Young people, USB and the Black Bloc. The political discourse fuelling the demonstrations (without ever mentioning Ukraine). A map

The figures for the Italian cities where student demonstrations took place on 30 October are somewhat inconsistent but nonetheless indicative of a level of widespread participation that I personally would not have expected. Between now and 20 November – the general strike called by the CGIL – and even 12 December – the new general strike called by the USB – further marches and demonstrations of various kinds are expected. Taken together, these two considerations lead me to say that attempting to map out what has happened and what is likely to happen is not merely a rhetorical call to ‘listen’, but forms part of the remit of those who grapple with the political and social dynamics of the country in which they live. Especially as all this is taking place in the run-up to a general election that many consider to be more significant than previous ones.

Fortunately, we are currently able to analyse the situation based on the report as at 30 October which, in the words of Minister Piantedosi, indicates clashes in a limited number of towns, organised by “organised fringe groups” and with “no demonstrators injured”. This demonstrates that the management of public order was handled intelligently, both on the final day of the marches and previously during the ‘Black Saturday’ of the looting in Milan.

The first question to address is whether or not the geographical spread of the demonstrations on the 30th is due to the organisational capacity of the USB. As has been noted on previous occasions, the USB is a small minority trade union which has a certain presence in the education sector, in ports and in logistics, where it enjoys strong support amongst foreign workers. The platforms on which it bases its strikes are not particularly original; they mix national demands with more geopolitical issues, which consequently end up bringing together Gaza, rearmament, pensions, wages and so on. The only omission concerns, exclusively and consistently, Ukraine.

We might attribute to the USB leadership a Jacobin mindset typical of the old Left, which enabled them both last year and now, at the end of October, to ride the wave – that is, to provide students with a date, a label (‘the general strike’), media coverage (the news programmes didn’t even make it clear who had called the strike) and an organisational foothold in exchange for a strong turnout at the marches. We provide the political ‘hardware’ (banners, megaphones, etc.); you bring the people; and so no one will wonder – as has happened before – whether any workers in the country’s major factories, offices or supermarkets actually took part in the general strike. The day was a success thanks to the students and this form of political exchange.

One might argue that the USB’s Jacobinism is facilitated by the fact that the small trade union and the student body share a set of slogans, and that consequently dialogue is easier and free of friction. Yet these remain two worlds that are still far apart: no student has thought to hand out leaflets outside factories, and no USB leader has attended a student assembly. They meet in the streets and march together. If the next general strike is called by the CGIL, the pattern can be replicated; the exchange is essentially the same, the media coverage will be much greater (talk show hosts will be out in force) and, in any case, the ‘big union’ will be there to ensure order during the marches. The slogans won’t need to change all that much either; even within the CGIL, the word ‘Ukraine’ sets people’s skin crawling.

As for the USB, it is more difficult to gauge the size of the student contingent that took part in the demonstrations. Reading the local reports, one gets the impression that there was a significant predominance of sixth-formers over students from technical colleges. In short, the core of the movement currently consists of the children of the ruling classes and the middle class, who seem to have a greater grasp of the geopolitical context and issues related to climate change, to which they add the catch-all keyword ‘the cost of living’ as a universal theme. Gaza functions as a symbolic place of identification, expressing in its own way a cosmopolitanism amongst the younger generations – a sense of ‘elsewhere’. Little is known about the actual influence of small youth organisations such as the Udu on the demonstrations: judging by the ‘tent movement’ launched against high rents, the numbers appear to be small. Often, in interviews with newspapers and on television, the young protest leaders allude to the practical shortcomings of the school system (poor-quality classrooms, lack of teaching materials, etc.), but this is certainly not the key driver of the mobilisation.

More interesting is the attempt to gauge what the protesters think about the school system as an institution and the relationship between academic qualifications and the labour market. If, as hypothesised, the students taking part in the march are predominantly from upper-middle-class backgrounds, it is easy to imagine that the choice between Italy and abroad is on their minds. In other words, their criticism of the Italian education system could lead them to swell the ranks of young people leaving Italy – whether out of principle or because of higher wages in other countries and more flexible labour markets. Certainly, the vast majority of students are aware that, in Italy, the first steps after leaving school involve long transitional periods and decidedly low pay.

However, judging by the placards carried in the march, this type of criticism is aimed more at challenging the current government than at reflecting on the structural distortions of the Italian system, with its rigidity and entrenched practices. In short, it is believed that simply ousting Giorgia Meloni will be enough to restore fluidity to young people’s entry into adult economic life. It is also to be expected that, given young people’s exposure to global communication, they harbour a sort of cosmic pessimism: whilst their fathers once thought that Italy was ailing, today they are inclined to believe that the whole world has fallen ill.

Let’s turn to the well-known relationship between student protesters and the hooded protesters or ‘black bloc’. It has been very convenient so far – especially on the left – to divide these two groups using the myth of the ‘bad guys’ who, at a certain point, break away and clash with the police. The truth is all too easy to explain: there are groups in every city for whom street clashes are standard practice, and whose history bears some resemblance to that of football ultras. In Turin, there is Askatasuna, which has been training for years in street battles, has led all the ambushes in Val di Susa, and has even built up a degree of support within civil society thanks to small-scale welfare initiatives set up in the neighbourhood where its club was based. Askatasuna in Turin is, in its own way, a minor legend of resistance to authority that fascinates university lecturers and the city’s small intellectual elite.

In other cities there are social centres, which vary greatly from one another but which, in any case, find their raison d’être in the myth of confrontation with the police. In short, the so-called ‘antagonists’ are a mixed bag: from anarchists to Potere al Popolo, the CARC, Cambiare Rotta and housing committees. The point to make is that, here too, there is a sort of political exchange between them and the large contingent of students. It is as though they were delegated to engage in physical confrontation because only that allows the marches greater media coverage and greater impact. And the sixth-formers accept this compromise.

The number of politicians explicitly supporting the movement remains small for the time being: they include the Grimaldis (AVS) and Chiara Appendino in Turin, and the maverick PD member Pacini in Milan. On 30 October, the PD’s Berruto took part in a march in Turin, and here and there in various cities a few PD mayors were present, but they are few and far between. This contingent is set to grow with the entry into the fray of the CGIL, which is capable of rallying support from significant sections of civil society, such as people in the entertainment industry, magistrates and architects. Nothing new under the sun.

This overview still lacks a plausible explanation of the events of 18 October in Milan, when gangs of youths—mostly the children of immigrants—ransacked shops such as Carrefour, Decathlon, Foot Locker, and so on. Young Arabs are highly visible at student marches, waving Palestinian flags; they are better organised than other groups and join the rioters when it comes to attacking the police. However, die-hard pro-Palestine activists have little to do with the looting on 18 October. There appears to be a difference in age and even in mindset between the two groups. On the one hand, there is the appropriation of certain symbolic consumer goods (not luxury items, incidentally); on the other, there is Palestine from the river to the sea.

So who, then, summoned the young people that Saturday? How was it possible for them to converge on the same streets, at the same time, and organise that chaos? These are questions that await an answer. Many say ‘it was TikTok’, others allude to hybrid warfare, but a big question mark remains.