A review of the Paris space summit: between old habits and new ambitions

The international space summit organised in Paris is an initiative that reflects certain characteristics of French diplomacy. France boasts a long tradition of multilateralism and is characterised by the predominant role of the president. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that Emmanuel Macron has invested heavily in the digital sector, from the ‘Choose France’ initiative – designed to attract technological investment – to the AI Summit in February 2025. With its mix of institutional representatives and private-sector decision-makers, the Space Summit replicates a successful formula for the space sector. The announcement of an agreement between the United Arab Emirates-based company Marlan Space and the French firm Loft Orbital to build a constellation of 50 observation satellites, incorporating artificial intelligence technologies developed by the French firm Mistral AI, provides a good example of the showcase effect of the Paris event. While the end of Emmanuel Macron’s term in office limits his domestic initiatives, on the international stage this type of event allows him to make an impact, advancing issues related to the strategic importance of technology and autonomy at European level – concepts he has been promoting for years. The fact that this summit is being held in Paris offers a different tone to that of gatherings in Brussels, such as the annual European Space Conference. In Paris, European positions were set out, but with an emphasis on the intergovernmental dimension, almost as a reminder that, in strategic domains, it is the Member States that hold the leadership, and not the Commission.

This summit also enabled Emmanuel Macron to prolong the debates on how to regulate technology within a transatlantic context. The absence of SpaceX and Blue Origin, two US giants in the sector, served both sides of the Atlantic to highlight their differences on regulation, with the US Administration continuing to oppose European regulatory initiatives. However, behind this apparent tension, it should be noted that the entire US space sector was represented in Paris, from the private sector right through to the institutions. On the German side, too, the absence of Friedrich Merz, due to internal political difficulties, was widely commented upon. Nevertheless, German ministers and officials did not miss the opportunity to take centre stage in Paris.

In the 21st century, we have witnessed a resurgence in global space activities, in the wake of the American ‘New Space’ movement. In Europe, this trend has led both to increased investment and to a relative renationalisation of space, particularly in countries such as Germany and Italy, which in the past had relied heavily on the resources of the ESA and the Commission. This aspect is particularly evident in the field of launch vehicles: alongside the traditional Ariane rocket, the result of French-led European cooperation, we first saw the emergence of the Italian Vega launch vehicle, and then, last week, witnessed the maiden flight of the German Isar Aerospace rocket – a success that paves the way for other small German, French or Spanish launch vehicles, projects driven by national agendas. We also see this trend in the satellite sector. The Iris 2 programme for a European telecommunications satellite constellation was launched in 2022, driven by political impetus from the European Commission, with Thierry Breton rightly highlighting concerns about potential dependence on US systems such as Starlink.

In Paris, various statements have emphasised the progress of the constellation, with the awarding of various industrial contracts, including to the Franco-Italian company Thales Alenia Space, which will supply secure digital payloads. However, Germany has decided to invest substantial resources in space technologies, with a budget of 35 billion for defence-related capabilities, which will enable it to develop its own secure communications constellation, SatcomBW4. Efforts are now being made to ensure that Iris 2 and SatcomBW4 can work to their mutual benefit, but this duplication signals a clear shift in German policy, which – partly to address the needs of its industry’s transformation – intends to prioritise national developments. Although not heralding any epoch-making changes, this summit demonstrates the effectiveness of French technological diplomacy: whilst it cannot govern the entire Union, it positions itself as a hub for European growth – a dynamic context that represents an advantage in terms of technological capability and, consequently, autonomy.