Understanding Putin’s blackmail of Europe

There are two different approaches to following up on the news published yesterday by El Mundo, according to which, based on information passed on by the CIA to European governments, Russia may be preparing drone attacks by sea against Italy, Spain or France. The first approach is one of downplaying the situation: there is no threat, there is no need to dramatise matters, we are not in danger, Russia would never harm us. The second approach is one of self-blame: can’t you see what happens when we play with fire, when we pit ourselves against Russia’s firepower and challenge Putin on the military front? There is also a third way, a third approach, which should be adopted by those who try to call a spade a spade, by those who try not to turn a blind eye to a problem, and by those who are not afraid to recognise that alongside the presence of a concrete threat there is also blatant blackmail: ‘Stop defending Ukraine,’ Putin tells us, ‘if you do not want to face serious trouble.’ Minister Guido Crosetto said yesterday that “the alarm raised by a Spanish newspaper speculating about possible attacks on Italy, Spain and France by Russian ships and drones serves no purpose and is entirely unsubstantiated” and that adding further fuel to the fire serves no one’s interests – a point one cannot help but acknowledge (thankfully). Yet to come to terms with Putin’s intimidation tactics in Europe, we must not focus on a single news item, a single warning or a single incident. We need to broaden our perspective and realise that a threat remains a threat; several threats become a danger; many threats become a plan.

Yesterday, the Danish intelligence services issued an official document warning the public of the following: Russia will step up acts of sabotage and hybrid attacks against the West and NATO in the coming months. On 18 September, at the Élysée Palace, President Emmanuel Macron, having convened the leaders of all French political parties, warned that in the face of the Russian threat, ‘no one is safe’. On 20 September, the heads of the intelligence services of the Czech Republic, Latvia and Sweden stated, in three separate declarations, that Russian sabotage in Europe would increase (according to the head of the Czech intelligence service, this activity will involve the increased use of drones, limited incursions into NATO territory, provocations and influence campaigns). On 18 September, a confidential memo from the French intelligence services reported by France Télévisions claimed that the scenario of a possible major Russian attack, previously anticipated around 2030, must now be brought forward to the autumn of 2027.

On 17 September, the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, claimed that ‘according to the assessment of the intelligence services’, Russian plans now include, in a short-term scenario, hybrid attacks using drones and missiles against states supporting Ukraine, including Poland. On 15 September, the US Department of Justice made public charges against five individuals alleged to have worked for Russian intelligence services and to have paid, or attempted to pay, people in the United States and other countries to carry out surveillance and targeted killings, “as well as instructing accomplices to carry out or attempt acts of terrorism against civilian and military infrastructure in European countries aligned with Ukraine”On 14 September, a transnational investigation—based in part on classified documents and intelligence sources—reconstructed Russia’s use of ‘disposable agents’, recruited online and deployed for surveillance and sabotage. On 4 September, a few days after Russia was blamed for the attempted drone attack on Leipzig-Halle Airport, the Swedish Security Service, Säpo, reported that Russian behaviour had become “more risk-taking and aggressive”, citing the use of various means through which Russia seeks to undermine Sweden’s willingness and ability to support Ukraine.

Meanwhile, to mention just a few incidents from the past month, Romania and Estonia reported separate incidents during a night of intense Russian and Ukrainian air activity: a drone struck the locomotive of a passenger train bound for Warsaw, a Russian frigate fired two flares at a Danish military helicopter, a drone carrying explosives was shot down in Lithuania by Italian Eurofighters, a Russian drone violated Moldovan airspace, and a Russian Mi-8 briefly violated Polish airspace. The aim of Russia’s intimidation tactics, as reported yesterday by El Mundo, remains the same: to reduce support for Ukraine, to divide NATO and to frighten the European public. In light of these events, it would be worth recalling what happened the last time intelligence warnings about Russia were underestimated (those who today claim that Russia is not a threat, or that if it is, it is our own fault, argued in February 2022 that Russia would never attack Ukraine, and even then, the West, which was trying to defend itself, was accused of being the instigator of an escalation). It would be worth remembering that the threats from the sponsors of terror do not become any less threatening simply because they are fed through the ‘Google Translate’ of downplaying by the sleepwalkers (Putin is not as he is portrayed).

Finally, it would be worth remembering that, when faced with a threat that becomes a danger and then a deliberate plan, there is only one way to defend Europe, apart from investing in our defence: to take the threat seriously, to call a spade a spade, to support Ukraine as never before, to continue sending Ukraine the weapons that can help it defend itself, not to be blackmailed by Putin’s scheme, and to ask ourselves every time we are about to comment on an event concerning Putin’s aggression whether what we are about to say, do or think might help Putin achieve his objectives or not. “I do not comment on reports from open sources regarding national intelligence, nor on what the Allies may have exchanged,” Italian Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, told Il Foglio yesterday. “I can say, however, that NATO does not view threats from a single perspective. Our approach is all-encompassing: the eastern flank and the Mediterranean are part of the same security space. Recent incidents demonstrate that hybrid actions, including drones launched from unexpected platforms, aim to test our reactions, create uncertainty and divide us. They will not succeed. The Allies are sharing information, strengthening air and maritime surveillance, and adapting their anti-drone posture and capabilities. The message to those who think they can test us is very simple: NATO is vigilant, united and ready to defend every centimetre of Allied territory, from north to south.” The aim of Russian intimidation is always the same: to reduce support for Ukraine, divide NATO and frighten the European public. To avoid alarming the public in the face of news such as that reported by El Mundo, rather than denying that there is a problem, it might be worth asking ourselves what we can do to continue defending the boundaries of our democracy and avoid becoming useful idiots of Putinism.