Following the US withdrawal, Iraq is attempting to bring weapons back under state control without severing ties with Iran

Even before the US military withdrawal from Iraq on 30 September, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi’s visit to Washington had already reshaped the nature of relations between Iraq and the United States. Yet the most difficult challenge, both now and in the future, is not being played out in Washington but in Tehran. It is there that Baghdad must convince its main regional partner that Iraq’s stability and sovereignty require a redefinition of the nature of Iranian influence in the country, not an end to the relationship.

For over twenty years, every attempt to forge a strategic partnership between Baghdad and Washington has been hampered by the weight of Iranian influence in Iraq and the wider regional rivalry between the United States and Iran. Recently, the repercussions of this conflict have extended beyond Iraq’s borders to neighbouring countries: cross-border attacks on Saudi infrastructure and, in late July, retaliatory raids carried out jointly by Saudi Arabia and the US Central Command (Centcom) against positions of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) on Iraqi territory. Most recently, on 11 September, a drone attack launched from the Iraqi province of Maysan struck Saudi Arabia’s east-west oil pipeline, forcing a temporary suspension of the flow and signalling the onset of a dangerous phase of regional escalation.

These developments present the Iraqi government with a twofold challenge: to contain the security fallout whilst, at the same time, managing the crisis on the diplomatic front. Baghdad has condemned the Saudi-Centcom retaliatory air strikes as violations of its sovereignty, but has also reiterated its opposition to the use of Iraqi territory as a launch pad for attacks against neighbouring states. The recent escalation involving Saudi Arabia raises a more pressing question: what future lies in store for armed groups in a post-coalition Iraq. Even now that the withdrawal of international coalition forces has been completed, the ongoing confrontation between the United States and Iran means that the disarmament of the militias remains a distant prospect, if not entirely out of reach. By fuelling regional instability, this conflict provides armed factions with a constant pretext for retaining their arsenals, undermining the state’s attempts to secure a monopoly on the use of force.

In this scenario, Baghdad has sought to convince the Iranian leadership that the new regional context calls for a different approach to managing relations, based on cooperation rather than on maintaining multiple competing centres of power: an objective that al Zaidi emphasised during his meetings in Tehran last July, following his visit to Washington.

Developments within Iraq reinforce this trend. The ongoing discussions within the Coordination Framework regarding the regulation or integration of militia weapons, together with the government’s anti-corruption campaign, should not be interpreted simply as concessions to American pressure, as claimed by some observers. Rather, they reflect a political choice dictated primarily by domestic considerations. Preserving the stability of the state, strengthening national institutions and preventing Iraq from once again becoming a battleground for proxy wars have become objectives shared by the Shia political establishment itself. However, this domestic trajectory faces growing difficulties with every new escalation, because the persistence of attacks allows factions opposed to the reorganisation of the arms issue to postpone any concrete action under the pretext of self-defence. A crucial aspect is that this change no longer concerns the government alone. Within the Coordination Framework and amongst some faction leaders, there are signs of a strategic reassessment: it is recognised that the previous model is no longer sustainable politically, economically or strategically. The costs of maintaining armed groups outside state authority now outweigh the benefits, whilst Iraq’s gradual transformation into a regional theatre of war threatens the political system itself.

At the same time, Iran appears to be reassessing its priorities in light of recent regional developments. According to Dr Firas Elias, an expert on Iranian national security, Tehran is taking a pragmatic approach to the issue of placing all weapons under state control. In his analysis, Iran’s objective is no longer to preserve the traditional model of armed factions, but to maintain its influence through a stable Iraqi state, equipped with effective institutions, in which armed groups operate primarily as political actors rather than as independent centres of military power. Elias also argues that Iran is not, in itself, opposed to the idea of reserving weapons for the state, provided that the process does not marginalise the forces close to Tehran. If addressed through political agreements between Baghdad and Tehran, the issue would likely be seen by Iran as an opportunity to reorganise its influence within Iraqi state institutions, rather than losing it altogether.

This assessment is in line with that of the Dutch researcher Wladimir van Wilgenburg, co-author of "The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflicts", who argues that Iraq’s interests are best served by maintaining balanced relations with both Washington and Tehran, given that any direct confrontation between the two capitals would seriously undermine Iraq’s stability and economy. Van Wilgenburg notes that some Iranian-backed armed groups, whilst receiving state funding, have recently targeted Iraqi and Kurdish oil and gas fields operated by foreign companies, before extending their operations to Saudi Arabia. Actions of this kind risk undermining the Iraqi government’s diplomatic efforts in the region.

Overall, these developments suggest that the dialogue between Baghdad and Tehran no longer centres on whether Iran should retain influence in Iraq, but on how it exercises that influence. Whilst Iranian influence has in the past been based on a variety of armed groups, the next phase could see a gradual transition towards stronger state institutions, with less reliance on direct military means. The success of this transformation will, however, depend on Tehran’s ability to rein in the armed groups aligned with it and to prevent actions that could risk dragging Iraq into a direct confrontation between the United States, its regional allies and Iran.

For Baghdad, the challenge is no longer limited to balancing relations between Washington and Tehran. It now also includes the task of preventing domestic actors from undermining that balance. The new equation no longer revolves solely around the possibility of a direct American response: it also encompasses the willingness of states in the region to participate in retaliatory actions whenever attacks from Iraqi territory threaten their security. Recent events have shown just how quickly unilateral initiatives can drag the country into the centre of the regional conflict, just as the government is seeking to consolidate a policy based on de-escalation and balanced engagement.

When, at the end of July, joint US and Saudi Arabian air strikes hit PMF positions and the pro-Iranian militias made it clear they were ready to retaliate, the threat of an escalating crisis grew, putting Baghdad on high alert. Tensions came to a head on 7 August, when Hadi al Amiri, leader of the Badr Organisation – a hardline faction within the Shia camp – released a rare video message addressing the Islamic resistance directly, calling on them to suspend any retaliatory attacks against Riyadh in order to safeguard Iraq’s sovereign interests.

Al Amiri’s August statement highlighted a widening rift within the Shia political-military sphere, between factions open to gradual integration and hardliners who oppose state control. For a brief period, the main actors aligned with Iran chose to wait and see how events unfolded, prioritising diplomatic manoeuvring over open confrontation.

Local sources indicate that Tehran played a direct role in enforcing that temporary lull: representatives of the Pasdaran (IRGC) are said to have sent messages to al-Amiri asking him to prioritise diplomacy, ordering prominent factions such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba not to take action against Saudi Arabia.

The arrival in Baghdad on 11 August of Esmail Qaani, commander of the Pasdaran’s Quds Force, was part of this diplomatic effort. The visit was reportedly prompted by tensions surrounding Jurf al Sakhar (renamed Jurf al Nasr), a fortified stronghold of the PMF where Iraqi security leaders have sought to establish a stronger state military presence. Meeting with the leaders of the Coordination Framework and the militia commanders, Qaani warned the factions against clashing with the Iraqi security forces, whilst at the same time asking the Framework’s leadership to put pressure on the Prime Minister not to weaken the armed groups.

However, the ambitious timetable set by the government to resolve the arms issue has been met with strong scepticism. When the 30 September deadline passed without a general handover of weapons, analysts had already pointed out in advance that the date served a political purpose rather than having any binding operational significance. As the Iraqi analyst Hamzeh Hadad had observed before the deadline: “This date is symbolic and its announcement is a signal from the new Iraqi government, which intends to tackle the issue of armed groups and integrate them into the state apparatus, but no one realistically expects this to be fully achieved by that deadline”. Explaining the reasoning of senior government officials, he adds: “Zaidi’s argument is that, with no more foreign troops in Iraq, there is no longer any point in bearing arms.” However, external air strikes and cross-border escalation have repeatedly threatened to stall progress, giving the most intractable factions a new reason to resist state control. On the counterproductive effect of foreign military action, Hadad warned: “The recent air raids by Saudi Arabia and the United States, and other actions that have violated Iraq’s sovereignty, will only strengthen the armed groups, providing them with a justification for their existence and for resisting disarmament.”

Confirming the symbolic nature of that initial objective, Prime Minister al Zaidi and the pro-Iranian leaders have ultimately opted for a phased approach extending until June 2027: a delay designed to gain valuable political breathing space. Recent statements by Ali al Assadi, political leader of Harakat al Nujaba, confirm that four major factions of the Islamic resistance, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, have now joined the process mediated by the Framework after securing a much longer transition period.

Under this negotiated agreement, heavy weaponry, including ballistic missiles and explosive drones, is to be transferred to the PMF (Popular Mobilisation Forces) Commission, whilst fighters will be integrated into civilian or security structures. However, this multi-stage truce remains fragile, as the factions’ compliance with their commitments depends entirely on mutual guarantees: that neither US nor Israeli forces will, from now on, target their leadership or facilities.

If the Iraqi government succeeds in transforming the agreements reached with Washington, Tehran and Riyadh into a framework that strengthens the state’s sovereignty and restricts the use of force to official institutions, Iraq could have a rare opportunity to move from being a battleground to becoming an influential regional player. If, on the other hand, certain armed groups continue to escalate the conflict – whether on their own initiative or as part of broader strategic calculations – the resulting foreign attacks on Iraqi territory will only lead to a new cycle of violations of sovereignty.

Non-state factions will then exploit these external interventions as a permanent justification for maintaining their arsenals, effectively reproducing the very same structural deadlock that has characterised the Iraqi state over the last twenty years.

Ali al Mikdam, researcher and journalist – Gisella Ligios, correspondent based in Iraq