World
European rifts •
The European Union’s foreign policy died in Dublin
The Europeans have neither a coherent, unified plan nor a strategy or negotiating tactic for tackling the talks with Russia. Ursula von der Leyen’s disagreements with Kaja Kallas, whom some consider too hardline on Russia

Photo: AP via LaPresse
Brussels. The European Union’s ambition to have a foreign policy came to an end in Dublin on Friday 13 November, when heads of state and government decided to entrust negotiations on Ukraine to an unprecedented group comprising representatives from five major member states, António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen. The negotiations with Donald Trump’s envoys – and, where necessary, direct discussions with Russia – will be led by the national security advisers of the E5 (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Poland), supported by two advisers to the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission. Instead of speaking with one voice, the Europeans will sit at the table as a group of seven. By deciding to exclude Kaja Kallas, the leaders have also condemned the role of the High Representative and her European External Action Service. In future, who would ever want to hold a post that is devoid of powers and real significance?
The informal European Council meeting in Dublin was supposed to focus on artificial intelligence. Instead, following the resumption of trilateral negotiations between the United States, Russia and Ukraine in Abu Dhabi, the heads of state and government spent two days at odds over who should represent them. “The debate over names fuels divisions,” a European diplomat told us ahead of the summit: “That is exactly what Russia wants.” In the end, “the leaders decided that our European team for the peace negotiations on Ukraine consists of the EU institutions and the E5 of the coalition of the willing,” said Costa. The principles are the same as those agreed in June. “Only Ukraine has the legitimacy to decide on matters concerning its territory and sovereignty,” explained Costa. “The EU has a central role to play in discussing Ukraine’s future, its reconstruction and its prosperity. Security guarantees must be addressed within the framework of the coalition of the willing, in close coordination with NATO,” added the President of the European Council. “We will work as a European team on this endeavour.”
In reality, the team is not only growing in size, but also becoming increasingly disorganised. In Miami, at the end of August, there were national security advisers from France, the United Kingdom and Germany, as well as Bjorn Seibert, the chief of staff to the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. In Abu Dhabi this week, they were joined by Italy’s national security adviser and Anna-Maria Boura, Costa’s diplomatic adviser. In Dublin, it was decided that Poland’s national security adviser would also take part in the next stages of the discussions. Kaja Kallas, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, who in theory should be leading the EU’s foreign and security policy, has been excluded. The ‘European team’ will consist solely of the advisers to the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission. Von der Leyen has long been at odds with the High Representative. Some Member States consider Kallas to be too hardline on Russia to take part in the negotiations.
The humiliation inflicted on Kallas is justified in various ways. “The European External Action Service is not an institution, but a service,” a senior EU official explained to us. The President of the European Council represents all the leaders. The Commission is present because it manages dossiers such as enlargement or economic sanctions. In the case of the negotiations on Ukraine, “no foreign minister plays an obvious leading role,” a diplomat told us. “The decisions at stake go far beyond traditional foreign policy. They concern security guarantees, defence, economic relations, sanctions, frozen assets, reconstruction and, potentially, the future security architecture of our continent.” According to the diplomat, the negotiations on Ukraine are “literally a matter for heads of state and government”.
On the face of it, the argument seems reasonable. But in reality, the level of discussion has not yet reached the leaders. Special envoys or senior officials are sent to represent them in discussions on Ukraine. António Costa’s chief of staff, Pedro Lourtie, is not attending the meetings because he is too busy with negotiations on the EU’s 2028–34 budget and has handed over to a mere diplomatic adviser, Anna-Maria Boura. The EU’s chief representative is Ursula von der Leyen’s chief of staff, Bjoern Seibert. The Europeans could have appointed Kallas or the Secretary-General of the European External Action Service, Kajsa Ollongren, who is regarded as a heavyweight in global diplomacy.
If Europeans are forced to resort to a seven-member format, it is because they do not trust the EU institutions, nor do they trust one another. Poland has insisted on joining the ‘European team’ because it believes that France and Germany are not sufficiently determined to protect the interests of the countries most exposed to the threat from Russia. Warsaw’s fear is a repeat of the mistakes of the ‘Normandy Format’, in which Germany and France played solely the card of appeasement with Vladimir Putin. “Any decision that alters Europe’s security architecture, particularly in Eastern Europe, taken without consulting the countries directly concerned, would be difficult to accept not only for their political leaders, but also for their citizens,” a second diplomat told us, criticising the negative outcomes of past “restricted formats”.
The fact is that the Europeans have no coherent, unified plan, nor any strategy or negotiating tactics, with which to approach the talks with Russia. Paradoxically, Kallas was the only one who had attempted to draw one up. In February, she had presented a document setting out the maximum demands and red lines to be put to Moscow: to accept an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine; to end the hybrid war against Europe; to pay war reparations to Kyiv; to cooperate with international justice regarding war crimes committed during the conflict; to ban the Russian military presence in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia; and to limit Moscow’s armed forces. The foreign ministers discussed this in May, but failed to reach a consensus.
Kallas has repeatedly warned against falling into the Kremlin’s trap of opening discussions concerning the European security architecture, but the issue is now on the table. It was raised by Donald Trump when he spoke of a ‘big, beautiful deal’ concerning not only Ukraine but the whole of Europe. His envoys, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, have signed a document stating that discussions on the security architecture will only take place after the war has ended. However, the Kremlin is insisting that the issue be addressed before a ceasefire, and Trump is in a position to call European security into question simply by altering the US military posture on the Old Continent.
Kallas’s exclusion also sends a signal of weakness in the face of Russia. “Nobody wants her, and not because she is a tenacious negotiator. She is simply stupid,” wrote former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, before the leaders made their decision. By excluding Kallas, the Europeans have made yet another concession to the Kremlin. They have given the impression that it is Russia that chooses which Europeans can sit at the table to represent them.
The implications of this decision also extend within the EU. By sidelining the High Representative, the leaders in Dublin have stripped this post and the European External Action Service of their functions. Whether on relations with the United States or China, or on the war in Iran or the conflict in the Middle East, the person who should be speaking on behalf of the EU has been definitively discredited. The Commission may be able to absorb what remains of the European External Action Service’s functions, but without the political legitimacy or institutional powers to conduct foreign policy. In its perpetual quest for a single voice to speak to the world, the EU lost that voice for good in Dublin.