Russian communists who refuse to take part in the farce of opposition to Putin have been arrested

Last September’s State Duma elections marked the beginning of a new phase in Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian regime. The President’s party, United Russia, won 349 out of 450 seats, 78 per cent of the total. This figure is significant in itself, as it represents a record in the history of the Russian Federation, well above the constitutional two-thirds majority threshold. At the same time, the result is also significant for the political forces that emerged from the election weakened, namely the so-called ‘systemic opposition’ parties. The term refers to parties that, while having their own agenda and electoral base, do not challenge the foundations on which the regime is based but rather support its general political direction, thereby helping to reinforce the image of a society united around certain national values, particularly in times of war. It should come as no surprise that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) is also among these parties. As the historian Giovanni Cadioli pointed out in an article in the magazine Il Mulino, the Communist Party – still led today by Gennady Zyuganov, who founded it in 1993 from the ashes of the USSR – blends the somewhat faded veneer of historical Marxism-Leninism with strong elements of pan-Russian nationalism, which sits well with the post-ideological platform of Putinism. However, the price paid for this submission to the Kremlin risks becoming higher with each passing year.

Compared with the 2021–2026 parliamentary term, the Communists, whilst remaining in second place, lost twenty seats, falling from 57 to the current 37. Immediately after the count, Zyuganov expressed his frustration on state television, stating that, according to the party’s internal surveys, the KPRF’s actual popular support stood at between 18 and 30 per cent of the vote and certainly not below 14 per cent. At the same time, he denounced (though certainly not in court!) widespread irregularities at polling stations, where many observers were reportedly barred from monitoring the count, and cast doubt on the integrity of the electronic voting system. This is an understandable outburst. The presidential administration and the security services, which are increasingly involved in predetermining election results behind closed doors, have long believed that the Communist Party is no longer a reliable partner, but rather risks becoming a destabilising factor, just like other opposition forces that have already been neutralised in the past. Hence the attempt to promote the rise of the LDPR’s national-liberals as a more accommodating alternative and, at the same time, to undermine the KPRF with decoy lists such as the Communists of Russia.

Moreover, the fact that pressure on Zyuganov and his supporters had increased is borne out by a number of regional events that preceded the September vote. In early February, the security forces carried out raids on the Communist Party’s offices in the Altai Republic, arresting several regional Communist MPs on charges of embezzlement. The same occurred in Omsk in May, whilst the most high-profile case involved the popular Communist politician from Saratov, Nikolay Bondarenko, who was removed from the Duma candidate lists after the local court had hastily sanctioned him for an old post containing a photo of Alexey Navalny.

The perceived unreliability of the Communists appears to be linked to the gradual emergence of a pacifist wing, particularly popular amongst younger members, which it is feared could oust the 82-year-old Zyuganov from leadership. What took place on 4 October in central Moscow would seem to suggest that such a development is not entirely without foundation. During a nostalgic rally organised to commemorate the 1993 constitutional crisis, many young anti-war protesters chanted slogans against the tsar and electoral fraud.

Police immediately broke up the gathering, arresting around seventy people. Zero tolerance, then. Just as had happened a few days earlier in Izhevsk, Udmurtia, when a communist activist was arrested for attempting to organise protests against electoral fraud. This was followed by the arrests of leading party figures. On 21 October, in Moscow, it was the turn of Oleg Mikhailov, Communist Secretary of the Komi Republic and former Duma deputy, whilst the day before yesterday it was the turn of Gennady Stepakhno, former vice-president of the Murmansk Regional Duma. Against the backdrop of an increasingly rampant crackdown, even the fortunes of the systemic opposition parties appear to be on the wane. In a totalitarian state, there is no longer any need to feign pluralism.