Stability does not come from a bonus but from the ability to deal with ambiguities. Restrictions on coalitions

No one will admit it – as is often the case in such situations – but the truth is that the electoral law which has caused such a stir, the one finally approved yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies, is also to the liking of those who oppose it. The centre-left likes it because it offers the prospect of a potential bonus that would enable them to form a government in the event of victory. Elly Schlein likes it, because it allows her to secure her position ahead of the elections. Giuseppe Conte likes it, because it offers him a good excuse to call for primaries. Carlo Calenda probably doesn’t mind it, at least in part, because it offers the centre greater room for manoeuvre than there would have been under the old electoral law. An electoral law drafted just a few months before an election always has characteristics that make it resemble a shambles – one that is entirely avoidable – and those who say there is an element of absurdity that is hard to deny in seeing majorities changing electoral laws just a few months before the vote for fear of losing the election are right. Nonetheless, the new electoral law compels us to confront a question with which we are now all too familiar: what conditions are necessary to achieve greater stability? Having a majority bonus for the list or coalition with the most votes that secures at least 42 per cent in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate helps.

Having a coalition forced to define its scope (scandal), its programme (scandal) and its candidate for Prime Minister (scandal) allows for clarity, and clarity is a necessary condition for attempting to secure a stable future (and it is understandable that coalitions are less keen on this). But the experience of recent years tells us that the ‘magic formula’ for stability in Italy is not tied to a mathematical equation, a threshold to be crossed, or a bonus to be triggered. Stability stems, first and foremost, from other factors. It stems from the willingness to make bold, rather than timid, choices in foreign policy. It stems from the willingness to take non-demagogic decisions on budgetary policy. It stems from the willingness to view market movements not as a sign of a conspiracy but as a barometer of a country’s economy. It stems from the willingness to recognise and legitimise leadership, without wasting time looking for ways to undermine it. It stems from the ability to be inconsistent with one’s own promises, knowing that what one says whilst campaigning is one thing, and what one says whilst governing is quite another. Finally, it stems from the ability to be flexible, to make compromises, to change one’s mind, and to take a stand on issues where people may disagree in words but not in deeds. An electoral law can also help to simplify matters, to generate, amidst a bit of a mess, positive mechanisms, such as the holding of open primaries, the formation of a coalition, a programme shared amongst allies, and an extra incentive to clarify which allies are incompatible with one’s political identity – such as General Vannacci. But elections are not won through electoral reforms; the ‘Stabilicum’ do not go to the polls, and stability does not arise from an electoral threshold.

Stability stems from something else. It stems from the determination, on crucial issues, to move beyond this era of ambiguity. And however tempting the majority bonuses may be, no coalition will be stable unless it has the strength to resolve – rather than circumvent – the most significant ambiguities: Europe, Ukraine, debt, immigration, security and growth. Stability does not come from the ‘Stabilicum’ but from the courage of coalitions to face up to a threshold that no electoral reform can circumvent: reality, my dear. The majority bonus carries weight, but the ability to govern amidst hypocrisy carries even more.