Iran wants to use the Houthis, but its resources in Yemen are limited

Tel Aviv. “It’s more about mutual self-interest than trust. The truce is based, in fact, not on a formal commitment, but on a convergence of interests. The United States and Iran have concluded that maintaining the status quo is more advantageous than a resumption of the conflict,” Ari Heistein, a researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), tells Il Foglio. In Yemen, on the other hand, the Shi’ite Houthi group could play a crucial role in the coming days, due to its position on the Red Sea: “Whilst Hormuz is the eastern gateway for Gulf oil trade, Bab el-Mandeb – under the military control of the Houthis – represents the western gateway, linking the Red Sea to the Suez Canal”.

In this geopolitical context, the role of Saudi Arabia is also coming to the fore; its military intervention against the Shia group between 2015 and 2022 has proved far longer and more complex than the Saudis could ever have imagined. Whilst until a few years ago Riyadh was Iran’s and the Houthis’ main regional adversary, today the Saudi monarchy wishes to prevent a new war in the Gulf, as this could jeopardise the success of the ‘Vision 2030’ plan, through which Mohammed bin Salman aims to transform the Saudi economy by reducing its dependence on oil: “An open conflict could jeopardise energy infrastructure, foreign investment and all major tourism and industrial projects. It would also undermine the image of reliability that the kingdom is seeking to build. It is therefore entirely in Saudi Arabia’s interest to keep both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea open, preventing the entire region from once again being perceived as a theatre of war.”

According to Heistein, Tehran has already asked the Houthis to prepare for possible counter-attacks should the United States strike Iranian energy infrastructure, thereby turning the Yemeni group into a strategic deterrent for Iran. The analyst explains that, after years of war against the Houthis, Riyadh knows that a resurgence of the group would bring the conflict right back to its own borders and once again put oil facilities, airports and strategic infrastructure in the line of fire: “The Houthis are frustrated by Riyadh’s refusal to meet their main demands: the provision of billions of dollars and the lifting of import restrictions. But they are also aware that a military escalation would not help their economic situation, which is already in deep crisis, and that, on the contrary, it would risk accelerating its collapse. For their part, the Saudis see no reason to rush into signing an agreement that would involve the transfer of billions of dollars to a terrorist organisation based on their own borders. Abdulmalik al-Houthi’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric – Heistein continues – can therefore be interpreted in two ways: either to prepare the population for a new war, or, more likely, to try to fuel the perception that Saudi Arabia is on the brink of a new conflict. This threat would represent the main means of exerting pressure to secure concessions from Riyadh. However, this short-term strategy rests on shaky ground, as the Saudis are well aware of the Houthis’ internal weaknesses, particularly in recent months, with the deterioration of relations with many of the tribes in northern Yemen.”

This has never been an issue confined to Hormuz; that is why one of the US’s initial demands in the war against Iran was to put an end to the network of alliances linking the Iranian regime to groups such as the Houthis or Hezbollah, which Tehran uses to protect its interests. At present, the Saudis, who had pushed for the truce, are once again on high alert in the face of an Iran perceived as a major regional problem.