years old and, for that reason alone, is less energetic and less credible, even in the eyes of his supporters, than he was six years ago. He is also less popular because he has been unable to deliver on his promises, and his style and personality have proved to be just that – rather than a means of achieving results – clearly revealing their unpleasant and counterproductive traits.

The question of what Trump will do following an election that might curtail his powers remains open, however, and in any case – even if he were not to contest the results and American political life were therefore to continue along more or less normal lines – his powers would remain considerable. It cannot therefore be ruled out that he might decide to use them in a radical manner, for example in foreign policy to secure at least one success in Iran, thereby regaining prestige in the Middle East, and to impose his own peace on Ukraine, humiliating Europe. On the other hand, there will continue to be a divided Democratic Party, without a programme and, at least for now, without a convincing leader.

The American crisis is therefore still ongoing and in full swing, and whilst it is similar to the European crisis, it is also very different from it. Unlike us, the United States has in fact continued to increase its wealth for years, particularly in the western states and the south-west. Thanks to this growth—on a scale unimaginable to us—as the New York Times reported a few days ago, a family of four in San Francisco with an annual income of $300,000 is, for example, entitled to a local authority grant for childcare services. The resources for the expansion of a welfare state – which, contrary to popular belief, already exists and is often substantial, albeit uneven due to its strong municipal and state components – are available, even though demographic trends, reactions to immigration and the emergence of new major powers – including technological ones – suggest that this availability is temporary, much like the situation in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s.

This helps to understand the strength of the radical left and of populism in general, and it will therefore be interesting to see how some of the referendums addressing this issue turn out, such as Proposition 40 in California, which calls for the imposition of a one-off 5 per cent tax on individual fortunes exceeding one billion dollars, a measure which, however – as even many Democrats admit – could have consequences contrary to those intended. Finally, it is worth noting the almost total absence of the ‘Europe’ issue from an election debate that, whilst it does touch upon foreign policy issues (Iran, Gaza, Ukraine and Russia, China, Latin America, etc.), does not make it its central focus.