Inside Operation Vivaldi: robots, organisation and the effort to save lives

Milan. Yesterday, the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, arrived at the front line in the Lyman sector, where he held a meeting with the Minister of Defence, Evgeniy Khmara, the Commander of the Armed Forces, Mykhailo Drapaty, and the commanders of the units operating in this area. He then met with the troops who are carrying out an offensive whose name incorporates a musical theme – specifically, Operation Vivaldi: The Four Seasons – and which has enabled the recapture of territory occupied by the Russians. It is one of the Ukrainian forces’ most successful operations; it was prepared over many months (during which we here amongst the allies despaired at the changes at the top of the Ministry of Defence and the army, condemning Zelensky’s self-interest, and dreading a winter which, yes, will be harsh, but which seems ever harsher to Europeans on their sofas than to the Ukrainians who are holding out and fighting) and is a case of strategy, deception and innovation that once again demonstrates the excellence of the Ukrainian defence. We heard about this offensive from the Ukrainian Army’s Third Army Corps, which is carrying it out, season after season. “Operation Vivaldi is an example of how the use of technology can overcome the enemy’s numerical superiority,” Oleksander Borodin, spokesperson for the Third Corps, tells Il Foglio.  

“Technology has enabled us to conduct offensive operations with reduced forces and with a casualty ratio that is extraordinarily favourable to us,” says Borodin, going on to explain that drones (UAVs) play a significant role: “All their parallel actions function as a single mechanism, a single system that allows us to maintain parity with the enemy in low-altitude airspace.” The interaction between reconnaissance and attack assets “enables us to destroy the enemy quickly,” says Borodin, “by expanding the kill zone”, which is a priority objective because if this zone is large, the Russians are forced back, direct firefights are reduced, and lives are saved. “Thanks to the systematic destruction of Rubicon’s launch sites – the Russians’ finest unit of unmanned aerial vehicles – and the depletion of its reserves, we have managed to paralyse its operations, along with those of numerous other enemy drone units,” continues Borodin, “and the Third Army Corps’ air defence system, structured in echelons, deserves a special mention, as it has ensured the air defence units’ total dominance of the airspace within its area of responsibility”. Borodin goes into detail, but remains clear: one can grasp the extraordinary nature of this offensive, and the care he shows for the men carrying it out. Sometimes, in accounts of war, the technological or strategic aspects are emphasised, and in cases of success, the operations seem almost easy. But this is not the case: they are complex, dangerous and deadly. Borodin conveys the extraordinary nature of the operation, the care taken and the risks involved. “We have established a unified radar network, as well as a mechanism for coordination with drone units, electronic warfare units and ground troops to respond swiftly to reports of enemy activity in the vicinity of our positions. Taken together, these actions limited the enemy’s ability to conduct reconnaissance and adjust the fire of drones and artillery”, thereby increasing the Third Corps’ offensive potential and enabling Ukrainian forces to move undetected.

The use of so-called electronic warfare – which effectively renders the enemy blind and deaf – gave an advantage on the battlefield that counterbalanced that of the Russians, who were on high ground and therefore in a very favourable position. “We repelled the enemy drones sector by sector,” says Borodin, “pushing them further and further back into their own territory, and we blocked their flight paths. Co-ordination with air defence units, together with unconventional solutions – such as equipping ground-based drones (UGVs, or as we call them: robots) with electronic warfare equipment – facilitated evacuations and logistical missions, as well as preventing the enemy from conducting in-depth reconnaissance’. With this mix of assets and the increase in the number of crews operating interceptor drones, it has been possible to carry out mechanised assaults. A telling example is that of the Second Mechanised Battalion of the Third Assault Brigade during the breakthrough between Serednje and Karpivka: “Thanks to the concentration of electronic warfare assets, a ‘blind spot’ was created, which allowed armoured vehicles to penetrate deep into the enemy’s defences in wooded areas,” says Borodin. “We deployed our troops, evacuated the wounded and even managed to repeat the manoeuvre several times.” For the first time, medium-depth strikes were employed, and a system was established based on coordination with other units – in particular with air defence – which enables effective strikes on three levels up to two hundred kilometres from the line of contact.

Earth-based robots have become one of the key factors in the success of Operation Vivaldi: “80 per cent of logistics and 90 per cent of evacuations were handled by UGVs”, which were deployed in sabotage operations: “We have adopted a new tactic involving the mounting of single-use Bullspike grenade launchers on kamikaze UGVs, which has enabled us both to exert psychological pressure on the enemy and to strike them,” says Borodin. “Another historic moment was the so-called ‘Grifone’ tactic: we were the first to deploy UGVs using heavy bomber drones.” Ground-based robotic systems based on armoured personnel carriers are now crucial for destroying Russian positions, with a twofold effect: demoralising the enemy and advancing into built-up areas – in this case Nove and Katerynivka – while destroying “an enemy command and communications hub”.

During Operation Vivaldi, robots equipped with combat modules were used in conjunction with the troops’ assault operations: kamikaze UGVs targeted command posts, drone operator positions and areas where Russian soldiers were gathering in the rear. “With UGVs, as well as with unmanned systems, it is possible to lay mines remotely, isolating future combat zones, which prevents the enemy from both bringing up reserves and advancing its assault groups,” explains Borodin.

The Third Army Corps was the first to use UGVs for demining operations and the first to do so during an offensive operation: as part of Operation Vivaldi, more than 30 kilometres of territory have already been cleared of mines in this way. There is also an organisational first: for the first time, the work of the units responsible for ground robots has been integrated into the brigades and then extended to the entire Army Corps, which is precisely the objective set by General Andriy Biletsky: to reduce the number of soldiers in the most dangerous areas and replace them with robots. Once again: technology, strategy and the protection of our most precious asset – human life.