Forget the Mecca Pact. Under attack from the Houthis, Riyadh turns to Tel Aviv

Tel Aviv. “What has become of Turkey and Pakistan – that is, the other two signatories to the Mecca Pact, the trilateral defence agreement signed by the three major Muslim nations – at a time when Saudi Arabia is in need?” Eyal Zisser, professor of Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University, former director of the Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern Studies and dean of the Faculty of Humanities, discusses this with Il Foglio. “As was clear from the outset, it was merely a ‘symbolic’ alliance, not to say rhetorical. Just as the United States has shown itself to be interested in intervening in the Middle East only when it feels directly threatened, but without any longer risking the consequences of a ‘boots on the ground’ intervention – as would be necessary in Iran and Yemen following the Houthis’ attempt to escalate tensions with the Saudis – the latter are now able to rely solely on their regional allies, united by the same threat.” Washington has not abandoned Riyadh, but does not seem willing to grant direct military intervention as requested by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. And it is precisely in the gap between the security guarantee expected and that actually granted that Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability is now becoming apparent. In recent weeks, in fact, the Yemeni group has struck numerous Saudi targets, injuring many civilians and seeking to put pressure on the Kingdom’s oil exports, forcing Riyadh to temporarily close a strategic oil pipeline that allows crude oil to reach the Red Sea by bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.

Bin Salman does not want to return to war with Yemen, where he has fought for years without managing to defeat the Houthis, but he cannot allow the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb to become permanently vulnerable. This is particularly because Vision 2030 presupposes a stable and secure Kingdom, and a permanent conflict would undermine its foundations. For this reason, for years, he has invested heavily in relations with the United States, particularly in his personal relationship with the current president, Donald Trump, trusting that this partnership would guarantee protection precisely in a crisis of this kind. However, Washington – already tied up with Iran, with a navy under pressure and dwindling ammunition stocks – now appears unable to open another front.

And this is where Israel comes in: “Whilst unable to guarantee the military support that only the Americans could offer, the Israelis can provide a wealth of intelligence expertise, not least because it is in our own interests to contain the Houthi threat. It goes without saying that, should they attack us again, a more concrete and immediate collaboration would develop,” continues Zisser. Israel and Saudi Arabia are reportedly already discussing, through the mediation of CENTCOM – the US Armed Forces’ unified command for operations in the Middle East – a cooperation modelled on that currently in place with the Emirates. At the same time, Riyadh is seeking British and European support and is discussing security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea with Egypt.

The most interesting snapshot of this new geopolitical landscape, however, comes from Germany. As confirmed by Centcom, last week military leaders from the United States, Israel and seven Arab countries met secretly at a ski resort. Seated around the same table were Admiral Brad Cooper, Israeli Chief of the General Staff Eyal Zamir and the commanders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, with Saudis and Qataris – who have no diplomatic relations with Israel – sitting alongside the IDF commander to discuss regional security. The interests of Riyadh, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Ankara and Jerusalem remain divergent, and the Mecca Pact itself has shown just how fragile alliances on paper can be when the time comes to translate them into military action. But something is changing: “Israel possesses all the capabilities the Saudis need: missile defence, drone interception and early warning.” Saudi-Israeli normalisation thus risks being overtaken by events: even before embassies are opened, the common threat is already fostering international cooperation. We are not yet facing a post-American Middle East, but one in which America is attempting to shift from the role of sole protector to that of regional coordinator. And now Riyadh, having learnt the hard way that no guarantee is absolute, is diversifying its ‘life insurance’.”