The enemy is at the portal

Sabotaged fridges, flights diverted due to false threats, six thousand schools on high alert. In a country that swings between downplaying the situation and hysteria, Parliament should recognise that national security is at stake, and the government should stop squabbling over who should defend the castle whilst the enemy is already in the courtyard.

16 NOV 26
Last updated: 08:51 AM
Translated by AI
Image of The enemy is at the portal

Photo: LaPresse

Sabotaged fridges, flights diverted due to false email threats, six thousand schools on high alert, a bounty on a deputy prime minister’s personal data. Italy continues to treat as mere crime news what also has strategic relevance for national security. Parliament should take note of this, and the government should stop squabbling over who should defend the castle whilst the enemy is already in the courtyard. A country of sixty million people fast asleep in the cloud, whilst the enemies of liberal democracy roam undisturbed amongst schools and fridges. Since October, remote controls for refrigeration systems have been tampered with in several European countries: France attributed the campaign against supermarkets on 11 and 12 October to Iran, whilst a subsequent incident affected the plasma storage units of the French blood transfusion service. In early November, dozens of hoax bomb threats were made against European flights, leading to fighter jets being scrambled and airports in disarray. Then came the news of the ‘bounty’ offered by NoName057(16) on the personal data of initially eighteen ‘enemies of Russia’, including Antonio Tajani. On 11 November, an email signed by the unlikely ‘Mikhail Andropov’ reached around 6,300 schools, leading to the evacuation of hundreds of them; the following day, the same thing happened again at nearly 4,000 schools, resulting in 77 evacuations. In between, there was the serious international disruption to Microsoft 365. It was not an attack, but it demonstrated with brutal clarity just how fragile the infrastructure is on which Europe has built its daily life. In the fairy tale, the princess pricks her finger on a spindle and sleeps for a hundred years. In the Italian version, the spindle is an email, and the slumber is that of a public that continues to turn a blind eye.

The Sleep Spell

The most obvious sign is the language. The week has been dominated by four reassuring narratives, all variations on the same sop. The first is that of the ‘mythomaniacs’, a label which, when it becomes the sole explanation, reduces a possible coordinated operation on a continental scale to a collection of disturbed individuals with too much time on their hands. The second claims, with regard to the schools targeted by the threats, that ‘no system was breached’, as if the aim were to breach a system rather than to paralyse a country: it is like offering reassurance after a bombing raid because nobody stole the silver. The third states that ‘an antivirus programme would have been enough’, dismissing what is a government problem as a technical glitch. The fourth is the most subtle. Faced with a claim of responsibility from a pro-Russian group, the Foreign Secretary himself was quick to clarify that he had spoken of pro-Russian hackers and never of the Moscow government. The distinction between a claim of responsibility and state liability is necessary; however, it must not become an excuse for inaction.
The counterpart to sleep is the nightmare: headlines about the ‘genocide of Italians’, endless live broadcasts, alarmism as spectacle. They seem like opposites, but they are twins. Downplaying and hysteria share a refusal to consider the threat in strategic terms. The former reduces it to a bit of fun, the latter inflates it into a catastrophe; neither asks who stands to gain from a frightened and divided Europe, nor by what means that advantage is being pursued. It is no coincidence that these incidents end up in the news or technology sections, almost never in the foreign affairs section, where they ought to be.

A domain, not a disorder

Yet the doctrine has been clear for a decade. Since the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO has regarded a cyber attack as potentially capable of triggering Article 5, subject to a case-by-case decision by the North Atlantic Council. Since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, cyberspace has been recognised as an operational domain, alongside land, sea and air; space was added in 2019.
These are categories that shape strategies, chains of command and rules of engagement. Italy itself is well aware of this. Since 2022, a regulation introduced by the Draghi government has permitted cyber defence intelligence measures, implemented by AISE and AISI under the coordination of the DIS and in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence, in accordance with provisions issued by the Prime Minister following the opinion of the Interministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic and after consultation with COPASIR. A country that equips itself with cyber defence tools has already acknowledged, at least on paper, that it could be attacked.
Nor does the classic objection hold water, namely that without physical violence there is no war. A remote command that alters the settings of plasma transfusion units, or that shuts down a hospital’s cold chain, can produce physical and potentially lethal effects. Classifying a cyber-attack as an armed attack requires a distinct assessment of its scale and effects. In 1919, Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes coined the phrase ‘clear and present danger’, a criterion developed in the context of limits on freedom of expression in the United States. The danger is clear because it has observable effects, even when the perpetrators and instigators remain to be identified. It is present because the incidents recur in quick succession.

Parliament should take note

Hence a proposal that costs nothing and is worth a great deal. The Constitution does not provide for a ‘state of alert’: it expressly regulates the state of war, which the Houses of Parliament declare pursuant to Article 78. However, Parliament has an appropriate political instrument at its disposal – the resolution – and should make use of it. The two Houses could pass a cross-party resolution formally recognising the existence of a current and real hostile threat to national security in the cyber domain and in the cognitive sphere. The same resolution would commit the government to reporting periodically to Parliament and to COPASIR, to strengthening national crisis management protocols, and to prioritising resilience in the budget.
In a low-intensity conflict aimed at sowing discord, a Parliament’s display of unity is itself a form of deterrence: it tells the adversary that their gamble on our fragmentation is a losing one. The opposition parties, moreover, are calling precisely for the debate to be brought before the Chamber and the COPASIR. They must be taken at their word, by flushing them out of the corner of hypocritical pacifism into which they have driven themselves.

Two leaders, no single command

This brings us to the political crux of the matter, which is also the most sensitive. Whilst the enemy is knocking at the doors of schools, hospitals and airports, within the government – according to press reports – a silent war of position between two opposing visions has been raging for years. Under-Secretary Alfredo Mantovano, the delegated authority for the security of the Republic, regards cybersecurity as an area that should remain under the civilian supervision of Palazzo Chigi, in coordination with the intelligence services and the National Cybersecurity Agency. Minister Guido Crosetto, on the other hand, is pushing for a cyber force integrated into the Armed Forces. In 2025, the Minardo bill, which would have enshrined this approach in law, was blocked by opposition from Palazzo Chigi. The solution outlined in the new bill is a typically Italian compromise: the Ministry of Defence will be responsible for safeguarding the cyber domain of military interest, whilst the Agency will handle the civilian coordination of resilience, without prejudice to the remit of the intelligence services and the Ministry of the Interior. Two structures, two chains of command.
Bill A.S. 2028, currently before a Senate committee with a plenary debate scheduled for December, is the result of that compromise. It assigns the role of military cyber authority to the Chief of the Defence Staff and renames the Information and Security Department the ‘Joint Cyber-Intel Command’. The technical report takes into account 1,200 certified specialists for the purposes of calculating incentives up to 2036, but the fund to incentivise them starts at 1.6 million in 2027 and rises to 13.67 million in 2036, before stabilising at 14.62 million per year from 2041. By way of comparison, although the scope is not entirely comparable, France has around 5,000 civilian and military cyber specialists, and Germany has nearly 16,000 personnel in the ‘Cyber- und Informationsraum’ sector, which also includes IT services, electronic warfare and other functions. The Italian figure of just over 1,000 beneficiaries within ten years relates to incentives and does not reflect the full military cyber workforce.
Crosetto’s arguments are more sound than those of his political opponent, for one simple reason. In a domain recognised by doctrine as operational, the adversary makes no distinction between civilian and military targets: it strikes at the interface between the two, knowing that this is where our bureaucracies falter. Deterrence requires an adequate and timely response capability, which – in its military component and under democratic control – falls to the Armed Forces. Integrating operational command does not mean militarising society nor undermining the Agency, which must remain the civilian pillar of regulation, resilience and the implementation of the European NIS2 Directive. It means having a single point where decisions are made, in real time, as to whether a hostile campaign constitutes a nuisance or an act of aggression, and who is to respond. Today, coordination is already the responsibility of Palazzo Chigi. The political challenge lies in translating this into integrated and timely operational decisions.
There is, however, a caveat that the otherwise tenacious Minister Crosetto would do well to heed, as it is his opponents’ most insidious argument. According to an analysis of the tables in the Multi-Annual Policy Document published by Cybersecurity360, the expenditure forecast for four programmes specifically focused on cyber security falls, for 2027, from 68.66 to 52.31 million compared with the previous plan: a downward revision of 23.8 per cent. Those who claim to be in charge must demonstrate that they are willing to fund it. Otherwise, the Cassandra risks looking like someone who cries ‘wolf’ and then cuts the shepherds’ budget.

The Prince’s Kiss

In the Brothers Grimm fairy tale, the awakening comes with a kiss. In the Italian version, the prince is neither a miraculous technology nor a new allocation of funds, however much both may be needed. It is the political will to call a spade a spade. Three steps are needed: a parliamentary resolution recognising the seriousness of the threat and transforming republican unity into a deterrent; an integrated operational command within the Ministry of Defence, with the Agency acting as a civilian pillar rather than a competing entity; and budgets that match the rhetoric, starting with the full utilisation of available European instruments.
Waking up, after all, costs far less than sleeping. It took just one email to reach over six thousand schools and disrupt lessons in hundreds of institutions; keeping the state afloat requires more than just an antivirus programme and a row amongst the powers that be. Sixty million princesses may wish to continue dreaming of a world where war is always somewhere else. Meanwhile, the castle is already under siege.