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The editor’s editorial •
The Trump–Putin axis against Europe
Strike at it, wear it down, divide it. The parallels between Trump and Putin do not concern Kyiv alone, but Europe first and foremost. Telltale signs, shared fears, common desires. Possible responses to avoid ending up on the menu

There are hybrid wars that we are desperate to see, but which remain to be verified, such as the one which, according to many observers, involves the invisible hand of Putinism, which may have played a part in fuelling the spiral of violence that suddenly erupted in the streets of major European cities. Then, however, there are hybrid wars that are right there before our eyes and which, despite everything, we stubbornly refuse to see, attempting to repress them and play them down. The first hybrid war – that involving children – deserves in-depth analysis and caution. The second hybrid war, concerning Europe, demands attention and understanding. This is a conflict that must be highlighted forcefully, not because it is ignored, but because it is often pigeonholed within a misleading framework.
It is often said that the provocations, escalations and threats that Putin’s Russia directs at Europe are directly and exclusively linked to the support Europe offers to Ukraine. The pattern is one we are familiar with: if you support Kyiv, you are exposed to Russian incursions; if you do not support Kyiv, you are safe. There is an element of truth to this pattern: if you are a European country that strongly supports Ukraine, there is a greater likelihood that your support for Ukraine will not be welcomed by Putin; however, the pattern as presented here reveals only half the truth.
The other truth was decisively highlighted by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz two days ago, who, despite the myriad challenges and difficulties in reaching consensus, has not lost his political clarity. And in an interview with Bloomberg, Merz shed light on an important truth. “What worries me most is Russia’s underestimated influence on our societies. Russia is seeking to destabilise the entire political order of our European continent. And this is not just about territorial gains in Ukraine. They fear democracy; they fear open societies and the success of European integration.” Merz makes an important point that helps us understand what lies behind Donald Trump’s inability to resist the temptation to embrace Vladimir Putin and sacrifice Ukraine on the altar of a new world balance – the new triangle whose vertices, in Trump’s logic, should be occupied by the architects of a new Yalta of global disorder: Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping. The point is simple to grasp.
The war of aggression waged by Putin against Ukraine is not merely a matter of the imperialist instinct of ‘Putinism’; it concerns a broader issue, which Putin himself has acknowledged: the idea that an alternative to the Putinist system could thrive menacingly on Russia’s borders. In this sense, the war in Ukraine today forms part of a wider conflict at the heart of which lies a converging interest between Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia: to weaken the European Union, limit its power, curb its integration, bet on disorder, and support the professionals of chaos. Putin does this by attempting to intimidate European countries, testing the resilience of democracies, making support for Ukraine a divisive issue within European public debate, and providing support – whether purely political or not – to Eurosceptic parties and their Trojan horses.
Trump does this by supporting Eurosceptic parties, betting on the division of the European Union, creating disincentives to integration, imposing tariffs on European markets and expressing a desire to disengage from Ukraine, a desire manifested in the diesel agreements with Putin, the threats against Zelensky, the fluctuations in U.S. intelligence support for Ukraine, the overtures to Putin, and the desire to regard Ukraine as part of the problem rather than the solution within any potential peace negotiations; it is a piece of a larger picture in which there is an objective mirroring Putin’s: to destabilise Europe.
Merz’s attempt to raise awareness of Russia’s long-term strategy against the cohesion and credibility of European security institutions is not an isolated one. A few months ago, the fourth report by the European External Action Service on information manipulation and interference, published in March 2026 and covering 2025, during a period prior to the escalation of Russian incursions into European airspace, clearly described how the objective of Russian campaigns extends far beyond the war in Ukraine and is aimed at undermining confidence in the EU, slowing down Ukraine’s accession to the EU, limiting the strengthening of European defence capabilities and dampening European countries’ support for Ukraine. Margus Tsahkna, the Estonian Foreign Minister, then stated explicitly on 8 October that “Russia’s objective is not simply to conquer certain Ukrainian territories, but to change the entire European security order”.
Ken McCallum, Director of the British MI5, added an interesting point on 13 October 2026 in his annual update on threats to national security: that for the United Kingdom “Russia remains the number one aggressor”, that Moscow is deliberately seeking to destabilise other European countries whilst struggling to achieve results on the ground in Ukraine, and that over the last ten years the volume of MI5 investigations into threats from foreign states has quadrupled, with the service dedicating more resources to these threats in 2026 than it did during the Cold War. Emmanuel Macron, the French President, on 24 September 2026, in turn, in a television interview with TF1 and France 2, said that “Russia regards Europe as Ukraine’s strategic depth”. Finally, on 17 September 2026, speaking before the Polish Parliament, Donald Tusk, the Polish Prime Minister, added a further piece to the picture: “To stir up hostility against the European Union, against our allies, against the Ukrainians means directly implementing the Russian strategy”.
Trump and Putin dream of jointly defining Ukraine’s new borders; they dream of jointly defining the new borders of democracies; they dream of engineering negotiations in which Europe, having no seat at the table, risks constantly ending up on the menu. Faced with this dual threat, Europe has begun to take action; it has attempted to launch a diplomatic initiative, with the German Foreign Minister meeting the Russian Foreign Minister, whilst the Finnish President also met with Witkoff and Zelensky in Oslo – and when Europe is under pressure, it usually gives its best.
But to manage threats, as well as weapons, we also need our wits; and to prevent Europe from remaining on the global geopolitical menu for long, the underlying issue is this: we must begin to understand that the Putin threat is not merely a matter concerning Ukraine’s very existence, but one that concerns the future of our Europe. Those who refuse to grasp this will end up on the menu. Those who try to understand it may find a way to react, to prepare, to equip themselves and to deal with a hybrid war – and not just a hybrid one – far more dangerous than that posed by the menacingly branded, hooded children on the streets of Milan.
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Nasce a Palermo nel 1982, vive a Roma da parecchio tempo, lavora al Foglio dal 2005 e da gennaio 2015 è direttore. Ha scritto qualche libro (“Le catene della destra” e “Le catene della sinistra”, con Rizzoli, “Io non posso tacere”, con Einaudi, “Tra l’asino e il cane. Conversazione sull’Italia”, con Rizzoli, “La Presa di Roma”, con Rizzoli, e "Ho visto l'uomo nero", con Castelvecchi), è su Twitter.
E’ interista, ma soprattutto palermitano. Va pazzo per i Green Day, gli Strokes, i Killers, i tortini al cioccolato e le ostriche ghiacciate. Due figli.
