Crosetto isn’t waiting for Aspides. The diesel issue

Speaking at the Risorsa Mare Forum in La Spezia, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto announced that he and the Chief of the Defence Staff had decided not to wait for the Aspides and to have the Navy ensure the safe passage of Italian ships through the Bab el Mandeb Strait. Crosetto has already informed the president of the shipowners’ association. The number of vessels to be deployed has not yet been decided: the decision will be taken by the government and Parliament. Technically, however, the way forward already exists. An Italian frigate could lower the European flag and temporarily opt out of Aspides’ directives for the duration of the escort mission. However, nothing is set in stone. High Representative Kaja Kallas could issue new directives, and the final say on the mission rests with the commander, Greek Admiral Gryparis. In recent days, an average of 27 ships per day have passed through the strait. 

The threat is very real: as of today, the Houthis control the entire Yemeni Red Sea coastline, the island of Perim and the Hanish Islands, and between 8 and 16 September they are reported to have dug some twenty kilometres of trenches around the strait. What is striking, however, is the minister’s choice of vocabulary, which is more akin to that of a Minister for the Economy than a Minister of Defence. Crosetto explained that delaying action in cases such as this means “holding back the economy”, because when a shipping route is disrupted, goods arrive late and prices rise for households and businesses. It is difficult not to view this insistence through the lens of the current oil crisis. Following the 10 September attack on the Saudi East-West oil pipeline, according to market sources cited by the energy pricing agency Argus, Aramco has cancelled or postponed until November the late-September shipments destined for at least three European refineries. At the same time, the closure of the Libyan Hamada-Zawiya pipeline brought three production sites to a standstill, and Libya is Italy’s leading supplier. Brent crude was trading at around $108, with physical shipments to Europe significantly more expensive.

Italy’s weakness, however, lies not so much in crude oil as in diesel. According to the Bank of Italy, in 2025 the Gulf states supplied Italy with around 10 per cent of its crude oil but a quarter of its refined products, mainly from Saudi Arabia, with a higher level of dependence than that of the other major eurozone countries. The European average stands at 11.9 per cent. In the first quarter of 2026, according to provisional data from Mase, this share rose to 30 per cent, with 74 per cent of imported diesel coming from the Gulf, compared with 56.6 per cent the previous year. This tension is reflected in prices: according to Argus, in early September the diesel margin in southern Europe exceeded $100 per barrel for the first time.

The link with Bab el Mandeb, however, must be handled with caution. With the Strait of Hormuz closed, Saudi oil can only be shipped from refineries on the Red Sea, which lie north of the strait and head towards Suez: no escort at Bab el Mandeb protects them, nor does it bring back the shipments cancelled by Aramco. The strait, on the other hand, is important for Europe as a whole. According to the analytics firm Vortexa, in August around 200,000 barrels a day of diesel bound for Europe passed through it, 60 per cent of which came from India, after those flows had almost come to a standstill in March and April. It is the last functioning leg of the eastern route, on the eve of a winter that Europe is facing with very low stocks. It is not known how much of that diesel reaches Italy, and Vortexa itself warns that the flow depends more on Indian refineries than on the Strait. The assumption is that the government wants to prevent that last door from closing as well, and above all to reassure shipowners and insurers, on whom freight rates and risk premiums depend. 

What is certain is that Italy’s move does not mark a break with its allies. Washington met with the Houthis in Muscat, securing a commitment not to target American, Israeli or commercial vessels, with the exception of Saudi ones. But these are temporary agreements, and the Americans’ channel of communication with Riyadh remains open. On Thursday, the State Department approved the potential sale of 48 F-35s to Saudi Arabia for $24.3 billion. The United States is not directly involved in the war in Yemen, but it provides intelligence and target data, and around two hundred American military personnel are in the kingdom on support duties. Next Tuesday, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Trump will meet with leaders or foreign ministers from the six Gulf states to discuss the next steps in the war with Iran and the post-war period.

In short, it remains to be seen what the Italian ships will actually be escorting. If the Houthis keep the promise they made to the Americans and strike only Saudi targets, the protection will serve primarily to instil confidence in those who must decide whether to cross the strait or sail round Africa. It is there, in the costs of a longer route, that the military issue intersects with that of pricing.