Is it a problem if anti-Semitic language becomes the norm in Germany?

When over forty per cent of voters support parties outside the political centre, it is hardly possible to exclude them from government responsibilities. Yet a creeping normalisation of the language and behaviour of extremists, on both the right and the left, is taking place. This is evident in the reversal of responsibilities following 7 October

8 OCT 26
Translated by AI
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The autumn of 2026 has set Germany on a new political course. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) stands at 30 per cent in the polls. A third of voters are prepared to vote for a party that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution classifies as an organisation suspected of right-wing extremism. In Berlin, Die Linke has won the elections and is closely linked to pro-Palestinian groups that espouse forms of anti-Semitism directed against Israel. The political centre is under increasing pressure, whilst the extremes, on both the right and the left, are gaining strength.
An example: in the state of Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD is set to appoint its first Minister-President shortly, with the support of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), which emerged from Die Linke. It is a sign of the times. The extremes are forming a politically effective alliance. Under pressure to form governments, however, even the political centre is willing to accept what is considered politically incompatible. “No anti-Semitism”, they say, yet in Berlin a coalition comprising Die Linke, the SPD and the Greens is taking shape. Katharina Dröge, the Greens’ parliamentary group leader in the Bundestag, considers such an alliance possible at federal level too. The Minister-President of Hesse, Boris Rhein (CDU), wants to allow the AfD access to certain key parliamentary posts. All this seems to follow logically from a democratic perspective. When over forty per cent of voters support parties outside the political centre, it is hardly possible to exclude them from government responsibilities. Yet a creeping normalisation of the language and behaviour of extremists is taking place, on both the right and the left. This is evident in the reversal of responsibilities that followed 7 October.
Humanitarian solidarity with the people of Gaza gives rise to more than mere political criticism of the Israeli government. In these circles, Hamas terrorists are portrayed as freedom fighters and victims of an oppressive regime. Time and again, anti-Semitic undertones emerge, as seen in the BDS campaign. To claim that there are only isolated anti-Semitic views within the AfD and Die Linke is to downplay the situation. Because it is becoming socially acceptable to discuss their positions. Their language is finding its way into the everyday discourse of talk shows. This rhetorical normalisation has consequences for the culture of political debate.
For Jews in Germany, this development is alarming. Three years after Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, antisemitism is taking root in mainstream society. It is true that both the AfD and Die Linke declare that antisemitism has no place in their parties. However, their public statements are not reflected in the policies they actually pursue. For example, a high proportion of AfD voters agree with anti-Semitic stereotypes. The AfD’s pro-Israel stance serves primarily as a tool of domestic politics. It is used to draw a line of demarcation against Islam and to emphasise the party’s xenophobic stance. As in the case of Die Linke in Berlin, when anti-Semitic slogans are adopted, no firm action is taken.
This development reflects a climate in which political consensus is crumbling. The Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949 on the conviction that human dignity is inviolable. Christian beliefs played a decisive role for many of the founding fathers. The conviction that the Holocaust must never be repeated became the foundation of the Federal Republic’s political identity. Solidarity with Israel is a matter of national interest, as Angela Merkel and others have stated. Yet synagogues in Germany continue to be under police protection, which has been stepped up since 7 October. The number of anti-Semitic attacks is on the rise – perpetrated not only by radicalised sympathisers of Hamas and ISIS, but also by members of the far right.
The Churches in Germany have taken an unequivocal stance on this issue. In the ‘Statement by the German Bishops on Ethnonationalism’, the German Bishops’ Conference emphasised that ‘ethnonationalism is incompatible with the Christian conception of God and of human beings’. For decades, the bishops have not issued voting recommendations. In the face of rising right-wing extremism, this situation is changing. On election day in Saxony-Anhalt, the local bishop, Gerhard Feige, called on people to “resist the evil spirit of nationalism and xenophobia”. The Bishop of Erfurt, Ulrich Neymeyr, who is responsible for relations with the Jewish community within the German Bishops’ Conference (DBK), sees in the AfD a tendency to “belittle the culture of remembrance of the Holocaust”. The consequences are evident in attacks such as the one on the synagogue in Halle seven years ago: “If the Holocaust is trivialised, the step towards justifying it becomes relatively short, and the step towards its repetition is just as short.”
Society and the Churches are facing this challenge. In the autumn of 2026, the situation will reach a critical point because the condemnation of anti-Semitism – once taken for granted – is losing ground. For decades, the Christian Democrats have been the dominant party in the Federal Republic of Germany. But just as the formative influence of Christianity is in decline, the Union (CDU/CSU) has also lost its role as a people’s party. The churches have not exerted any discernible influence on recent elections. Their ability to hold society together is diminishing. Today, less than half the population belongs to a church. The number of people attending religious services has become negligible.
This is accompanied by a shift in religious culture that has political repercussions. Where there is no living connection with Judaism, solidarity falters. It finds expression in church liturgies, particularly in the Old Testament readings. It is here that memory takes on a tangible form and a sense of shared belonging with Judaism becomes perceptible. When this connection dissolves, the religious foundation of what Germany has hitherto committed to politically – that anti-Semitism must have no place – crumbles. This consensus was already under scrutiny before 7 October, but has been increasingly so since then. The process of becoming accustomed to the unthinkable is advancing.
Gregor Maria Hoff, lecturer in Fundamental Theology and Ecumenical Theology at the University of Salzburg