It’s not just about drones. Connecting the dots to combat the influencers of Putinism

It is straightforward to connect the dots: one merely needs to wish to do so, to wish to understand, and simply to open one's eyes. Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani yesterday sounded an alarm that deserves to be taken seriously. During the informal meeting of European Union foreign ministers in Wicklow, Ireland, Tajani admitted that international diplomatic circles, starting with Italy, harbour serious fears that there may be “Russian influence on the vote” in the coming months. This includes, says Tajani, the "vote in Italy". Tajani spoke on behalf of the government in the wake of the detailed accusation made by the German government regarding Russia’s role in three separate incidents of sabotage that took place at Leipzig Airport. “Russia,” says Guido Crosetto to Il Foglio, “has been provoking and testing us for months. It would be wrong and foolish not to recognise how many hybrid and physical attacks have struck certain countries in recent months. The logic behind it eludes me, but the actions are clear, and from these actions one can discern the Kremlin’s intentions. One need only look at the rise in recruitment to understand, for example, what future Moscow has in mind.” Putin’s interference in the democratic fabric of European countries takes on different dimensions and scales, and, naturally, there are various levels at which to attempt to prevent, counter and combat it. There is the military level. There is the level of provocations. There is the level of cyber-attacks. There is the level of interference. A level-headed political approach, determined to repel any form of Russian incursion into Europe’s democratic life, must not lose sight of any of these fronts. The military level is managed by sending weapons to Ukraine and by strengthening national defences.

The scale of provocations is managed by choosing not to downplay Russian interference. The scale of cyber-attacks is managed by responding blow for blow, including through pre-emptive action, on Russian territory. The scale of interference is addressed not by turning a blind eye, but by calling a spade a spade and connecting the dots to understand what it means to fuel or counter such interference. Russian interference takes various forms but all share a single objective: to manipulate information, fuelling disinformation, in order to downplay the scale of the Russian threat, to weaken the Ukrainian front and to divide the Western front. A sensible policy must address direct interference originating from Russia, but it cannot turn a blind eye to another form of propaganda carried out within individual countries by independent actors who, whether out of conviction, self-interest or for reasons yet to be uncovered, take up and amplify alternative narratives that serve to downplay the scale of the Russian threat, attempt to weaken the Ukrainian front and seek to divide the Western front. On 17 March 2026, the European External Action Service (EEAS) provided a clear definition of what constitutes foreign manipulation and information interference, describing them as ‘largely non-illegal’ behaviour that is manipulative, intentional and coordinated, capable of undermining values and political processes. Putting the pieces of the Russian threat together means having the courage to denounce Russia’s complicity when a drone is placed at an airport in a NATO country, but it also means having the courage not to regard Putin’s propagandists as mere extremists sowing discord.

Europe needs to show greater resolve to support Ukraine’s defence; NATO needs to show greater courage to help Europe strengthen its security; but politics needs to show greater resolve to keep Putin’s propagandists out of coalitions. If one cares about defending Europe from the Russian threat, one cannot accept an alliance with anyone who is unwilling to commit in writing, as part of a programme, to providing military assistance to Ukraine for as long as it is necessary. If one is serious about combating Russian interference, one cannot make an alliance with a Putinist propagandist contingent on the future of electoral law. Any concession by the PD to the M5S’s anti-Ukrainian propaganda will be a concession to Russian propaganda. Any concession by the centre-right to Roberto Vannacci’s anti-European propaganda will be a concession to Russian propaganda. Recognising Russian influence is crucial, as is recognising its influencers. And if Italy wishes to be at the forefront of preventing “attempts to influence elections in countries where voting takes place”, the way forward is clear: impose the line of defending Ukraine on allies, and reject potential allies who act as Russian influencers.