Trump’s miscalculations regarding Turkey’s commitment to Riyadh

Ankara. The United States hopes that Turkey will commit – including through a ground presence – to the defence of Saudi Arabia, but at present the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is not willing to do so, particularly whilst he is busy clearing the field of opposition ahead of the presidential elections in Turkey. He does, however, appear willing to provide Riyadh with a more adequate supply of defence and intelligence systems. Trump, on the other hand, has hinted that he might secure a more direct commitment from Ankara to defend Saudi Arabia through military operations against Yemeni Shia militias. Signed in Mecca on 7 August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, the defence pact has been compared by Ankara to Article 5 of NATO. The comparison is misleading: the agreement expresses nothing more than solidarity and a willingness to cooperate, and does not provide for joint command structures or integrated facilities comparable to those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The crisis with the Houthis in Yemen provided the first test. Drone and missile attacks on Saudi territory and infrastructure have put the signatories’ commitments to the test. Pakistan has condemned the attacks but ruled out a military response. Turkey initially focused on de-escalation; subsequently, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Ankara is ready to contribute to Saudi Arabia’s defence needs and is considering sending personnel, pilots, aircraft, air defence systems and electronic warfare equipment to protect Saudi infrastructure, but the agreement itself and any supplies must comply with Turkish constitutional procedures, including parliamentary approval. The crisis reveals the nature of the agreement better than any slogan.

It is neither a ‘Muslim NATO’ nor a Sunni bloc aligned against Iran or Israel. The three countries have different priorities: Pakistan is primarily focused on India; Turkey on Russia, Syria, the Kurds and the eastern Mediterranean; and Saudi Arabia on Iran, Yemen and the reliability of external protection. Their threat maps overlap only partially. There is no common enemy. Realist alliance theory helps to make sense of this ambiguity: states cooperate to safeguard interests and security, not out of mere solidarity. Each seeks commitments that are credible enough to ensure they are not left alone, yet flexible enough to avoid being dragged into an unwanted conflict. Riyadh wants reliable partners; Islamabad has no intention of becoming embroiled in a wider confrontation with Tehran; Ankara wants to increase its influence without compromising NATO or its own freedom of action.

The precedent set by the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) – a now-defunct Middle Eastern military and security alliance known as the Baghdad Pact, founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom – calls for caution: when members have differing priorities, cohesion can weaken. The agreement may, however, lead to concrete cooperation. Joint exercises and collaboration are planned in the fields of air defence, drones and electronic warfare. But coordinating different systems is complex: Turkey operates within NATO structures, Saudi Arabia relies on Western systems, whilst Pakistan is also linked to the Chinese military ecosystem. Command structures, intelligence arrangements and the criteria for activating collective defence remain to be clarified. The crisis has highlighted the limits of Saudi diversification. Riyadh is seeking broader relationships, not a new exclusive protector: security with the United States, economic ties with China, military cooperation with Pakistan and industrial cooperation with Turkey, whilst keeping channels open with Tehran. This diversification broadens Saudi Arabia’s options without eliminating its dependencies.

The Middle East is not divided into rigid blocs. American exclusivity is waning, but Washington’s material dominance remains evident. The Mecca Pact does not resolve the contradictions between the signatories: it provides a framework for negotiating assistance, limits and responsibilities. The crucial question is not merely which side one is on, but which threat one is confronting, with which partners and at what cost.