The Italian left has become the black sheep of Europe

Has being anti-Europe become a left-wing stance? Amidst the current political debate – with governments squabbling over the boundaries of the Schengen Agreement, heads of government arguing over the Dublin Regulations, and migration policy held hostage by leaders across Europe worried about their own popularity – there is one issue that has been simmering beneath the surface for several months, affecting the balance of power between parties and coalitions. There was a time, not so long ago, when the progressive camp used to exploit the right’s distance from Europe to highlight its dangerousness and unacceptability. The formula was tried and tested: the more the right expressed its scepticism towards Europe, the easier it was for its opponents to find arguments to demonstrate their indisputable moral superiority. Today, the right’s opponents in Italy seem to be finding it somewhat difficult to apply that tried-and-tested formula. And the reason is simple. On many issues, the Italian left has become a black sheep in Europe. And its distancing from European Union policies has come at a time when the right-wing government – once not particularly pro-European – has moved closer not only to Europe on various issues, but in many cases also to the positions of the European Socialists, as demonstrated by the special rapport forged between the right-wing Italian Prime Minister and the left-wing Danish Prime Minister, who just yesterday were aligned in ‘defending Europe from uncontrolled immigration’. The result of this clash is interesting: for the left today, the defence of Europe is no longer set in stone; it is no longer an absolute; it must be contextualised. And on a growing number of issues, a section of the progressive camp tends to view Europe no longer as a natural ally with whom to build an alternative to the right, but as a constraint to be challenged when its policies diverge from those of the Italian left. This applies to many areas, such as immigration. Within the European Union, the Pact on Migration and Asylum was approved thanks in part to the decisive support of the European Socialists, just as it was backed by Meloni’s party and Forza Italia, in an attempt to reconcile solidarity and responsibility in border management.

Following the Pact, Europe has gone even further: it has worked on a common return system that also includes return centres in third countries and has approved a European list of safe countries of origin. A tougher mechanism for managing external borders than the one in place previously. As our David Carretta rightly pointed out, Germany’s decision to resume Dublin transfers is not linked to the Ceuta-Schengen case, but is the result of an agreement concluded by Piantedosi within the framework of the new Pact on Migration and Asylum. The result: the European Socialists supported this approach, whilst the Italian left largely did not; the Italian right, with the exception of Salvini, did. And the very same left that is now calling on Meloni to respect the agreements with Germany on the Dublin Regulation was opposed to those agreements, which were set out in the Pact on Migration and Asylum. But the same scenario can be observed in other important issues. The debate on military spending, after all, is part of this story and arises within this new balance of power, which sees the Italian right more closely aligned with the European socialist parties than the Italian left is. In the European Union, to give just one example, the progressive camp tends to view the threat posed by Putin not as a fabrication of the arms lobby, but as a very real danger. And, whilst the drive to increase military spending has not yet reached the levels set by NATO’s benchmarks, the issue is not whether it is right or wrong to arm oneself to defend against the Russian threat – as is the case in the Italian debate – but when, how and for what purpose. When it comes to defending security against the Russian threat, the Italian right is more pro-European than the left, which has for decades made its closeness to Europe a badge of respectability. The same applies to the European Stability Pact, which maintains the benchmarks of a 3 per cent deficit and 60 per cent debt and imposes multi-year consolidation plans. The left, which calls on the right in Italy to show greater rigour on odd-numbered days whilst accusing it of austerity on even-numbered days, continues to challenge rules that the Meloni government has, in fact, accepted and within which it has built its budgetary policy. The new Pact, after all, is the product of a European majority comprising Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals and Conservatives. It is the same story with the SAFE fund. SAFE is now a tool used by two-thirds of the Union. Nineteen countries have submitted their plans, using up the 150 billion available, and the EU Council has already authorised funding for 18 of them. In Italy, Forza Italia and Fratelli d’Italia are in favour, the Lega is not, whilst the M5S and AVS are opposed, and the PD is forced to strike a balance between its pro-European tradition and its alliance with Conte and Fratoianni. And it is not just SAFE: 18 out of 27 countries – exactly two-thirds of the EU – have already triggered the national safeguard clause to increase defence spending. In short: what is portrayed in Italy as a capitulation to militarism has become a policy supported by a large majority across Europe.

The same scenario can be seen in relation to environmental issues. In March 2026, the Commission presented a specific strategy to bring the first European SMRs (Small Modular Reactors) online in the early 2030s: it estimates around €241 billion in investment in nuclear power by 2050, not including further investment in SMRs and advanced technologies. The M5S and AVS are opposed; Schlein’s PD has contested the return to nuclear power; the Italian right is in favour. The result: on yet another major environmental taboo, Brussels is moving in a direction much closer to the Italian centre-right than to the left of the broad political spectrum. Something similar is happening in the automotive sector. The Commission has even revisited the taboo of a total ban on internal combustion engine cars from 2035, proposing to replace the target of a 100 per cent reduction in tailpipe emissions with a 90 per cent target, accompanied by offset mechanisms and greater technological neutrality. And it is doing the same with regard to environmental regulation of businesses: fewer obligations, less bureaucracy, greater competitiveness. The Italian left thus continues to defend certain elements of the regulatory framework of the old Green Deal, just as Brussels is trying to ease them. A similar scenario is playing out with regard to trade agreements: the European Union signed the agreement with Mercosur on 17 January 2026, and the interim trade agreement has been provisionally in force since 1 May 2026. The PD is in favour, of course, but the M5S and AVS are opposed, whilst Meloni, on this point too, is perfectly aligned not only with the moderate European right but also with the European Socialists. The political reality is clear. The European Union today is more focused on security, defence, immigration control, competitiveness and simplification, and is less closely associated with the ‘Green Deal’ Europe of the previous parliamentary term. The Italian left, which for years has treated adherence to European Union policies as the hallmark of its own political credibility, now finds itself at odds with Europe on many of the issues that really matter. This, ultimately, is the new paradox: the Italian left continues to portray Meloni as a threat to Europe, yet on a growing number of issues it opposes her precisely because Meloni follows Europe’s lead. When it comes to pro-European sentiment in words, the Left preaches well, claiming to want a more sovereign, larger Europe, with fewer inefficiencies and more powers for those in charge. But when it comes to pro-European sentiment in practice – the day-to-day reality of concrete choices – a new question arises: is it the Italian Right or the Italian Left that is the black sheep of Europe?