The Russian vote for a Duma without an opposition is also a test for United Russia

From 18 to 20 September, Russian citizens are called upon to elect a new State Duma, the lower house of parliament. Comprising 450 seats, half of which are allocated on the basis of single-member constituencies and half from multi-member party lists, this branch of the legislative assembly has long since ceased to be the body that represents the pluralism of society, but instead constitutes one of the cogs in Putin’s ‘vertical of power’. The composition of the body is, therefore, the result of a sophisticated system of power management, designed to mediate conflicts between factions within the elite and, ultimately, to guarantee the stability of the regime and the personal survival of the Russian president. For this reason, participation in the elections is subject to rigorous scrutiny, designed to ensure that lists and candidates meet minimum requirements for adherence to the regime’s agenda.

Alongside United Russia, which for the first time since 2008 is once again officially Putin’s party, all the other nine lists appearing on the ballot paper belong to the systemic opposition – lists which, whilst having their own political ethos and a modest voter base, share the government’s line with the majority. This ‘opposition of convenience’ includes the Communist Party, led by the evergreen Gennady Zyuganov; the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), formerly led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky; and the social-populist party Fair Russia, whose secretary is still the former Chairman of the Federation Council, Sergei Mironov. At the same time, there are newer parties, most of which are ‘decoy’ lists (the Russian Communists, the Direct Democracy Party, the Pensioners’ Party), whilst others are direct offshoots of the presidential administration, created to foster the impression of pluralism and counterbalance the votes of the established systemic opposition parties.

These include both Rodina, the ultra-nationalist party led by an LDPR MP, and Novyye Lyudi (New People), a centrist-inspired party founded ahead of the 2021 elections to attract young and moderate voters. It is no coincidence that its leader, Vladislav Davankov, the current Deputy Speaker of the Duma, was trained at the School of Governors, an elite training programme overseen by the Kremlin to shape the future ruling class. Yabloko, the liberal-democratic party founded by Grigory Yavlinsky, amongst others, is not taking part in these parliamentary elections for the first time since 1993. Due to its anti-war stance, Yabloko’s list was excluded from the ballot following an appeal lodged by Rodina itself. Even in the single-member constituencies, Yabloko’s candidates were largely removed by the courts on the basis of far-fetched justifications.

The vote, albeit rigged, is an important test to gauge the popularity of United Russia compared with the rest of the systemic opposition and to ascertain the prevailing dynamics within the elites, who are increasingly under the thumb of the security services. Depending on what the results are and how they are presented, it is reasonable to expect further actions linked to the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. Most speculate that there will be a new mobilisation. Realists, on the other hand, point out that the September 2022 mobilisation was never officially declared over and could resume at a faster pace at a decentralised level. What is certain is that the new Duma will remain united ‘for Victory’.