Lessons from Germany on how to rebel, in Italy, against the Alternative für Putin

The record-breaking percentages achieved by the AfD in the much-publicised election in Saxony-Anhalt could lead a significant section of the centre-right leadership to regard a shift towards the Vannacci-style right as inevitable, based on reasoning that is seemingly straightforward but fundamentally flawed. In blunt terms: the far right is gaining support, not only in Germany, and in order to rein it in—and perhaps even neutralise it—we must stop being timid; we must embrace its issues; we must not remain indifferent to its demands; and we must perhaps create the conditions for forming an alliance in the next elections. If, however, viewed with a less superficial eye, the German case should quite simply point to a completely opposite path. Faced with an extremist right that presents itself not only as an alternative for Germany – Alternative für Deutschland – but also as an alternative to the Meloni-style right – ‘Alternative zu Meloni’ – faced with an extremist right that has turned Ukraine into a target to be struck, whilst the Italian right has made it a defining feature of its identity to be defended. Faced with an extremist right that has turned ‘Putinism’ into an identity trait to be defended, the Italian right has made it a totem to be toppled. 

Faced with an extremist right that has turned pro-European sentiment – embraced even by Meloni – into an enemy to be eliminated. Faced with all this, there are countless reasons to steer clear of it without fear of losing support. The reasons that are easiest to understand and to focus on do not concern only the Trump- and Putin-inspired mix of ideas of which the AfD is a vehicle, but rather a reality that affects Italy. If there is one country that has an interest – even a self-serving one, and not just an idealistic one – in having a Europe that is more generous with investment, more supportive on immigration, more mindful of the accumulation of European public debt, and more eager to use the levers of openness rather than closure when it comes to the global market, that country is Italy; observing Italian politicians celebrating the AfD’s rise resembles the scene of turkeys jubilantly marching to take part in Thanksgiving, before being speared with forks.

The second reason—trivial yet essential—concerns another fact that should not be overlooked, and that fact relates to a characteristic that Meloni possesses and could exploit to her advantage during the election campaign: she is a ‘tent-style’ right-winger – no longer an underdog but not yet part of the establishment – capable, in other words, of offering something to appeal to both the moderate and the less moderate right, and thus able to win over voters who are most uncomfortable with the establishment right. Meloni’s ‘right nation’ differs from the one envisaged in 2004 in the famous book by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, but it is a right-wing movement capable of being both flexible and adaptable, which could attempt, without undue difficulty, to ignore the polls when forging future alliances. In what sense? It’s simple. Yesterday, during a conference organised by Confartigianato, Alessandra Ghisleri presented an interesting poll that highlights a truth often overlooked: a centre-right without Roberto Vannacci’s ‘Alternative für Putin’ has more or less the same percentage of the vote as the centre-left (42.3 per cent, compared with 43 per cent) and, if the provision introduced in the Chamber of Deputies as part of the electoral law – which excludes from the coalition’s total the votes for lists polling below three per cent, whilst retaining the best-performing list among those below the threshold – were to be confirmed alongside the new electoral law, the centre-right, despite having a lower percentage, could secure the majority bonus and win the elections without Vannacci (216 MPs and 107 senators, without needing Vannacci’s 24 MPs and 12 senators).

Meloni’s ‘right-wing nation’ – neither an underdog nor part of the establishment – would then have yet another reason not to form a coalition based on the polls: whatever percentage the centre-right currently holds, an important factor – not currently captured by the polls – must be added to that figure: the ‘tactical vote’, which may prompt right-wing voters, tempted by the Alternative für Putin, to realise at the ballot box that voting too far to the right risks being the best way to bring the left to power. At first glance, the AfD’s result might suggest to the right that it should resign itself to the idea of having to move even further to the right so as not to lose the election. On closer inspection, however, the AfD’s result serves as a reminder that if there is one country that can hope to have an alternative model to the AfD approach, that country is Italy. A country that knows that advocating a ‘less European’ approach to immigration means less solidarity, that knows that advocating a ‘less European’ approach to the economy means less investment, and that can perhaps understand without too much difficulty that there should be no contest between having a right-wing alternative to those in Europe – an alternative to the Merz model and the AfD model – and having a right wing in search of an ‘Alternative für Putin’.