Meloni and Sánchez are at loggerheads over Ceuta whilst covering up Morocco’s culpability

The Meloni government’s reaction to the Ceuta crisis, with its decision to suspend the Schengen Agreement with Spain, was undoubtedly driven by domestic political considerations: to condemn the lax approach of a government allied with Elly Schlein’s PD and to flex its muscles on immigration in order to stem the rise of General Vannacci. But in Spain too, the Sánchez government’s similar response has domestic reasons: to confront a right-wing government allied with Vox and to divert attention from problems with Morocco. This difference in treatment – inexplicably cordial towards Rabat and excessively harsh towards Rome – has been highlighted on several occasions by the Spanish opposition parties.

From 31 July – the day after 70,000–80,000 migrants from Morocco invaded the Spanish exclave in Africa – and throughout the following month, the Spanish government consistently thanked the Moroccan authorities for their ‘cooperation’ and categorically ruled out any responsibility on the part of the regime of Muhammad VI, despite ample evidence to the contrary. By contrast, on 30 July, after Foreign Minister Tajani announced the closure of the Schengen border with Madrid and criticised the government’s migration policies, his counterpart José Manuel Albares described Tajani’s message as “unworthy” and summoned the Italian ambassador the following day in protest. On 25 August, when Morocco’s responsibility was by then clear, the People’s Party spokesperson in Congress, Ester Muñoz, pressed Defence Minister Margarita Robles during a hearing: “Why did the government not summon the Moroccan ambassador after his Justice Minister claimed that Ceuta and Melilla belong to Morocco? Why have you sparked a diplomatic row with Italy and not with Morocco?” A few days later, on 28 August, again during a parliamentary hearing, when asked a similar question as to why the government had summoned the Italian ambassador within a few hours but not the Moroccan one, Foreign Minister Albares replied cryptically: “The summoning of ambassadors is rarely made public.”

In fact, what nobody knew—because the government had kept it confidential—was that the Moroccan ambassador had already been summoned. Pedro Sánchez revealed this yesterday during a speech to Parliament on the Ceuta crisis: “We have heard two [Moroccan] ministers make unacceptable statements regarding Ceuta and Melilla,” said the Prime Minister, referring to Moroccan claims over the sovereignty of the two Spanish cities, “two statements for which, I wish to inform you, we summoned the Moroccan ambassador on 21 August.” What Sánchez failed to mention, as Spanish newspapers later revealed, is that the Moroccan ambassador was not in Spain at the time and that the meeting never took place: a chargé d’affaires attended in her stead. In any case, the ministry made no mention of the meeting or the protests “out of caution”. Such discretion was not observed in other diplomatic crises, such as those Spain has recently experienced with Israel, Argentina and Italy. In essence, the Spanish government reacted harshly to Italy’s action regarding Schengen by publicly escalating the diplomatic row, whilst keeping secret the summoning of the ambassador from a country whose military – according to evidence gathered by the Spanish police – ‘led’ the invasion of Ceuta, which Sánchez considers a ‘violation of territorial integrity’ – and whose ministers publicly claim sovereignty over two Spanish cities.

On the other hand, the Italian authorities’ behaviour has been no different. Just as Madrid did, Rome has also taken great care to avoid attributing responsibility to Morocco for the violation of a border which – as Italy always insists in the case of Lampedusa and the Mediterranean coast – is a ‘European border’. For the Italian government, however, the blame lies with the “regularisation of over 500,000 migrants” decided by the Sánchez government. Yet the regularisation has nothing to do with it. Firstly, because right-wing governments in Italy have carried out such measures in the past – and on a much larger scale – without this leading to mass influxes. Secondly, because there is no temporal link with the Ceuta crisis. Thirdly, because there is no reference to the measure in the reports from the Spanish police and intelligence services. Fourthly, because, according to the latest figures, the regularisation has led to an increase of 338,000 foreign nationals registered with Social Security, alongside a slight rise in unemployment: this means that the vast majority of undocumented migrants in Spain were already working (off the books) or found employment immediately.

In essence, whilst they are publicly squabbling amongst themselves over internal political positioning, the Sánchez and Meloni governments agree on one thing: not to pin the blame on Morocco for the Ceuta crisis and, more generally, not to upset the regimes that blackmail Europe by controlling migration flows. Warnings about the danger of ‘hybrid’ attacks on Europe are pointless if, whilst they are happening right before our eyes, we choose to look the other way.