Goering and then the others

The chief architects of the Nazi system were dead or had disappeared. There is no need to say anything about Hitler: as the absolute ruler of the Reich, he bore primary responsibility for the war, the genocide, the endless massacres of civilians, and, in general, for all the crimes – the likes of which had never been seen before, as Churchill had said, ‘in the dark catalogue of human atrocities’. After him, the most ferocious and bloodthirsty collaborator was Heinrich Himmler, head of the entire SS. This organisation, which began as a storm trooper force supporting the party, had become a gigantic military, economic and bureaucratic machine. The most important – and most fearsome – branch of this empire of evil was the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), which comprised the Gestapo, the Kripo and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). We shall discuss this shortly. Himmler, like his superior, also committed suicide by taking cyanide.

Third on the list was Dr Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda and the dark soul of the regime. His loyalty to Hitler was so blind that, following the Führer’s death, he poisoned his own children, witnessed his wife’s suicide and, in the end (it seems), shot himself. His charred body was found – and photographed – alongside the six innocent children dressed in white, lying as if asleep: a Dantesque depiction of angels and demons.

Finally, Martin Bormann, Hitler’s and the party’s secretary, the dictator’s right-hand man, who managed his life and perhaps his habits. No one had access to the War Lord except through this silent, ambiguous and detested bureaucrat. Nothing was known about him: some believed him to be dead, having fled the Berlin bunker. Others considered him to be on the run, protected by complicit organisations. Amidst the uncertainty, he was tried in absentia.

At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the Big Four had instructed the public prosecutors to publish an initial list of ‘criminals’ by 1 September. And this is where the difficulties began, because nobody seemed to have a clear idea of what was required. In fact, the Nazi organisational structure was virtually unknown: for example, the figure of Adolf Eichmann, who is today the most brutal symbol of the Holocaust, was completely unknown. Moreover, the Americans and Soviets wanted to see in the dock representatives of the financial world that had funded Hitler, of the industrial world that had armed him, and of the propaganda apparatus that had supported him. Finally, the intention was to bring charges not only against individuals but also against organisations and associations, such as the Wehrmacht General Staff, the SS, the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst. From this perspective, the confusion was enormous, and in a sense it still remains so. The Gestapo and the SD were both organisations within Himmler’s SS, and therefore the charge was superfluous. Above all, however, it conflicted with the long-standing principle that criminal liability is personal: even today, the Latin maxim ‘societas delinquere non potest’ is so binding that, in our legal system, the liability of legal entities – as provided for by the famous Law 231 – is referred to, with modest understatement, as ‘administrative’.

The British – who intended to shorten and streamline the proceedings – had already submitted, on 21 June, an initial list of ten defendants, those most conspicuously implicated in war crimes. This included, in addition to Hermann Göring, Reichsmarschall and the regime’s second-in-command; Robert Ley, head of the Labour Front; Rudolf Hess, formerly a close confidant of Hitler, who had fled to Britain in 1941; Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister; Wilhelm Keitel, head (after Hitler) of the OKW, that is, of the entire Wehrmacht; Julius Streicher, editor of the crude anti-Semitic newspaper "Der Sturmer"; Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the Reich Security Main Office, comprising the Gestapo and the SD; Alfred Rosenberg, official theorist of Aryan racism and Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories; Hans Frank, Governor of Poland, with its associated extermination camps; and finally Wilhelm Frick, Minister of the Interior and head of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia

Deputy Chief Prosecutor Maxwell Fyfe explained that the choice had been determined primarily by the fame these individuals enjoyed. As for the evidence, the team of deputy prosecutors would set to work to find it. For some, it took little effort; for others, the task proved to be rather complicated. The Americans considered the list to be inadequate and unrepresentative: they added Hjalmar Schacht, former President of the Central Bank and Minister for the Economy; Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands; Admiral Karl Dönitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from 1943 to 1945 and Hitler’s designated successor; Walter Funk, Schacht’s successor following the latter’s fall from grace; Albert Speer, Minister for Armaments; and finally Baldur von Schirach, leader of the Hitler Youth. For the Russians, of course, this was not enough. Nikitchenko insisted on expanding the list to include industrialists, starting with Gustav Krupp. The reader may wonder whether this Nikitchenko was the same man who, as we have seen, was a member of the panel of judges. Paradoxical as it may seem, that was indeed the case. Even the Frenchman Falco, who was to become the substitute judge for Donnedieu de Vabres, took part in the selection of the defendants. It seems that no one had any objections. These were not the only anomalies. The ineffable Nikitchenko, during the second session of the Preparatory Conference at Church House in London, had put it this way: ‘We are dealing with major war criminals, who have already been convicted and whose sentences have already been announced by the heads of government in the declarations of Moscow and Crimea’. In any democratic country, such a pre-emptive pronouncement of the verdict would have disqualified him as a ‘iudex suspectus’: here too, no one had any objections. But the height of judicial eccentricity was reached with the Krupp case, which warrants a brief mention.

This dynasty of industrialists had played a decisive role in the Kaiser’s warmongering policies, supplying him with the deadliest artillery. The founder’s daughter, Bertha, had lent her name to a gigantic cannon which propaganda would later confuse with the much heavier one – also made by Krupp – that was bombarding Paris from a distance of over one hundred kilometres. With Hitler’s rise to power, Gustav Krupp had re-armed Germany even more decisively. A staunch Nazi, this man had been identified as the leading figure in the war industry, and was therefore indicted alongside the political and military leaders. But by June 1945, he was a mere shadow of his former self, consumed by senile dementia, and could not be brought to court. Judges and prosecutors were divided. Some wanted to try him in absentia. But this ran counter to every basic rule: a defendant is considered to be in absentia only if they voluntarily evade trial, not if they are unable to attend. Having discarded this outlandish idea, Jackson came up with an even more bizarre one: to summon his son Alfred in his place, who until a few years earlier had been enjoying life, and had only recently, following his father’s illness, taken on operational responsibilities. According to Telford Taylor, one of Jackson’s key associates, this was ‘the lowest point’ in his boss’s arguments. Fortunately, President Lawrence, who described this proposal as ‘compelling’, dismissed it as a disgrace. But it was a long and deplorable battle, which did no credit to either Jackson or his supporters.

And now we come to the defendants. In addition to those already mentioned, others were added, whom we shall look at later. However, for reasons of space, we shall describe only the most representative ones.

Hermann Goering was, formally, second only to Hitler. Or rather, he had been until April ’45, when, with Berlin under siege, he proposed to the Führer that he should hand over his powers to him as his designated successor. The dictator, enraged, ordered his arrest on charges of treason. The portly marshal was, however, already safe, and shortly afterwards he surrendered to the Americans. He was treated with every honour, and appeared at a press conference with the pride of a satrap standing alongside an American colonel. Eisenhower was outraged: he sent the prisoner to a cell and the unwary officer home. Göring was no petty braggart. He came from a distinguished family, and during the First World War he had earned a reputation as a hero as a fighter pilot with the legendary ‘Red Baron’s’ squadron. A staunch Nazi, though not a fanatic, he had gone along with Hitler’s rise to power without neglecting his own countless vices. He had created the Gestapo and the first concentration camps, but had soon left this thankless task to Himmler, turning his attention instead to rebuilding the Luftwaffe and enriching his own estates. In 1940, he had lost the Battle of Britain and the Führer’s trust. He did not let it get him down: he devoted himself to plundering the artistic treasures of the occupied countries, and to heightening his enjoyment of them with the aid of drugs. He had put on weight without losing any of his intelligence: at his trial, psychologists considered him the sharpest and most lively mind; Jackson would soon realise this at his own expense. But behind this brilliant intellect lay a personality of ruthless unscrupulousness. Goering had countersigned the most heinous orders concerning deportations and exterminations. He knew the gallows awaited him, and he wanted to play the leading role right to the very end, mocking the court. After the sentence was read out, he poisoned himself with cyanide in his cell.

Ernst Kaltenbrunner, like Goering, was formally one of the most powerful men in the Reich. In reality, he was an obedient bureaucrat, whose cruelty was surpassed only by his unquestioning subservience to Hitler and Himmler, his immediate superior. This unassuming Austrian lawyer was, in fact, the head of the Reich Security Main Office, established and run by Reinhard Heydrich until his death in May 1942 in Prague, following an ambush carried out by Czechoslovak soldiers trained and parachuted in by the British. As is often the case, the importance of an office depends on the personality of the person who heads it. Heydrich was exceptionally intelligent, cultured, athletic, a music lover and a violinist. His ambition matched his ability, and was surpassed only by the ruthlessness of his character. He had organised and presided over the Wannsee Conference, where the ‘Final Solution’ for the extermination of over 10 million Jews had been adopted, many of whom came from allied countries, such as Italy, or even countries yet to be conquered, such as Great Britain. The RSHA comprised the best of the best, or the worst of the worst, of the SS. First and foremost was the Sicherheitsdienst, or Security Service (SD), divided into two branches. The internal branch, commanded by Otto Ohlendorf – whom we shall encounter later – was also responsible for the composition of the Einsatzgruppen, the murder squads which, in the wake of the occupying forces, exterminated political commissars, partisans, priests and, of course, Jews. The external branch, headed by Walter Schellenberg, was more sophisticated; it managed espionage and counter-espionage, and was essentially aimed at eliminating Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr, who was considered a traitor. Worse than the SD, within the RSHA, was only the Gestapo, the notorious secret police tasked with tracking down and killing the Reich’s real or supposed enemies, and above all with eliminating the Jews. The head of Section IV B4 was none other than Adolf Eichmann, who reported directly first to Heydrich and then to Himmler, bypassing his superiors, including Kaltenbrunner. The RSHA also included the Kripo (criminal police), which dealt with a bit of everything, often meting out summary justice. Its head, Arthur Nebe, after having committed the most heinous crimes, joined the conspirators plotting against the Führer’s life. He was discovered and executed.

Heydrich had become so powerful – it was rumoured that he even had Himmler spied on – that the latter began to fear him, and perhaps even to encourage his assassination. In any case, after his death, Himmler was no longer willing to take any risks. He left the post vacant, and in 1943 appointed Kaltenbrunner to head it; apart from his callous cruelty, Kaltenbrunner was characterised by an acromegalic physique and a face disfigured by a scar from a duel in his youth. This puppet never became the effective head of the organisations he was supposed to lead. The SD was run by Schellenberg, and the Gestapo by Heinrich Müller, who disappeared after the war and, unlike Eichmann, was never tracked down. But whilst Kaltenbrunner’s actual capabilities fell short of the high rank he held, his orders had nonetheless led to the deaths of millions of Jews and other groups of dissidents. The defendant put up a cowardly and grotesque defence, claiming that he had never known anything about the extermination camps and had never seen one. He was contradicted by photographs and by the testimony of Rudolf Höss, the commandant of Auschwitz, who, with meticulous diligence, laid out the figures of the massacre. For Kaltenbrunner, too, the verdict was already a foregone conclusion.

Like the two previous figures, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel was also, formally speaking, the second-highest military authority after Hitler, as head of the OKW, or Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. In this role, and by virtue of those paradoxes that occur only in dictatorships, he even issued orders to Goering, the head of the air force. But in reality, Keitel was merely a devoted yes-man, so subservient to Hitler’s influence that everyone called him ‘Lakeitel’ – a sycophant. He was a handsome man, and on the surface could have passed for an aristocratic Junker. But seen up close, and when compared with von Rundstedt – the senior-most of the field marshals and a figure of the highest prestige – he appeared for what he was: Hitler’s butler. It was precisely because of this servile subservience that the dictator had placed him in the most prominent position within the armed forces, without fearing any objections even to the most reckless plans and the most disastrous decisions. When Hitler, following the failure of the conquest of Moscow in December 1941, dismissed Field Marshal von Brauchitsch from command of the army and appointed himself in his place, he placed himself beneath Keitel in the chain of command – even though Keitel was, in reality, obeying him. The reader may well lose their way in this labyrinth of absurdities. But one of the reasons why Hitler lost the war was also this: he had created a sea of hell and a mountain of stupidity. Keitel, however, had nothing in common with thugs like Kaltenbrunner or depraved individuals like Streicher. He was an old-school officer, capable and diligent. He did not consider himself a genius, and was the first to be surprised when Hitler appointed him to the helm of the Wehrmacht. His fault lay in adapting to Hitler’s strategy, endorsing its wickedness and carrying out his criminal directives. He signed the infamous ‘Night and Fog’ decree, which provided for the elimination of the so-called ‘enemies of the Reich’, who were made to vanish without trial like ghosts evaporating into the darkness. His authority enforced the most criminal acts, such as the massacre of defenceless civilians and the killing of prisoners. Yet during his trial he conducted himself with dignity: he did not deny his guilt, and his repentance was not a shameful whinge. After being sentenced to death, he requested the punishment meted out to a soldier – the firing squad. His request was denied. During the hanging, his head struck the wooden block, and the post-mortem photograph shows his bloodied face. Even Eisenhower himself was saddened by this.

Alongside Keitel, the prosecutors sought to include Alfred Jodl, a colonel-general who even today is invariably mentioned alongside Keitel, owing to that twin-like association found in the most diverse fields: in mythology, such as Castor and Pollux; in literature, such as Euryalus and Nisus; in films, such as Gianni and Pinotto; in fashion, such as Dolce and Gabbana; and even in politics, with Bonelli and Fratoianni. Jodl had been the Chief of Operations at the OKW, subordinate to Keitel but in fact far more efficient. Whilst his superior, as has been said, merely passed on the Führer’s directives, Jodl oversaw the operational plans and, with his staff, directed all the fighting on the Eastern Front and, during the Battle of the Ardennes, that on the Western Front as well. In his role, he was obviously aware of the violations of every human and divine rule of war: the pogroms against the Jews, the massacres of civilians, the indiscriminate reprisals, and so on. Yet even today, historians remain uncertain as to the extent of his criminal liability. His case was debated at length, but in the end, reasons of state prevailed. He too, like Keitel, was sent to the gallows. Many Allied military officers did not agree with such severity.