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Faces of China. Xi’s greatest concern is his generals
The purges carried out by the relentless Zhang Shengmin and the obsession with the enemy within

At the age of 68, Zhang Shengmin finds himself as Xi’s sole deputy at the head of the Military Commission, and thus the second-in-command at the top of the Chinese leadership (photo: Getty)
"It is the hands that strike one most of all. Delicate, slender fingers, almost transparent. Nothing like ‘fingers stubby as fat worms’ – Stalin’s fingers, from the verse that cost the poet Osip Mandelstam his life. These are the hands of a man of letters, of a mandarin, who have inherited the millennia-old art of confidently tracing, with a brush dipped in ink ground on stone, exquisitely elegant marks on rice paper. General Zhang Shengmin is also known as a refined calligrapher. He is a virtuoso of caoshu, the swift and fluttering cursive script that was in vogue during the Tang dynasty. He has become the de facto number two in China, thanks to the investigations that led to the death sentences of the previous numbers two and three.
General Zhang (a very common surname; no relation to Zhang Youxia, the most distinguished of the purged generals, alongside Liu Zhenli) is Xi Jinping’s Vyshinsky, his Grand Inquisitor. He directs the investigations, followed by the trials – and the inevitable death sentences – of Xi’s rivals or those he finds unwelcome. He is cultured, methodical, relentless and incorruptible. Above all, he is unwavering in his compliance with the Leader’s wishes. He certainly has the physique du rôle for the part that history has called upon him to play. He is not a bulldog. He is pale, frail, with dark circles under his eyes, thin lips and a ruthless gaze, yet with a touch of irony. He would be perfect for playing the role of the imperial mandarin on screen. Or Nosferatu, or Dracula. Or Fu Manchu, the supervillain invented by the British author Sax Rohmer in the early 20th century to embody the ‘Yellow Peril’. The sort of characters who send shivers down your spine just by meeting their gaze.
General Zhang is Xi Jinping’s Vyshinsky. He is the one who directs the investigations, followed by the trials, which are inevitably followed by death sentences.
Zhang was promoted to the Politburo in a great hurry – something that has not happened since the days of the Cultural Revolution. Without even waiting for a regular party congress, which is due to take place next year. More importantly, he is vice-chairman of the Party’s Military Commission. The only presidency that really matters in China. Of which Mao was, in his day, the quintessential chairman. The current chairman of the Military Commission is, of course, Xi Jinping.
Firstly, following the official announcement of the promotion, Zhang wrote an editorial in the CCP’s official newspaper, the Renmin Ribao, the People’s Daily. In the issue dated 17 November. ‘Maintain intense pressure against corruption’, read the headline. The gist was that no one can consider themselves ‘untouchable’. Whatever their rank, their position, or whatever services they have rendered to the nation, no one can claim immunity. A promise of guaranteed, harsh punishment. No leniency for those who stray from moral standards. Zero tolerance for corruption, for the abuse of power for personal gain. But also for political alliances, the exchange of favours between economic and political powers, the formation of power groups and monopolies, the buying and selling of posts and positions, and even for ‘vote-buying and electoral corruption’. This sounds rather curious in a country where people do not vote at all for the highest offices, and where appointments, promotions and resignations do not take place in the secrecy of the ballot box but, institutionally, in opaque and secret backroom deals amongst top leaders.
A vast and highly commendable programme. One that follows in the footsteps of the anti-corruption programmes pursued throughout China’s millennia-long history by one dynasty after another. Including the latest, the Chinese Communist Party dynasty. In reality, the purges have little to do with corruption. Instead, they have a great deal to do with loyalty – or lack thereof – to the Leader, the emperor of the moment. More precisely, they have to do with his perception of it. There is a rule regarding corruption that applies in all authoritarian regimes. The higher up the ladder of power they are, the more staunchly they denounce it. And, at the same time, they are quite inclined to tolerate it, to turn a blind eye to it for themselves, their families, their clients and their friends. There is little reason to be surprised. It happens even in the best democracies. Think of Trump’s inner circle.
“Kill these rabid dogs. Death to this gang that hides its ferocious teeth and eagle’s talons from the people,” thundered the inquisitor Vyshinsky during the show trials of the 1930s against Bukharin and the bloc of right-wingers and Trotskyists. He was a learned jurist and a skilled diplomat. He enjoyed a distinguished career. But not with the speed or at the same level as General Zhang. Who, at the age of 68, finds himself as Xi’s sole deputy at the helm of the Military Commission – in effect, the number two at the top of the Chinese leadership. Like Agatha Christie’s ‘Little Indians’, the group that started out as seven has, in the blink of an eye, dwindled to just two. It is now official. But this had already become clear a few months ago when he was promoted to three-star general, their highest rank.
The irony is that Zhang has never had any experience of military command. Unlike the ‘great marshals’ whom Mao pitted against one another, he has never fought in a war. He has never been Minister of Defence or Chief of the General Staff. He has never commanded a military region or an army corps. Within the characteristic dual command structure of the Chinese armed forces, he has held roles as a political commissar. Even the fact that at one point he was involved with missile and nuclear forces does not mean that he held any particular position regarding political or strategic decisions. He earned his reputation as a relentless enemy of corruption whilst serving as procurator of the Party’s Disciplinary Commission. Under Xi, almost more generals and admirals have fallen from grace than in Mao’s time. The leadership of the People’s Liberation Army has been decimated almost as much as that of the Red Army was under Stalin.
Under Xi, almost more generals have been purged than during Mao’s time. The Army’s top brass has been decimated almost as much as that of the Red Army under Stalin
The nomenclature at the top of the Chinese armed forces and the Party is extremely complex. It is not just the ranks on the epaulettes that matter. Ranks and roles also matter (and far more so). As early as the 18th century, the Enlightenment thinkers of Europe were fascinated by the administrative system and bureaucratic structure of the Chinese empire. The nine-rank hierarchy dates back as far as the Wei dynasty (220 AD); indeed, the system provided for a double tier within each rank. During the Ming and later the Qing dynasties, officials in the capital, gathered in the immense courtyard in front of the Hall of Supreme Harmony in the Forbidden City, took their places according to rank and grade. To avoid mistakes, special place markers were set out. It is exactly the same in the CCP’s assemblies and ceremonies today. No seating arrangement is random, especially at funerals. The closer one is to the emperor, the greater the importance. Recently, Zhang had often appeared alongside the supreme leader; Xi was even seen stopping to greet him, as if to imply that Zhang is the only person in uniform whom he trusts.
It is not a comfortable position for Zhang. Designated successors have never fared particularly well. Deng Xiaoping had ousted the successors he himself had chosen, first Hu Yaobang and then Zhao Ziyang. Before that, there had been the sensational downfall of Lin Biao, the military leader who had secured victory for Mao’s Communists over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists, and who had later devised the Little Red Book. He had been designated by Mao as his successor at the 9th CPC Congress, in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. Less than three years later, the Trident aircraft in which he was fleeing to the then arch-enemy, the Soviet Union, was shot down over Mongolia. When welcoming Nixon to Beijing, Mao hinted that there were differences in foreign policy between himself and his former heir apparent. Lin is said to have been opposed to the China–US rapprochement.
Xi has no successors; the exact same dilemma looms over Putin. As for Trump, the mid-term elections have shattered his dreams
Xi Jinping’s biggest problem is that he has no successors. Nor can one rely on clear rules for succession. He was the first to break them, scrapping the two-term limit at the head of the party, which had worked for two previous successions. The exact same problem looms over Putin. As for Trump, it is clear that he would have liked to succeed himself once more, or to appoint his own successor. The recent mid-term elections have dashed this dream. Contrary to what many feared, American democracy does not take kindly to would-be dictators.
The three have just met in Shenzhen, at a summit which has prompted comparisons in the world’s press with the Yalta Conference, where Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill divided up the world and Europe. With equal alacrity, half the commentators in the press worldwide were quick to deny that this could be a ‘new Yalta’. That is the only certainty. Those leaders of the time emerged victorious from a world war they had won. Putin is mired in a war against Ukraine that he cannot win, despite it having already lasted longer than the First and Second World Wars combined. Trump is emerging battered from a war which, whatever he may say, he has lost against Iran. Xi can only thank his lucky stars that he has not got himself entangled in a war over Taiwan. It would have caused him immense trouble. Talk of a generals’ revolt is the least of it. No one can send a generation of only children to their deaths with impunity, especially in a country hit by a dramatic demographic decline. When Mao, to please Stalin, sent a million Chinese volunteers to die in the Korean War, gaining nothing except a return to the starting positions on the 38th parallel, those were entirely different times. Chinese lives were worth little; they were expendable.
What Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping have in common is that they are the leaders of the world’s three major nuclear powers. Putin has secured his place at the table solely because he has over 6,000 nuclear warheads. Yes, he also has oil, but if that were his only asset, he would carry roughly the same weight as Saudi Arabia or Iran. As far as we know, China still has only 600 warheads. But it has – and can continue to launch into orbit – satellites in such numbers as to outshine those of Elon Musk’s Starlink. A photograph released just a few days ago by U.S. intelligence shows the prototype of an orbital spacecraft that would be capable of launching missiles able to strike any point on the planet with a launch warning of two and a half minutes – just one minute in the case of the most densely populated regions of our hemisphere. At least, that is what the computer simulations suggest. Around forty of these AI-guided ‘space mega-drones’ would be enough to achieve a ‘global strike’ capability on a par with that of current arsenals.
The bomb still matters. And how. If you have the bomb, you’re in a position to deter any attack. Look at Kim Jong Un’s North Korea. If you don’t have it, you risk ending up like Ukraine or Iran, not to mention Venezuela. But in itself, the bomb is already obsolete. Firstly, because it cannot be used: nobody can want the end of the world. And then there’s the deterrent effect. It hasn’t been used since Nagasaki and Hiroshima. And if you can no longer actually use a weapon of mass destruction, the deterrent effect plummets. In the Second World War, unlike in the First, nobody used poison gas. Not even the Nazis, except in the extermination camps. There are, perhaps, still things that cannot be done, war crimes that cannot be committed, however malicious one’s intentions may be. The Russians are destroying infrastructure in Ukraine; the Americans are doing the same in Iran. But no one yet dares to destroy dams to flood or, worse still, starve an entire population. There are limits even to genocide.
Once one weapon of mass destruction has become obsolete, another is always found. ‘General technical trials for the end of the world’ are multiplying, in which it is no longer necessary to resort to the atomic bomb to destroy, or to deal an utterly devastating blow to the enemy. It would be enough to paralyse computers and electronic connections to bring any developed country completely to its knees. A few decades ago, there was talk of neutron bombs – so-called ‘clean’ bombs, so to speak – which kill living beings but leave infrastructure intact. It is uncertain whether it would be preferable to destroy everything while allowing a few living souls to survive. Drones, the major innovation of recent wars, are now little more challenging than video games. Yet these are child’s play compared with the prospect that a single click could switch off the lights, shut down the banks and all forms of public transport, and even stop the heart of someone with an implanted pacemaker. The winner is whoever has the best hackers. The loser is whoever fails to keep pace with the countermeasures. Staying one step ahead of the competition when it comes to artificial intelligence has become crucial. Even more so than having access to ‘cannon fodder’, oil and raw materials was in the past.
“A nuclear war cannot be won, and must not be fought” – the only clear message to emerge from the summit in Shenzhen. Trump, Putin and Xi appear to have no intention of going to war with one another. Let us hope they mean what they say and act accordingly. However, they remain silent on the wars currently underway. Not a word on how to stop, or at least slow down, the mad race to see who can technologically inflict the most damage on their adversary. That is to be expected. The main concern of each of the three is not how to prevail – either individually or collectively – over the other two, or over one of the other two. Their great obsession is how to prevail over their respective domestic enemies, against those who threaten their power at home.
The only thing to emerge from Shenzhen is that Trump, Putin and Xi do not want to go to war with one another. It is more urgent to prevail over those who threaten power at home
For Trump, the enemy that worries him most is not Xi’s China. Nor, by any means, is it Putin’s Russia. It is the American Democrats, who dealt him a crushing defeat in the mid-term elections and who now threaten to oust him from the White House. In the next presidential election, or even sooner. They now have the majority needed for impeachment, which is by no means a judicial procedure but rather a process driven by political majority. Defence Secretary Hegseth could fall before him. He managed to escape a ‘friendly’ impeachment attempt, initiated by a Republican senator, solely because the new Democrat-majority Congress has not yet taken office. Having sacked generals and admirals en masse – women, Black people, or those who were politically unwelcome – may well be forgivable for someone who wins a war. It is not so for someone who loses one.
For Putin, too, the danger he must guard against is not Zelensky. It is that someone in his own camp might hold him to account for having led Russia to the brink of economic collapse and for the nearly half a million lives squandered in a pointless war in Ukraine. A war he would have lost even if he had won it. In the best-case scenario for him, he would retain the territories that were already his before he decided to attack Ukraine. Stalin was responsible for 20 million deaths. But he had the advantage that he had not started the war against Hitler, and that he had, in any case, won it. More than Hitler and other external enemies, he had always feared the hugely popular General Tukhachevsky and his rival Trotsky. He had taken great pains to have them killed even before the war began. With Hitler and the capitalist powers, compromises could be reached. With internal rivals for power, however, they could not.
It is therefore understandable that Xi Jinping’s main concern, in a China where ‘power grows out of the barrel of a gun’, is currently his generals. Just as Mao’s main concern was not American imperialism – which he regarded as a ‘paper tiger’ – nor even Soviet imperialism, against which he was about to go to war. It was his potential political rivals, such as his second-in-command, the President of the Republic Liu Shaoqi, the ‘leaders on the path to capitalism’, and, above all, the generals who had won the War of Liberation for him. All those who might overshadow him. Starting with Marshal Peng Dehuai, who had dared to criticise the catastrophic Great Leap Forward. Mao had systematically eliminated them, even physically, one after the other.
