The missing majority. A guide to Arab political parties in Israel

For decades, the vote of Israeli Arabs has been virtually invisible in national politics; whilst it has secured a considerable number of seats in the Knesset, it has rarely determined who would govern the country.

Then, in 2021, when Mansour Abbas brought his Ra’am party into the ‘government of change’ led by Naftali Bennett, for the first time in Israel’s history an Arab minority party became an integral part of the majority, marking a turning point in the role of the Arab electorate at the polls.

Today, the country is still healing the wounds caused by 7 October and, despite the reluctance to form an alliance with an Arab party, given the mathematical equation requiring 61 seats out of 120 to form a government, the Arab vote could prove decisive.

Arabs, in fact, account for more than a fifth of the population: 2.157 million out of 10.244 million, or 21.1 per cent of the electorate.

As the Arab-Israeli journalist Ali Waked explains to Il Foglio, the real wildcard in the upcoming elections therefore lies not only in how many Arabs will turn out to vote, but above all in which party they will vote for. This is not necessarily limited to Arab parties alone: in fact, around 15 per cent of the Arab population votes for Jewish-Zionist parties.

Their political landscape, therefore, is far from monolithic. Arik Rudnitzky, director of the programme for Jewish-Arab cooperation at the Moshe Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, describes it as a ‘mosaic’. According to a survey he conducted, 77 per cent of Arabs say they are in favour of joining a coalition, citing as their top priorities neither Gaza nor the West Bank, but rather rampant crime in Arab communities, followed by fears of a new regional war: “The Palestinian dimension remains, but it increasingly coexists with that of the Israeli citizen who wants security on their doorstep, in their homeland and, above all, in economic terms.”

Led by Yousef Jabareen, it brings together three parties with different ideological identities which, however, if united, would, according to today’s polls, win between 8 and 9 seats. These are the three parties that make up the coalition:

Founded in 1977, it is a socialist and secular party with Arab-Jewish roots. Although it draws its support mainly from Israeli Arabs, it has always included Jewish members as well.

The programme combines socialism, social justice and the defence of minority rights. It advocates an end to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state and the recognition of full civil and national equality for Arab citizens. On the economic front, it promotes redistributive policies, the strengthening of public services, the protection of workers and greater investment in Arab towns and cities, particularly in education, healthcare, housing and infrastructure.

Another key issue is the fight against organised crime in Arab communities, accompanied by calls for state institutions to take greater responsibility for ensuring security.

Founded in 1996 by Ahmad Tibi, a former political adviser to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and, since then, a leading figure and one of the longest-serving Arab members of the Knesset.

Compared with other parties, it has a less ideological identity and is more focused on the political and institutional representation of the Arab minority. It describes itself as secular and supports the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, the creation of an independent Palestinian state and a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

On the domestic front, priorities include equality between Arab and Jewish citizens, the fight against discrimination, access to public resources and the improvement of the economic and social conditions of Arab communities. Particular attention is paid to urban planning, healthcare, education and the fight against crime.

The political strategy of the party and its leader prioritises negotiation and a presence within institutions.

Founded in 1995, it is the political party that most clearly articulates a Palestinian national conception of Arab citizenship in Israel, distinguishing itself from both the socialism of Hadash and the pragmatism of Ta’al.

The fundamental principle of its programme is the transformation of Israel into a “state of all its citizens”, in which political and legal equality does not depend on ethnic or religious affiliation. Balad therefore challenges the current constitutional definition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people and proposes a model based on full individual equality and the recognition of the collective rights of the Palestinian minority.

Key demands include the protection of the Arabic language, cultural and educational autonomy, the separation of religion and state, and a fairer distribution of public resources.

On the Israeli-Palestinian front, Balad advocates an end to the occupation, the right to Palestinian self-determination and a solution to the refugee issue.

It was founded in 1996 and, unlike other major Arab political movements, its political identity is rooted in political Islam and a socially conservative outlook, albeit accompanied by a growing institutional pragmatism.

The decisive moment came in 2021, when Mansour Abbas assured Ra’am that it would become the first Arab party to formally join the coalition government led by Naftali Bennett.

His programme focuses on the fight against organised crime, the economic development of Arab communities, housing, the recognition of Bedouin villages, infrastructure improvements and increased funding for education and public services.

Whilst supporting the Palestinians’ right to an independent state, Ra’am believes that participation in Israeli institutions can yield concrete results, without waiting for a comprehensive resolution to the conflict.

Ahead of the 2026 elections, Abbas has chosen to stand separately from the Joint List, whilst retaining the option to negotiate with different political blocs. The most surprising political move was to appoint Yoav Segalovich as the party’s number two: a Jew, former police commander and former MP for Yesh Atid, the centrist party led by former Prime Minister Yair Lapid. He serves as a guarantor, vis-à-vis the Jewish parties, of Ra’am’s intentions as a reliable partner for the country’s governability.

Today’s polls predict between 50 and 55 seats for both Netanyahu’s bloc and the opposition, whilst the Arab parties, if united, would win between 13 and 15 seats, five of which would almost certainly go to Ra’am.

This is why, in this round too, Abbas could prove to be the kingmaker: because Eisenkot might need precisely those five seats – or even just their external support – to form an interim government capable of isolating Netanyahu and leading to a possible split in the Likud and even the formation of a government of national unity, without the current prime minister.

Although Avigdor Liberman, leader of the most right-wing party in the anti-Bibi coalition, swears he will never support a government dependent on Arab MPs, Abbas has already set the price to be paid for his support, even from outside the coalition: a radical plan to tackle crime in Arab towns, the reinstatement of equality programmes frozen by the current government, and the most provocative demand of all: Segalovich at the Ministry of Security, replacing Itamar Ben-Gvir.

The paradox of the upcoming elections is therefore that, whilst almost all Zionist leaders promise voters they will not rely on the Arab minority, the maths could force them to do exactly the opposite. Abbas is banking on this: that, when the time comes to choose between another Netanyahu government or five Islamist MPs, it will be the latter who tip the balance, and perhaps bring about a political turning point for the country.