The rule of law explained with Revolut

The Revolut case, precedents in town planning, fashion and the speed with which guarantees are applied to businesses. What does it mean to have a justice system which, in the name of moralisation, overflows and breaks delicate embankments (just ask the Bank of Italy)?
17 NOV 26
Translated by AI
Image of The rule of law explained with Revolut

Photo: Getty

The ‘creative justice’ department of the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office, responsible for judicial overreach and the media coverage of criminal proceedings, yesterday opened a new chapter in its long-running saga by turning the spotlight on one of Europe’s best-known banks: Revolut. Revolut, as you know, is a fintech group founded in the United Kingdom in 2015: it offers banking services primarily via an app (current accounts, cards, bank transfers), operates within the European Union via a bank licensed in Lithuania, serves millions of customers worldwide and, in Italy, has become the country’s third-largest bank by number of customers (six million, 60 per cent of whom are under 35). Yesterday, at the request of the public prosecutor’s office and following a series of investigations by the Guardia di Finanza, the Court of Milan ordered a one-year period of judicial administration for Revolut’s Italian operations, with administrators appointed to support senior management in anti-money laundering controls, without replacing them. The allegation is as follows: inadequate internal anti-money laundering controls, which, according to the investigators, allowed individuals under investigation or convicted of serious offences to move millions of euros without adequate reporting. So much for the news report. But alongside the news report, there is a necessary interpretation that deserves to be considered alongside it.
This analysis concerns a long-standing trend within the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office, which in recent years has become the tip of the iceberg of judicial overreach. For some time now, the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office has led us to regard it as entirely natural for criminal proceedings to be pursued with the aim of moralising the country. And within this paradigm shift, the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office has, with some regularity, breached certain boundaries. It has done so in the field of town planning, to disastrous effect, by reclassifying what could at most be considered minor transgressions as criminal offences, and thereby arrogating to itself the right to intervene in a city’s town planning policies – not on the basis of the principle of legality (criminal offence or not), but primarily on the basis of the principle of morality (right or wrong). Over the course of several months, the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office has also come to prominence for a series of aggressive actions carried out by Public Prosecutor Paolo Storari, who also led the investigations into Revolut and who, whilst undoubtedly motivated by the best of intentions, has brought virtually everything under the prosecutor’s office’s scrutiny, investigating numerous companies and, in some cases, judicial administration measures against companies involved in various capacities in the Milanese inquiries into public procurement, labour and supply chains (DHL, Esselunga, Carrefour, GLS, BRT, Uber, Securitalia, Lidl, GXO, Amazon, FedEx, Armani, Dior, Alviero Martini, Tod’s and many others). In a country where the political leadership has resigned itself to the fact that the judiciary may be entitled to define migration policies, industrial policies, environmental policies and urban planning policies, it is hardly surprising that yesterday’s court-ordered administration of Revolut in Italy is viewed as just another step in the process, dictated by the judicial authorities’ simple desire to protect Revolut’s customers: if there is a problem with inadequate supervision, the sooner action is taken, the better, isn’t it?
The problem, however, is that the way in which the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office has handled the Revolut case perfectly reflects the desire of a section of the Italian judiciary to assume full powers for itself, so as to more easily fulfil the role of the country’s sole and supreme moral arbiter. In this specific case, the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office, drawing on the immense powers granted to public prosecutors and courts by the Anti-Mafia Code, has in effect chosen to act in place of the Bank of Italy, which is responsible for overseeing anti-money laundering measures at banks operating in Italy. According to information obtained by Il Foglio, the Bank of Italy had been aware, since 2024, of a number of legal proceedings against individuals who had carried out transactions via Revolut accounts, and the Bank of Italy itself had subjected Revolut to a series of inspections. However, the absence of the words ‘Bank of Italy’ in the statement issued yesterday by the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office, announcing that Revolut had been placed under special administration, is indicative of a discrepancy that is not merely formal in nature. The devil is in the details, but it is in the details that the rule of law is sometimes hidden. The placing of institutions under special administration by the Bank of Italy usually follows a lengthy process comprising not only inspections and discussions, but also evidence – and not merely circumstantial evidence.
Receiverships initiated by a public prosecutor’s office, on the other hand, can take place even without the caution that a Bank of Italy procedure must, by contrast, exercise. And if one considers the imposition of an invasive measure, such as a receivership, against an entity – such as a bank – which manages people’s savings, thrives on trust and operates under the supervision of specialised Italian and European authorities, it will not take long to realise that the impact of the public prosecutor’s office’s actions extends beyond the reputational consequences this may have for Revolut; it also concerns the notion that a country such as Italy could accept the judiciary acting unchecked in situations where other bodies should have the authority to intervene before the judiciary does. And here too, the differences between the two approaches go beyond mere technicalities. The Bank of Italy has the tools to rectify serious irregularities, including by intervening in the management of banks, through procedures subject to safeguards and judicial oversight. The Anti-Mafia Code, on the other hand, allows a judge to intervene more swiftly and preventatively, even before liability has been definitively established (a further detail: the order appointing a judicial administrator cannot be challenged, whilst the Bank of Italy’s measures can be contested before an administrative court).
The issue is therefore clear: how much scope is afforded to the company’s defence when the state intervenes in its management? This is not a new issue. A source working within the traditional banking system points out that the alarm regarding the risk of judicial substitution in banking supervision was first raised as early as July 2023 by a study published by the Bank of Italy itself. In Legal Research Notebook No. 97, edited by Olina Capolino, it was observed that Article 97-bis of the Consolidated Banking Act grants supervisory authorities significant powers to intervene in the management of banks. Even at that time, an anomaly was highlighted: for the judicial administration provided for under Article 34 of the Anti-Mafia Code, ‘there is no explicit provision for coordination with sector-specific regulations’. Of course, this is not about delving into the substance of the issues raised by the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office. Nor is it about seeking to shield banks from the law. It is simply a matter of not turning a blind eye to a broader issue, one that concerns banks as much as it does urban planning, the industrial sector and environmental policies: simply ensuring that the rule of law is protected from disproportionate interventions by the judiciary. Above all, it is a matter of ensuring that those doing business in Italy face a state eager to act by placing greater emphasis on a culture of safeguards rather than a culture of suspicion. These are not mere technicalities, but the difference between a state interested in having a judiciary that knows how to stay within its bounds and a state keen to promote a judiciary capable of playing a substitute role aimed at doing what perhaps falls outside its remit: expanding its powers to act more swiftly in its attempts to reform the country’s moral standards.