The Israeli army responds to Naza

“NAZA” presents a distorted, misleading and dishonest picture of the planning and execution of the IDF’s attacks. It is based on factual errors and anonymous testimonies which generally describe only an initial phase of a much broader process. The filmmakers omit the context of the war in Gaza and the IDF’s conduct, in order to suit their narrative, and accentuate the distortion through manipulative editing and references to historical atrocities, attributing malicious intentions to the IDF that the alleged ‘evidence’ does not substantiate. The serious dilemmas of asymmetric warfare raised by those interviewed are not treated with the seriousness they deserve.

The distortion begins with the headline. ‘NAZA’ is the acronym for the Hebrew ‘Nezek Agavi’, meaning ‘collateral damage’: a technical term used by any law-abiding army, and one that has also been used for years by the IDF to refer to incidental harm to civilians resulting from an attack on a military target. The film portrays this assessment as indifference. It is, however, an obligation under international law: it enables commanders to assess the lawfulness of an operation, put precautions in place, modify the plan or cancel it, thereby reducing the risk to civilians – as has happened many times in this war.

The IDF is open to genuine criticism, learns from substantiated allegations and improves its practices. It is bound by international humanitarian law; its procedures implement those obligations, with units dedicated to minimising harm to civilians. Suspected violations are investigated and, where warranted, addressed through disciplinary action, criminal investigations or other measures.

Contrary to standard practice, they did not submit the allegations to the IDF prior to publication, nor did they provide a copy of the film after the screening – despite being asked to do so – nor did they provide any details regarding the incidents. The IDF assessed the film on the basis of a report from a representative who attended a public screening, other reports and statements from the filmmakers.

Two sections: the fundamental flaws; the main allegations. This list is not exhaustive of all the false and distorted claims.

The anonymous sources regarding the identification of targets are described as former intelligence officers. The accounts generally concern the initial and intelligence-gathering stages, not the planning and approval stages, which are the responsibility of operational bodies, not intelligence. The film treats them as if they were the ones making the final decisions. Even if one accepts their roles and their intention to report faithfully what they saw — or, more problematically, what they heard — many of their statements reveal an insufficient understanding of the subsequent stages, which lie outside their remit, and misrepresent the IDF’s policy.

An interviewee may mistake a preliminary estimate of the number of civilians around a target for the final figure. That figure does not include subsequent precautions or the civilians whom the planned attack would have affected. Concentrating the strike, changing the weapon or timing, and updating evacuation figures following warnings can significantly alter the estimated risk.

For every attack, commanders must assess proportionality in advance: the anticipated incidental damage to civilians and civilian property must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected, and they must order all possible precautions. Experts assess the damage and propose less harmful means; independent legal advisers review the plans and set out conditions and recommendations. During the war, commanders have imposed restrictions, amended plans, deferred proposals or refused approval due to anticipated harm – whether during the planning stage or in real time – often because of the unexpected presence of civilians.

The preliminary stages alone do not determine final assessments, conditions, precautions during implementation or actual effects. An executive-level analyst does not represent the entire process – in which other professionals are involved – nor the full range of policies and directives that fall outside their remit. This is not a complete account, but rather the inference that the film invites the viewer to draw.

Checks carried out in good faith would have prevented obvious errors; the result shows that none were carried out. Apart from anonymous accounts – the precise roles and direct knowledge of which are unknown – no directives, contemporary recordings or other evidence are cited. The alleged attacks do not specify a target, date, location or victims: these are generic and unverifiable claims. Contrary to standard investigative practice, the allegations were not submitted to the IDF prior to publication, an omission which casts doubt on the willingness to test the narrative against evidence that might refute it.

The context is not given due weight: the massacre of 7 October, Hamas’s military entrenchment amongst the civilian population, and the IDF’s measures to protect civilians. The events of 7 October do not simply balance out the suffering; they highlight the threat that materialised in that attack and the security rationale behind the subsequent operations. Failing to give this the proper weight leads to a misrepresentation of Israel’s objectives in the war. Hamas has embedded operatives, weapons and infrastructure on a large scale within and beneath civilian areas, using hospitals, UN facilities, schools and mosques for military purposes, as documented, and has used civilians as human shields, with operatives in civilian clothing. This is the context of the film: hidden targets, the position of civilians, and the effects of an attack. Urban combat and civilian casualties are a choice made by Hamas, not by Israel.

The film omits the IDF’s measures: many attacks were called off or never authorised due to the risk to civilians; others were planned to minimise that risk as much as possible; personnel and resources were dedicated to protection, including a Damage Mitigation Cell which issued warnings and monitored civilians throughout Gaza; and numerous independent legal advisers were involved. Through COGAT, Israel has coordinated aid and facilitated the delivery of civilian supplies: more than 3.9 million tonnes of food since October 2023. This refutes the claim of indifference attributed to the IDF.

The following covers the main allegations, including the factual and legal context, without exhausting the list of false claims.

The IDF has never planned, approved or carried out an attack in Gaza expected to result in 500 civilian deaths, nor one with a figure even remotely close to that. No one has seriously claimed such a death toll or anything close to it. The filmmakers have highlighted this claim, even in the trailer, without being able to verify it and without any evidence.

Two errors: a policy threshold – which requires high-level approval – is mistaken for authorisation to attack, and a database is mistaken for a list of targets. The regulations have never automatically authorised attacks that put a fixed number of civilians at risk.

For each attack, the commander assesses proportionality on a case-by-case basis: the anticipated civilian deaths, injuries and damage to civilian property must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected. The regulations allocate authority and require higher-level approval once certain thresholds of estimated damage are exceeded, in accordance with military requirements and changing circumstances. This is standard practice in Western armed forces, for strategic, operational and tactical reasons, not merely legal ones.

Regulations never relieve a commander of the responsibility to make an individual assessment. The interviewee is confusing the threshold of authority with approval. That threshold is not a permitted number of casualties: it merely specifies who is authorised to give approval.

A threshold of 200 casualties for an attack on a military target has never existed or been applied. The thresholds set out in the regulations are much lower. No such attack was authorised or carried out in Gaza, and no one has put forward credible allegations of a death toll of that magnitude.

“Lavender” is not a list of approved targets. As the IDF has explained, it is a database that cross-references intelligence sources to update information on the operations of terrorist organisations in Gaza. Inclusion on the list does not identify a person as a target nor does it authorise an attack. The misrepresentation appears to stem from those who are unfamiliar with the entire process.

Regarding the policy on target identification, see the IDF’s response to the New York Times dated 26 January 2025, “IDF Targeting Methods During the First Weeks of the Hamas-Israel War”.

This is what international humanitarian law requires: a civilian is a civilian regardless of age, and no civilian life is worth less than another. Estimates are taken into account before proceeding and, throughout the war, the presence of various categories of civilians, particularly children, has led to attacks being called off, postponed or rescheduled.

Various units examine the outcomes and reports of civilian casualties. According to officials in certain intelligence units, those interviewed do not appear to belong to these units and cannot testify on this matter. Soldiers are generally not present at the sites struck by air strikes, and the ability to verify reports is limited. Within these limits, the IDF monitors open sources and, where necessary, other means. This has resulted in debriefings on hundreds of incidents and lessons learnt. Any suspected breach of the law or regulations must be reported and is investigated; further inquiries may follow. The Military Advocate General decides whether a criminal investigation or other measures are warranted.

In the IDF, artificial intelligence does not determine whether an object or a person is a target, nor whether it is struck. Targets are identified by human analysts, approved by at least one authorised intelligence officer, then passed on to other officers with different specialisms, and the process concludes with a decision by an operational commander, in accordance with international humanitarian law. Computational tools come into play at a later stage, to cross-reference databases that have already been compiled and assessed and to direct analysts towards relevant information: they do not select targets autonomously. Hamas has tens of thousands of operatives and conceals its military resources amongst civilians; establishing that a person or object is a legitimate target requires a considerable intelligence effort. These tools make the process more precise, whilst complying with the law, without replacing human agents. This may stem from a lack of understanding of the entire chain of approval.

The guidelines prohibit the targeting of civilians. The allegations, including shootings at distribution centres, have been verified: every credible report undergoes a preliminary review. Where there is reasonable suspicion, the Military Advocate General (MAG) orders a criminal investigation and, if the evidence warrants it, brings charges.

The rules of engagement permitted firing only at operatives and suspects who posed an immediate threat. The IDF worked to ensure that the sites remained operational and that food reached civilians, in accordance with humanitarian law and the IDF’s values. The sites were located in an active war zone, with armed militants mingling amongst the population, and soldiers were exposed to risks.

Following several tragic incidents involving civilian deaths inside or near the centres, debriefings, lessons learnt and further instructions were issued. It cordoned off the areas, erected barriers and signs, and opened additional routes (press release of 30 June 2025, with photographs). The reports do not, in themselves, establish liability or the circumstances of the incidents: evidence is required for each incident. Exceptional incidents have been referred to the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism (FFAM).

The basis for the attacks is the identification of military targets. A warning does not permit the disregard of civilians present, nor does it in itself authorise an attack, and an algorithm has never decided on an attack. Damage assessment begins only after a structure has been identified as a military target; without this, no attack is planned, regardless of the percentage of civilians remaining. The degree of abandonment was one factor, alongside intelligence and surveillance. If it was anticipated that civilians would be affected, the rules prohibiting disproportionate attacks and requiring precautions applied.

The description of attacks on ‘neighbourhoods’ is misleading. There were instances in which Hamas used groups of buildings, or significant parts thereof, as combat complexes: command posts, weapons depots, observation or anti-tank positions, and tunnel shafts, often linked by an underground network. Each structure struck had to be assessed individually and designated as a military target. Even then, mindful of civilians, the IDF assessed proportionality and restricted the area to what was operationally necessary, in accordance with the law and going beyond what it requires.

The distinction between combatants and civilians is fundamental and unequivocal in every protocol. The guidelines prohibit deliberate attacks against civilians and foreseeable disproportionate harm, and require all feasible precautions to be taken. Regarding this distinction, the IDF has carried out countless documented actions — warnings, planning, cancellations — and has repeatedly made its methods and activities public. To say that ‘there are no uninvolved civilians in Gaza’ may reflect a personal sentiment, but not the IDF’s approach, its guidelines or its harm-reduction activities throughout the war.

The accusation of ‘genocide’ is outrageous and unfounded; the State of Israel has categorically rejected it. Seeking the views of non-experts who are unaware of the accepted definition is manipulative and irrelevant. Immediately after 7 October, before any significant military response had taken place, an international campaign falsely equated the casualties and destruction with “genocide”, in order to mislead people about the meaning of the term. The opinions of interviewees who are uninvolved in command decisions do not demonstrate any genocidal intent. The film invites a conclusion that the evidence neither supports nor could support.

The defining feature of genocide is the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. The interviewees could not prove this, because it never happened.

The operations pursued objectives set at the political level: to dismantle Hamas’s governmental and military capabilities and to create the conditions for the return of the hostages. Harm to the Palestinian population was never the aim. Warnings, cancelled attacks and facilitated aid served precisely to protect the very population that the film’s makers accuse Israel and the IDF of seeking to destroy.

The film falsely portrays an army that seeks to cause harm to civilians and omits those behind the decisions: those who plan to minimise harm, the legal advisers and the commanders who approve or reject them, in an army bound by the law and its own values. Several interviewees describe the moral weight of those procedures. It is real, and the IDF does not dismiss it: decisions that may cost civilian lives are among the most difficult, and soldiers must feel this weight and act accordingly. That burden is no sign of wrongdoing or indifference: it reflects the seriousness with which those decisions were taken. The omitted processes demonstrate the concrete effort involved: further intelligence gathering, modified plans, cancelled attacks, sacrificed opportunities, and limited force due to assessed risks. The film ignores these. The tragic consequences of war do not justify distorted facts. A serious discussion requires an account of how the decisions were made: the film does not provide this. The impression of an inhumane IDF arises solely from distorted facts, omitted context, ignored IDF publications and explanations, coupled with emotional manipulation and contrived effects. The IDF has acted and continues to act humanely, even though the filmmakers have done everything possible to conceal this.