How to deal with Trump’s possessive tendencies

In normal times, the Danish-American agreement on Greenland dated 22 September would not have been a particularly noteworthy development. The pact – a solid, significant piece of work – would have demonstrated the strong relationship between Copenhagen and Washington, served as further proof that NATO functions well, and advanced the long-term interests of all the allies. A brief toast, a round of applause, and then everyone back to work.

In the Trump era, however, the agreement is a significant achievement simply by virtue of having been signed. The last twenty months of turmoil have been pointless and ill-timed. Indeed, Donald Trump’s threatening remarks, his arrogance, his boasting and his social media posts have undermined not only Danish confidence in American reliability, but also that of many other allies, both within NATO and beyond. It is to be hoped that the matter is now resolved, and that we can begin to re-establish ‘normal’ consultations and operations within NATO.

The US’s national security interest in Greenland is long-standing, justified and consistent with that of Denmark, the Greenlanders and all NATO allies. What is anomalous here is Trump. When his term in office ends, so too will this anomaly. This is the first lesson for European leaders. To conclude that US strategic foundations have changed solely because of Trump is a serious mistake: it means over-complicating an issue rather than assessing it carefully. The agreement of 22 September is normal, but Trump’s behaviour is not.

Greenland forms part of the North American landmass, which is crucial not only for NATO’s Arctic members but for the entire alliance. Today, due to the threatening behaviour of Russia and China, the Far North is Europe’s new ‘soft underbelly’. In 1868, Secretary of State William Seward, having purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, attempted unsuccessfully to acquire Greenland from Denmark. In 1917, concerned about Atlantic access to the Panama Canal, Washington purchased the Danish West Indies, but failed once again to secure Greenland.

With Denmark under German occupation, the Danish embassy in Washington agreed, in April 1941, to allow US forces to establish bases in Greenland to protect themselves from German threats. A similar agreement authorised the deployment of US Marines in Iceland, which was also under Danish sovereignty at the time. Both of these agreements were concluded before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, which led to America’s formal entry into the Second World War.

During the war, the United States established seventeen bases in Greenland, which Harry Truman attempted to purchase once again in 1947. Despite offering 100 million dollars – a princely sum at the time – Denmark refused once more. In 1951, however, with the Cold War now in full swing, Washington and Copenhagen signed the Defence of Greenland Agreement, which followed on from the 1941 agreement and has functioned effectively for 75 years.

At the end of 2018, Trump asked me whether America should buy Greenland. The growing Russian and Chinese threats in the Arctic, particularly towards Greenland, certainly warranted closer attention. The National Security Council staff looked into the matter in depth, and we concluded that the 1951 agreement provided a logical framework within which to proceed. The broader issues concerning Greenland’s future did not require an immediate resolution.

The prospects for confidential talks between the United States and Denmark on Greenland collapsed in August 2019, when Trump described Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen as “a bad woman”, after she had called a potential US purchase of Greenland “absurd”. Nevertheless, throughout the remainder of Trump’s first term and during the Biden administration, security cooperation regarding Greenland continued. All very much as normal.

Trump’s second term is the anomaly. For ‘psychological’ reasons, he declared that he wanted to ‘own’ Greenland. This revealing statement is significant above all for what it does not say, namely that Trump was unable to articulate America’s real strategic interests. But this was not about American strategy; it was about Trump himself. The more Denmark and Europe reacted, the more vitriolic his statements became; the more photo opportunities in Greenland he sought; the more condemnation he faced; and the more he relished it. Ultimately, everything remained centred on him. Engaging indefinitely in a public debate with Trump may yield domestic political benefits for foreign leaders, but it is invariably counterproductive.

On the contrary, Denmark made the right move quite early on, proposing confidential talks between senior officials, away from the media spotlight. In due course, these negotiations resulted in the agreement of 22 September. Trump was able to claim victory – something only his most sycophantic advisers believed – whilst Denmark and Greenland were able to rightly claim to have secured a good deal. It is back to business as usual.

Other foreign leaders have also reached the same conclusion. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum is engaged in extremely complex and delicate trade negotiations with Trump. Although it is still too early to say whether she will succeed, her discreet approach appears to be going well, in contrast to the deteriorating relations between Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. During Trump’s first term, Japan’s Shinzo Abe also held private and ongoing discussions with Trump to advance Tokyo’s interests.

Since Trump acts in a transactional rather than strategic manner, by definition there is no counterstrategy that is guaranteed to work. However, the Danish example is worth examining closely for the lessons it offers. As Secretary of State Jim Baker liked to say: ‘Keep your eyes on the prize’ – do not lose sight of the objective.

John Bolton, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, served as National Security Adviser during Donald Trump’s first term until 2019.