War below the threshold. Europe after Leipzig

There is no need to invade a NATO country to test the Alliance. This is the weak point on which the Kremlin is increasingly focusing, in a step-by-step manner. A few days ago, Reuters revealed that last spring a joint operation involving the UK, Norway and the US intercepted and thwarted a covert Russian naval operation simulating the use of technology capable of disabling undersea cables without leaving a trace. London had already warned Russia that it was capable of monitoring its submarines engaged in ‘malicious activities’: although not all incidents have been officially attributed to Russia, more than twenty submarine cables in the Baltic and Arctic regions have been damaged between 2024 and the present day. But it is not just undersea warfare that is keeping NATO officials in Europe awake at night: there are drones crossing borders and disabling crucial infrastructure such as airports, acts of sabotage, disinformation, psychological warfare, and support for groups – including political ones – that act as ‘Trojan horses’ within Western democracies. This is the scenario envisaged by Carlo Masala, director of the Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies at the Bundeswehr University in Munich and professor of international politics, in his book published last year, Se la Russia attacca l’Occidente (Rizzoli): the primary challenge for NATO is not necessarily the invasion of a member state, but everything that might occur below the threshold of Article 5: acts of sabotage, drones, cyber-attacks and provocations. “We are still vulnerable. And the Russians know it,” says Masala in an interview with Il Foglio.

In last year’s book, the analyst envisaged a Russian incursion into Narva, a town in the far north-east of Estonia, right on the border with Russia. Today, he says there is one thing in particular he would rewrite: the hybrid war could arrive before the end of the war in Ukraine: “In my book, there is an act of sabotage and an assassination attempt. But what we are seeing – or have seen in recent weeks – is an intensification of this type of hybrid war against NATO countries.” Although investigations are still ongoing, and there has been no official attribution, “I find it rather interesting that, more or less in the same week, there was the attack in Leipzig. Then the munitions factory in Colleferro, near Rome, exploded. There is another munitions plant in Bulgaria that has exploded. A ballistic missile has landed in Poland. There are drones in Romania constantly, practically every day. There is an armed maritime drone in international waters off the coast of Romania,” says Masala: “This constant testing of NATO’s resolve through hybrid warfare tactics is something I would probably focus on much more if I were to rewrite the book.” Another nuance, says Masala, which he had not foreseen when he wrote his essay, concerns the Kremlin: “I always thought that the precondition for Putin to test NATO’s resolve was that the war in Ukraine would have ended. But if we look at the latest assessment by the US security services, they believe the risk is already quite high. And when I thought about it, I used to say: no, they won’t do it whilst a military campaign is underway in Ukraine. They’ll wait until the campaign is over. Well, that’s something I’d change now.”

And “the third thing I could never have imagined… In the book, I have a US president who, naturally, is reminiscent of Trump, because I thought he might win the election. But the Trump Administration’s determination to throw Ukraine under the bus is something I completely underestimated. I thought they might look at the whole issue from a national security perspective, saying ‘it’s not our war, we don’t want to get involved in a war with Russia’. But that they would essentially go so far as to actively push Ukraine into capitulation – that I really hadn’t foreseen at all.”

Donald Trump’s second inauguration as President of the United States, on 20 January 2025, marks a watershed moment in history, and not just in the history of the war in Ukraine. According to Masala, however, it is not just the occupant of the White House who has changed: “First and foremost, I believe Moscow was hoping to bring the United States entirely over to its side. And that did not happen. The United States is willing, to some extent, to side with Russia regarding its demands, but there are limits to American engagement with Moscow. And I think the Russians misinterpreted this.” The constant references by Russian officials to the Alaska summit between Trump and Putin are not enough – even within the Trump administration there are those pushing for the defence of Ukraine, and one prime example, within the MAGA sphere, is precisely the ‘conversion’ of the influencer Laura Loomer. For Masala, there is another factor: “The Ukrainians have become more effective at waging war. The fact is they are neutralising more Russians than the Russians are able to recruit. And now, with the help of European countries, they are able to carry out long-range attacks into Russia, which are causing some problems for the Russian economy. This shows that Russia, essentially, does not have a viable military strategy in Ukraine. And this may have led Putin and the Russians to believe that, if they now attempt a horizontal escalation, they could create a situation in which European countries deem it too risky to continue supporting Ukraine, cease their support and, as a result, Ukraine would effectively be forced to capitulate. Ultimately, I think we are witnessing a combination of new factors: economic problems in Russia, an improved Ukrainian military strategy, and the fact that some of the hopes linked to Donald Trump’s election have not materialised.”

Yet an escalation of this kind is causing alarm – in part quite legitimately – amongst European citizens, and governments themselves are updating their security measures in anticipation of a new wave of hybrid attacks: Germany, following the drone incident at Leipzig Airport, has raised its threat assessment from ‘abstract’ to ‘high’ and has strengthened measures to protect critical infrastructure. On social media, there is a constant stream of warnings about a probable kinetic escalation, for example between Germany and Russia, with users suggesting that others take out home insurance policies in case of missile attacks or acts of war (which do not even exist): “It’s all rubbish. If we look at what Germany and Russia did following the attacks in Leipzig, at a diplomatic level it was simply a tit-for-tat – that is, an action and a reciprocal retaliation. We closed a consulate-general and the Russian House, which is a sort of cultural institution. What did the Russians do? They closed our consulate-general in St Petersburg and the Goethe-Institut, our cultural institution.” It is therefore a classic diplomatic tit-for-tat: “If the Russians say that the Germans have declared war on Russia, well: that’s a lie. It’s part of this sort of psychological game the Russians are playing to scare people. But, I’m sorry to say, closing two Russian properties here in Germany won’t trigger a war between Russia and Germany. It’s completely out of touch with reality. It’s part of the psychological warfare in which we are all embroiled.” On 4 August, a bomb attached to a drone was found near a Ukrainian aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport. For almost a month, the German government avoided publicly attributing responsibility for the incident, and it was only on 1 September that Berlin officially attributed responsibility to Russia, after gathering investigative and intelligence evidence. Did the German government react too late, or did it simply follow standard practice in diplomatic relations: first gathering evidence, verifying the attribution and only then taking action? To understand the German government’s diplomatic and political strategy, one must look at the elections, explains Masala: “Last Sunday there were regional elections in Saxony-Anhalt. And in two weeks’ time we will have regional elections in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. So, two eastern German Länder, where there is strong pro-Russian sentiment. With pro-Russian parties leading the polls: the AfD, Alternative für Deutschland, and this BSW, Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht. If you put something forward without concrete evidence, you essentially fuel this kind of anti-government and pro-Russian sentiment. So I think they did the right thing. Before taking action, you have to establish responsibility; you can’t do it on the basis of a hunch. Anyone with even a modicum of experience knew what was happening in Leipzig; they knew these were professional actors, not domestic terrorist groups or the like. And if you’re dealing with professional actors, you eventually end up either in Ukraine or in Russia. That’s why I think it was the right thing to do to wait until we had much more evidence to establish the link with Russia before taking action. Because otherwise it could have backfired on us enormously. Even now, certain pro-Russian forces are saying that there is no concrete evidence, that no photographic evidence or intercepted phone call has been shown, but these are all arguments that don’t hold water, because naturally a government cannot publish such things.” But the evidence does exist, and it is so detailed that it led the government to make a public attribution: “It was the right thing to do. I think most people haven’t realised that we imposed sanctions – in terms of closing the consulate and the Russian House – but also submitted a list of new individuals to be sanctioned to Brussels. This is, I would say, the normal way of proceeding.” But what has sent the most significant message to the Kremlin are measures that are less diplomatic and more effective. Which ones? For example, Masala explains, “we announced that we would be supplying – I’m not sure exactly how many – 4,000–5,000 attack drones to the Ukrainians. And then that our foreign intelligence service is now assisting the Ukrainian intelligence service in identifying targets and pinpointing Russian positions. And the third measure, which is more symbolic, is a military signal to Russia. A German Navy live-fire exercise had long been planned, involving the launch of a ballistic missile from a frigate. Two years ago, the German government would have told the Navy: ‘Don’t do it’, because it would have been a terrible coincidence. This time, on the night the sanctions were officially announced in Leipzig, they said: ‘Go ahead with your launch’. They sent a message to Russia: we are not afraid. You cannot intimidate us.”

Germany is not, however, the only case. In recent months, Russia’s hybrid warfare has become a recurring theme in statements by governments and NATO, but it is not yet clear to what extent this growing awareness has translated into a genuine capacity to respond to provocation. This is also because, despite the various incidents recorded on the territory and in the waters of allied countries, there has not even been a call for Article 4 to be invoked – the article that provides for formal consultations amongst allies when one of them considers its security to be under threat. “This is, in fact, also a concern for NATO and European Union officials. Because the fact remains that whatever happens in terms of hybrid warfare does not justify a large-scale armed response. NATO is an organisation that defends the territory of its member states. And, in defending it, it may naturally also enter the territory of the state attacking NATO members. But with hybrid warfare, what do you do? Do you declare war on Russia? Do you immediately go into Russia? First of all, that is not what NATO countries want to do. And NATO is not capable of doing so. So, when it comes to hybrid warfare, NATO is still very ill-equipped. It can take certain military measures, for example in Romania or the Baltic states. It can send more aircraft to help intercept drones, but it cannot go and strike those orchestrating these attacks. From this point of view, we are still weak. Let’s put it this way: we are still weak. And the Russians know this. And so they will not cross a certain threshold.” According to Masala, even if the Russians had succeeded in the Leipzig attack, the circumstances would not have existed in any case to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: “And everyone talks about Article 4, but Article 4 is also rather symbolic. For example, what the Germans did was to organise a sort of ‘Article 4-style’ show of solidarity. Because, as you saw, after the press conference, within two hours, every European leader had sent a message of solidarity via social media. This is what you get with Article 4: in the end, everyone assures you they’re on your side, but they do nothing.”

On the European front, however, something has changed in the fight against Russian covert operations. On 30 August, as part of the European Irini mission, the Italian Navy boarded the oil tanker MV Sun in the Mediterranean, suspected of belonging to the Russian shadow fleet and of sailing under a false flag. This is the sixth instance in recent months of a vessel suspected of being part of the shadow fleet being inspected by EU naval operations. “Well, let’s put it this way: I think we’re getting better at countering Russia’s hybrid warfare moves,” comments the lecturer. “And more and more countries have amended their national legislation so as to be able to intercept ships from the shadow fleet, which has prompted Russia to send frigates to escort some of the vessels that are breaching sanctions. So certain measures are having an effect. The point is that you cannot completely prevent hybrid warfare.” He gives an example: “Let’s suppose that the explosion at the munitions plant in Colleferro was somehow orchestrated by the Russians. You can always blow something up in Italy. You cannot prevent it entirely. So we’re making progress, yes, but I think one problem is that you can’t create a deterrent because there are so many ways for it to succeed.” But the point, according to Masala, goes beyond the European Union. “Do you remember when Radcliffe was in Moscow? Unlike Burns, who had gone to Moscow in 2021, he did so publicly: military aircraft, transponders on and so on. Four days earlier, NATO’s air forces conducted some unannounced exercises around Kaliningrad and in the Baltic states, involving aircraft we rarely see in the region – American aircraft. One was an electronic warfare aircraft, the other a long-range reconnaissance aircraft. “I believe what we are seeing is actually a shift in the US position: they are now helping Europe to deter whatever the Russians may be planning, because at the same time they know they will not be actively involved should deterrence fail. So we are stepping up deterrence to send signals and hope that Russia understands them.”

Another striking aspect of the way this war has unfolded is the strength of the partnership between Russia and North Korea. Moscow has received ammunition and troops from Pyongyang for the war in Ukraine, whilst Kim Jong Un’s regime has, in return, secured economic support, field training, and military and technological assistance; furthermore, there are an increasing number of permanent facilities and infrastructure projects, such as the opening, just a few days ago, of the first road bridge between the two countries. This is a very concrete model of cooperation, built on diverse yet perfectly complementary interests. Faced with this kind of relationship, we often think of the western frontier, because Europe and its partners find it much more difficult to transform shared interests and strategic convergences into equally effective and operational cooperation with Ukraine. “No, we try to use the same model, but we fail,” Masala tells Il Foglio. “A month ago I was in South Korea. And the South Koreans, on an intellectual level, fully understand the importance of Ukraine. But what the Russians do is blackmail them. They say: ‘If you support Ukraine more actively, we might sever economic ties’. And the South Koreans fear that, if they were to support Ukraine more actively, this would strengthen the Russian-North Korean alliance, and that Russia would cross two thresholds it has not crossed so far: namely, supporting North Korea with re-entry technology for its intercontinental ballistic missiles and, potentially, with nuclear power stations for the nuclear submarines Pyongyang is planning. This is why the South Koreans are doing everything they can rhetorically to show solidarity and are even providing non-lethal aid. But the equipment they do have that could genuinely help the Ukrainians – that they are keeping for themselves. So we are reaching our limits because of factors like these. It must be said that the Russians and the Chinese, outside Europe, know far better than we do how to play the diplomatic game. Full stop.” One need only look at the issue of interceptors, says the analyst: “Greece and Spain have them. And so far, no one has managed to persuade either Greece or Spain to send any to Ukraine, where they are desperately needed right now.” The Russians are effective at throwing a spanner in the works, even in direct negotiations with Washington: Masala urges us to distinguish between two levels in the talks between Witkoff, Kushner and the Russians. On the one hand, there are the negotiations on Ukraine, on which Moscow continues to reiterate that it has no intention of changing its position. On the other hand, there are the talks on economic cooperation between the United States and Russia, which, according to Masala, represent the Trump White House’s real interest, because the Russians are reportedly presenting Witkoff and Kushner with the prospect of major economic benefits. In this interpretation, Ukraine is primarily the obstacle to be overcome in order to restore bilateral economic relations. Even the subsequent mission to Kyiv, involving security advisers from the E3, reportedly failed to yield concrete results: “The Ukrainians continue to insist on security guarantees, and nobody really wants to give them,” says Masala. “And Putin is essentially saying: ‘I want it all’. And the Ukrainians are essentially expected to give in to his demands. So we haven’t really made any progress over the last two years.” Donald Trump’s former National Security Adviser, John Bolton, recently said that, given the US administration’s current policy, the only hope for Ukraine and Europe would be to keep holding out until the end of the Trump presidency, in the belief that US policy might change again after 2028. Do you share this view? “Unfortunately not. Firstly, we need to see how Ukraine will get through the winter. Because what the Russians are doing now is essentially preparing for winter, bombing all of Ukraine’s energy and water infrastructure, and even its food infrastructure. Secondly, there are rumours that Russia might carry out another mobilisation after September, once the Duma elections have taken place. So we need to see whether or not that happens. I believe we are approaching a situation in which one or both sides will be completely exhausted. The Ukrainians still face a manpower problem, and the Russians are confronting serious economic consequences of their actions. This could lead, by 2027 – perhaps by mid-2027 – to a state of exhaustion and then to some form of negotiation. But even then, I wouldn’t expect any sort of peace treaty. Rather, I would expect the fighting to simply stop. And then we would have a situation of this kind for at least a couple of years.” This scenario could therefore resemble, at least in part, that of the Korean War, with a conflict that freezes without reaching a genuine solution. The difference, however, is that in Korea the armistice formalised a new situation on the ground, whereas in the case of Ukraine there might not even be an agreement of this sort. The risk is therefore that of a conflict that remains unresolved, with limited fighting and a state of war that continues to smoulder without a genuine conclusion. Meanwhile, the analyst’s concern is that ‘the Russians will continue to escalate the conflict when it comes to hybrid warfare. And that we will see much more of this in the coming months. Because Putin still believes he can win this war militarily and regards European support as the main obstacle to achieving a military victory’. And then there are the sanctions: “Look: one of the organisers in Leipzig entered the country on a visa issued by Italy. We must put a stop to this sort of thing. We must reach an agreement to ensure that these Type C visas are not issued. And even diplomats in Austria and Switzerland – neutral countries – can still travel around Europe. We must put a stop to these things, at least to reduce their ability to carry out attacks. We cannot prevent them, but we should do everything necessary to minimise these activities.”