How should we assess the Meloni government’s record for longevity?

Pass or fail? The Meloni government’s record for longevity is right here before us, best wishes, and having turned stability into a synonym for Italianness is no small feat in such turbulent times as those Europe has been experiencing recently, when even in solid, reliable and, so to speak, stable countries, prime ministers have fallen from power as quickly as undersecretaries used to be replaced in Italy.

The record of stability is not merely an abstract figure but one that is accompanied by other data, such as the cost of debt and foreign investment, which help us understand what a country gains from not living as if in a body that is in fits and starts – even though Italy’s unstable governments have enabled the country to find its own formidable reformist stability, in the name of political opportunism. Yet when a government reaches a significant milestone, to understand how it achieved this goal it may be useful not to dwell on a single detail; it may be useful to step back from the snapshot of the moment and widen the frame to try to offer the reader a brief assessment – without rhetoric, but with some facts. Ultimately, the question is this: pass or fail? The starting point must necessarily be linked to the end point: for a government that has been in power for so long, with such a large majority, such a weak opposition and such a massive influx of European funds, it is difficult to argue that it has done everything it could have done to transform stability into a synonym not only for ‘Italianness’ but also for productivity. Over four years, the Meloni government has recorded low growth, a high tax burden, high public debt, sluggish industrial output and energy costs that remain amongst the highest in Europe – yet none of this has prompted the government to act in a timely manner on crucial issues such as nuclear power or improving the efficiency of the system governing renewables. All of these figures, considered in isolation, contribute to a picture of opportunity missed.

If the past four years in government had been ordinary years, it would be reasonable to assess the Meloni government using ordinary criteria. But Meloni’s years in government have not been ordinary, and for this reason we must make an effort to assess her record through the lens of extraordinary circumstances. By ‘extraordinary circumstances’, we mean, first and foremost, Ukraine. For those who hold dear the non-negotiable values of an open society, Ukraine, since 2022, has been one of the guiding stars around which the non-negotiable values of liberal democracies revolve. Consequently, one’s proximity to or distance from Ukraine can serve as a yardstick for measuring other factors that inform the assessment of political action. Relations with Europe, defences against extremists, ties with Trump’s America, the defence of the West, and the battle against the exporters of terror. In recent years, Meloni’s Italy, with regard to the defence of Ukraine, has not done everything necessary, but it has done everything sufficient to place the Meloni government on the right side of history. The Prime Minister’s choice of side has, in turn, steered the government’s course towards a more pro-European direction than even the most optimistic forecasts had suggested, to the point of supporting a European Commission of which a former minister in Meloni’s government, Raffaele Fitto, is vice-president – a Commission that Meloni has chosen to back even at the cost of having to embrace parties in Europe that are not exactly popular: centrists, liberals and socialists. Meloni has been pro-European on the defence of Ukraine, albeit less enthusiastic than other countries. She has been pro-European in her approach to immigration, albeit with many undertones of demagoguery. She has been pro-European in supporting free trade agreements, although she has consistently rejected the idea of moving away from the general principle of unanimity in European institutions. She has been pro-European in relations with China, and the decision to scrap the ill-fated memorandum signed by the Conte-Salvini government with Beijing was perhaps one of the Meloni government’s most courageous acts. It has also been pro-European in its dealings with Trump; after all, whenever Meloni’s Italy has found itself having to choose between pandering to the demands of the MAGA movement or standing up for Europe, the choice has always been the right one and has coincided with support for Europe – and the support that is gathering around the farcical and threatening Trumpist anti-Europeanism, in its Vannaccian ‘bagna cauda’ version, is ultimately a sign of the space for anti-Europeanism that the Meloni government has, in fact, fortunately left unguarded.

One could write reams about the myriad details concerning the Meloni government’s four-plus years in office, its inadequate leadership, the mistakes made regarding the referendum on the justice system, the missed opportunities to turn the NRRP into an engine of development, the banana skins trampled upon in tax matters, on the Luddite approach to innovation, on the Ilva disaster – though this was offset by the market-led rescue of ITA and TIM. Yet Meloni’s four years, to be properly judged, must be contextualised within the extraordinary nature of the times in which we find ourselves, within the extraordinary nature of a period in which what we took for granted is no longer so, within the extraordinary nature of a historical phase in which choosing which side to be on no longer means choosing whether or not to support a reform. It means being for or against the non-negotiable values of an open society. It means being in favour of, or against, the defence of the boundaries of our democracy. It means being prepared to defend Europe from those who want it to be weaker, more vulnerable and more exposed to the extremism of terrorism. And if one judges the four years of Meloni’s government on all these points – even though Meloni chose not to focus on this issue during the celebrations marking her four years in office, because whilst taking firm action on Ukraine is a duty, speaking out clearly about it during an election campaign is more difficult, and the vote will not be high, since having done what was necessary does not mean having done enough – the final verdict can only be positive. In an Italy seeking to build defences to stem the tide, having had a government for four years that has acted as a bulwark against Putin’s propaganda and anti-European extremism is not everything, but it is no small thing. Well done.