It is possible to rein in the illiberals. Lessons from beyond the mid-term elections

Democracies are fragile; otherwise, they would not be democracies. And like all fragile things, they must be looked after, nurtured and supported, and we must remember how dangerous it is to take their functioning for granted. In recent years, however, due to the widespread prevalence of leaders reluctant to defend the non-negotiable principles of open societies, a sombre warning has often been sounded – the same one heard repeatedly over the last two years of Trumpism: if a democracy is placed in the hands of a politician with illiberal tendencies, that democracy is bound to crumble.

Trump, as we know, has repeatedly given the impression that, in a democracy, he considers only those results to be acceptable that suit him, and 6 January 2021, with the storming of the Capitol unopposed by Trump himself, was the epitome of Trumpian illiberalism. However tempted he may be in the coming days to use every weapon at his disposal to try and sway any election results he finds unpalatable, it can be said without fear of contradiction that the history of American democracy over the last two years has provided further evidence to reflect on a recurring theme: a democracy, however much it may be under strain, may be shaken but always remains a democracy. Democracies, when faced with illiberal waves, know how to resist, know how to react, and know how to produce antibodies.

It has happened in America on several occasions over the past two years, when the democratic system has stemmed the tide of Trump’s excesses. It happened on 20 February 2026, when, by six votes to three, the Supreme Court ruled that Trump could not use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose his blanket tariffs. It happened on 30 June 2026, when, in another six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court rejected Trump’s attempt to automatically deny citizenship to children born in the United States to undocumented parents. It happened in late 2025, almost a year ago, when, once again, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Governor of Illinois, who had challenged the legality of the White House’s decision to deploy the National Guard in Chicago without adequate justification. Moreover, some of Trump’s reckless decisions were repeatedly curbed by a powerful ally of democratic systems: the market. Many will recall the deterrent role played by fluctuations in U.S. government bond yields during the first fierce tariff threats levelled by Trump.

The grossly exaggerated claim that democracies are coming to an end – as the Council on Foreign Relations wisely noted in a splendid article a few days ago – does not concern America alone, but also other interesting democratic contexts, which have shown a vitality exceeding all expectations. In Serbia, a few days ago, elections were held with a turnout of almost 70 per cent – the highest level since the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. In Brazil, turnout exceeded 80 per cent. In Israel – a country described by the global propaganda machine as facing a crisis of democratic identity – 77.9 per cent of the electorate voted, the highest turnout since 1999, with some 67,000 Israelis living abroad returning home to cast their votes. In Hungary, the European Union’s most notorious autocrat, Viktor Orbán, was ousted at the ballot box. In Canada, in 2025, a record turnout (69 per cent, the highest since 1993) rewarded a staunch anti-Trump candidate.

It is true that democracies are often mistreated. But the news coming from democracies around the world serves to remind us that whilst illiberalism exists, democracies have the defences to manage it. And who knows, perhaps the mid-term elections are there to remind us of this once again.