The EU has a mandate issue in the negotiations on Ukraine

The closer we get to the resumption of trilateral talks between the United States, Russia and Ukraine – scheduled to take place in Abu Dhabi on 10 and 11 November – the more nervous some European leaders are becoming. And that nervousness is set to grow after Donald Trump spoke of a “big, beautiful deal” with Russia that is also expected to include an agreement on Europe’s security architecture. The US President’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who is leading the negotiations alongside businessman Steve Witkoff, explained that Trump had discussed with several European leaders “a broader European security architecture that could help establish the conditions for a lasting peace” in Ukraine. Kushner also provided some details: “Ongoing security consultations, reliable crisis communications, greater military transparency, reciprocal measures to reduce the risks of escalation, and a lasting framework for long-term European security and stability”. Furthermore, there are some key principles: “Any agreement must fully respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and autonomous decision-making of every nation. Each country will retain authority over its own security and alliances, and no country will have a veto over the sovereign choices of another. NATO will remain central to European collective defence,” said Kushner.

This week’s talks in Brussels must have had some influence on Trump’s son-in-law. The principles of the security architecture outlined by Kushner have never been acceptable to Vladimir Putin, whose objectives are to turn Ukraine into a vassal state and to roll back NATO to its pre-enlargement stance vis-à-vis the former Warsaw Pact countries. European unease stems from the possibility – considered ‘real’ by several leaders – that Trump might strike a deal with Putin behind Ukraine’s and Europe’s backs. The proliferation of meetings in various formats and the phone call to the Russian leader by the President of Finland, Alexander Stubb, and the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, are described as “theatre” designed to demonstrate once again to Trump that Putin does not want a deal. However, these talks have also fuelled another form of unease, that of those not directly involved. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticised the phone call by Stubb and Støre. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said that “Eastern Europe and Scandinavia cannot be left out of the conversation” because Finland, Norway, the Baltic states and Poland all share borders with Russia. Giorgia Meloni wrote a letter to the EU envoy, threatening not to recognise commitments that had not been agreed in advance.

Beyond the EU representative, Meloni’s letter raises a real issue: the mandate. What is Ursula von der Leyen’s chief of staff, Bjoern Seibert, talking about when he discusses matters with Kushner and Witkoff? What concessions is Europe prepared to make to Russia in exchange for a ceasefire? What are the European ‘red lines’ set by France, Germany and the United Kingdom regarding Europe’s security architecture? In the latest conclusions of the European Council, there is only one reference to the negotiations led by the United States. “The path to peace in Ukraine cannot be decided without Ukraine. The EU will decide on matters within its competence or which affect its security,” the leaders said. Thanks to sectoral sanctions and the more than €200 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets, the EU has significant negotiating leverage and cannot be left out. But the 27 member states are divided on strategy, both in form and substance. Some leaders are prepared to make concessions to end a war that has worn them down. Others are opposed to dialogue with Putin because he has no intention of making peace.

At European Council level, there was no real discussion on the mandate. Only the High Representative, Kaja Kallas – despite being convinced that Putin is not serious – made the effort to draw up a document setting out the red lines and demands that Europeans should present to Russia: an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine; an end to the hybrid war in Europe; limits on Russia’s rearmament, which threatens European security; no legal recognition of the occupied Ukrainian territories; cooperation with international justice; payment of war reparations; and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. Presented in February, the Kallas list has so far only been discussed at the level of foreign ministers.