The two populist responses to the panic in Ceuta

The crisis in Ceuta, the Spanish enclave in North Africa which in recent days has been overwhelmed by a flood of migrants from Morocco, is not merely a humanitarian crisis defined by numbers, but also a political drama characterised by denial. The humanitarian crisis is what you are already aware of. Over the last three days, around 50,000 migrants have arrived in Ceuta, according to the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, and up to 60,000 according to local authorities (48,000 people are reported to have already returned voluntarily to Morocco). In Italy, to put this into perspective, from 1 January to 31 July, there were just over 16,479 arrivals by sea (three times fewer). Those entering Ceuta, of course, even though they are arriving in a territory that forms part of the European Union, do not acquire the right to travel freely within Spain or the rest of the Schengen area; rather, they enter a process involving Spain, which is obliged to identify, accommodate and assess the status of each of the arrivals. Not everyone can stay in Ceuta: a large proportion of the migrants will have to be taken to Spain, with all the consequences that entails and the complications arising from a recent ruling by the Spanish Supreme Court. The ruling established that anyone intercepted at sea whilst swimming towards Ceuta or Melilla cannot be immediately turned back under the specific ‘rechazo en frontera’ procedure applicable to those who cross the physical border (according to the Sánchez government, this was the reason for the immediate arrivals, not the ongoing crisis with Morocco – caused by Spain’s sudden rapprochement with Algeria – nor the huge number of undocumented migrants regularised through a mass amnesty involving 500,000 people, which, according to much of the European right, including the Italian right, is said to have encouraged migrants to set off for Ceuta). 

The humanitarian crisis in Ceuta is plain for all to see, and it is not difficult to imagine what the consequences might be for European public opinion should tensions flare up between migrants arriving in Spain and citizens frightened by the mass arrival of tens of thousands of people. Alongside this humanitarian crisis, however, there is another, political in nature, characterised by symmetrical denials affecting both the right and the left. The Italian government’s clumsy and emotional reaction to the Ceuta situation – ‘let’s close Schengen’ – is a textbook example of pure political masochism. Italy cannot suspend Spain from Schengen: it can only temporarily reintroduce checks at its own internal borders, provided they are necessary and proportionate. Reintroducing these checks is not in itself a populist choice: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway and Sweden have been doing so for years. Believing that building walls is the right answer to managing external borders, however, is populist. It is populism because there is no issue of such epoch-making significance – such as immigration – that can be successfully managed by a single country. It is populism because the problems Spain faces today are the same ones that Italy might one day face in its dealings with countries on the other side of the sea, which collaborate – sometimes for profit, sometimes through blackmail – with European countries in managing the opening and closing of the immigration tap. Spain has Morocco, Italy has Tunisia and Libya, and Greece has Turkey. It is populism because border countries, such as Italy, when they propose restrictive measures whilst the problems concern other countries, do nothing but create the conditions to legitimise future restrictions by others, should the very same problems that Spain faces today come to affect Italy.

In 2023, whilst serving as a minister, Salvini denounced the unilateral restrictions imposed by Austria at the Brenner Pass as ‘unacceptable’, ‘unsustainable’ and contrary to European rules, arguing that they would harm lorry drivers, businesses and the free movement of goods. When populists discuss the measures needed to manage immigration, they tend to exclude from public debate the only viable solution – one that involves Europe – and instead promote only nationalistic ‘shortcuts’ which, if adopted by all, would turn border countries, such as Italy, into permanent refugee camps. Alongside these right-wing omissions – omissions that sometimes have more to do with public propaganda than with government action, because the Prime Minister herself, Giorgia Meloni – who is now engaging in demagoguery regarding Schengen – has made a significant contribution in recent years to strengthening Europe’s handling of migration and the fight against irregular immigration, as demonstrated by Italy’s support for the new Pact on Migration and Asylum – there is another, no less worrying trend, concerning the progressive camp, particularly in Italy. When discussing issues relating to irregular immigration, the progressive camp focuses heavily on the demagoguery of the right – ‘you are xenophobic’ – and pays little attention to the complete absence of an agenda for managing these phenomena. And in Europe, this phenomenon of denial primarily affects a single left-wing movement, namely the Italian one. Left-wing governments are aware of – and do not deny – the problem of irregular immigration, and many have proposed drastic solutions to manage the phenomenon. The Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, a progressive, has long implemented tough measures against uncontrolled immigration, which, according to Frederiksen, poses a threat to Europe and to Denmark. Yesterday, the Prime Minister herself said that “the EU must immediately take all necessary measures and consider all possibilities, including the suspension of Schengen cooperation”. In Spain, Sánchez himself – regarded as a role model by the Italian left – has never approached immigration with a ‘let’s welcome them all’ attitude: the army has been deployed at the borders, frontiers are heavily guarded, and policies to speed up repatriation are stricter and more efficient than those in Italy; there have also been disputes with the judiciary, which have made it more difficult to manage immigration by encroaching on the powers of the legislature and the executive.

In recent years, when faced with irregular immigration, the Italian progressive movement has never found the words to explain its view on security – it is easier to attack the demagoguery of one’s opponents – it has boycotted the Pact on Migration and Asylum, signed by Meloni and also by Sánchez, and has criticised the European Union every time it has attempted to implement innovative solutions to try to secure its borders. The Ceuta case, as our David Carretta points out, could demonstrate that the ‘harsh’ measures envisaged by the EU in the new Pact on Migration and Asylum to deal with cases such as this – ‘expedited rejection of asylum applications, detention capacity and rapid return’ – may not be sufficient and could even collapse. On the one hand, the populism of autarky acknowledges the problems but sidesteps the solutions. On the other hand, the populism of naivety fails to recognise the problems and offers no solutions. When it comes to managing immigration, there are no simple solutions, but there are many mistakes that are easy to spot when tackling the issue. A sensible policy, one that seeks to educate its followers rather than merely being led by them, should immediately call for Frontex to intervene and announce the suspension of all agreements with Morocco, at least until Morocco takes back all irregular migrants who have arrived in Ceuta (a large proportion are already returning), and should promote a review of international conventions to restore clearer policy margins, whilst respecting fundamental rights, thereby preventing judges – from Italy to Spain – from using their powers to have the final say on migration policies. There are no simple solutions, but there are simple mistakes to recognise. The populism of deportations may work within an algorithm, but in reality it risks triggering an invasion no less dangerous than the surge in irregular immigration: propaganda, demagoguery, scapegoats – problems which, rather than being resolved, tend to multiply. It says Ceuta, but it reads ‘reality’.