How to Win the Challenge Against Putin. NATO’s Top Commander in Europe Speaks

Objects flying over Europe. Drones threatening airports. Incursions into NATO airspace. Daily provocations. Threats along Europe’s borders. What is to be done?

Alexus G. Grynkewich is a rather important American general. Since July 2025—after a career in the Air Force as a fighter pilot, with extensive experience flying F-16s and F-22s, and after holding senior command positions at the Pentagon and in the Middle East—he has served as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe. He is the military officer with operational responsibility for the forces of the Atlantic Alliance on our continent and, at the same time, the commander of U.S. forces in Europe. Every decision concerning American forces in Europe passes through him. Every decision concerning NATO forces in Europe passes through him.

General Grynkewich is an imposing 54-year-old, with a quick wit, alert eyes and a dazzling smile. His daily agenda encompasses everything that currently worries European nations: how to build a credible defence and deterrence against countries seeking to weaken and threaten NATO, such as Russia.

General Grynkewich became known in Italy when Giuseppe Conte, speaking from a stage in Naples, put words into his mouth that the general had never said. According to Conte, Grynkewich believes that NATO does not consider Russia a threat to Europe in any way. After a long courtship, Grynkewich agreed to speak with this newspaper. He chose to do so at a particularly significant moment for Italy, when the efforts made in recent years to defend Ukraine, support NATO and resist Russian influence must contend with an election campaign in which leaders on both the right and the left—you know whom we are talking about—will prosper by minimising the Russian threat, demonising countries that have been attacked and casually turning antidotes, such as NATO, into viruses.

The first question for General Grynkewich can only be the most important one. How serious is the Russian threat to Europe today? What is the risk that Moscow, believing that the West is unwilling to respond, might decide to test a NATO country directly? And how dangerous is it for deterrence when political leaders deny or minimise that threat?

“While we see no imminent threat of attack, Russia remains the most significant direct and long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. To counter the threat it poses, and the persistent threat of terrorism, Allies are delivering on their defence commitments made at the NATO Summit in The Hague last year—as we already saw at the Ankara Summit in July—and delivering the capabilities needed to deter and defend while strengthening our industrial base and resilience. Together, we are building the future: a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO—a modernised Alliance. Together, we are building NATO 3.0.”

General, what is your most candid assessment of how much time Europe has left to prepare? How many years might Russia need to rebuild sufficient military strength to attempt a limited attack or test NATO’s Article 5, which establishes the principle of collective defence, according to which an armed attack against one or more members in Europe or North America is considered an attack against all Allies? Two years? Five years? Ten years?

“In his first annual address to the United States Congress, then President George Washington emphasized the importance of maintaining a strong military to ensure national defence and prevent potential conflicts. He argued that a well-equipped army and a well-prepared nation are essential for safeguarding peace and stability. This principle reflects the broader idea that readiness for conflict can prevent future conflicts, as highlighted in the Latin phrase, ‘Si vis pacem, para bellum,’ meaning, ‘If you want peace, prepare for war.’ If one agrees with this principle, and I do, then the discussion on timing becomes moot. We need to be prepared now, and we are, but we must also ensure we are more prepared tomorrow, and even more the day after that. This requires constant effort and attention, and we must not wait.”

What do you say to those who argue that every euro spent on defence is “a euro taken away from healthcare, education and welfare”? Isn’t the opposite also true—that without credible deterrence, democracy, freedom and the welfare state are precisely what Europe may no longer be able to protect?

“Security underpins everything within our societies and is therefore essential for protecting our freedom and way of life. NATO’s enduring purpose is to safeguard that freedom and the security of all its members and the one billion people living in Allied territory. The Alliance has done this incredibly well since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, our founding document, on April 4, 1949. We will continue to do so.”

Help us focus on one further detail: over the past two years, what have been the most dangerous and underreported Russian actions against Europe? Airspace violations, sabotage, cyberattacks, GPS interference, attacks on undersea infrastructure, intimidation or the notorious hostile operations involving Russia’s shadow fleet—which incident in recent months has concerned you most?

“The most dangerous Russian action is its ongoing war against Ukraine. It costs thousands upon thousands of lives a month, and the risk of spillover is dangerous for everyone. That is why it needs to end, and why Allies fully support President Trump’s efforts to achieve a lasting peace. But until the war ends, Ukraine can count on NATO’s support. Russia cannot wait us out.”

There is, however, another problem. Russia, Iran and North Korea exchange weapons, ammunition, drones, missiles, technology and, in some cases, personnel. Can we now speak of an emerging authoritarian military bloc operating in a cohesive and coordinated manner? And why do the regimes that sponsor war, terrorism and destabilisation sometimes appear more coordinated than the democracies trying to resist them?

“The potential for simultaneity—multiple conflicts occurring on multiple fronts at the same time—is a real potential challenge. That is why the shift to NATO 3.0—a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO—is essential. This also requires a massively expanded defence industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic that is capable not only of rebuilding Allied military strength, but also with the capacity to sustain operations across multiple theaters simultaneously.”

Is it correct to say that Ukraine’s eventual membership of NATO—an outcome that NATO has endorsed in its official documents—would matter not only for Kyiv but also for the security of Europe as a whole? And can we say that a peace settlement leaving Ukraine in a permanent grey zone would simply prepare the ground for the next war?

“Membership is a decision for NATO’s 32 Allies and Ukraine. The focus of current political-level talks is not on NATO membership but on ensuring that any peace deal will be lasting. This requires a robust and ready Ukrainian military. Strong Ukrainian Armed Forces are the best way to deter any future Russian aggression. This is, as President Trump often says, ‘Peace through Strength.’”

General, if you had to identify three urgent military priorities for the Italian government, what would they be? Air and missile defence? Ammunition? Drones and counter-drone systems? Naval capabilities? Cyber defence? Intelligence? Logistics? Where is Italy most exposed today?

“The most urgent thing for all Allies is to deliver on their defence investment commitments from the Summit in The Hague, strengthen the defence industrial base, meet their capability targets, and assign their forces to the NATO Force Model and to standby forces like NATO’s high-readiness and multinational Allied Reaction Force (ARF). Allies should also assign forces to our ongoing missions and activities, including NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) and NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), and to enhanced vigilance activities like Eastern Sentry, Baltic Sentry, and Arctic Sentry.”

Here is a delicate issue: can people who systematically repeat Kremlin or Iranian propaganda—even without receiving direct instructions—become unwitting instruments of hybrid warfare? And where does legitimate dissent end and the amplification of a hostile power’s narrative begin?

“We know that actors like Russia and Iran deploy a broad range of tools in their efforts to gain advantage—including in the information space. Societal resilience—the ability of a society to continue functioning in times of difficulty and recover from shocks or crises with minimal disruption—is deeply important in this context. This is just as important as NATO’s resilience, rooted in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 3 emphasizes the importance of continuous and effective self-help as key to mutual aid among NATO member countries. NATO’s resilience, therefore, is both a national responsibility and a collective commitment. This resilience is crucial for maintaining credible deterrence and defence as it ensures that military efforts to defend NATO territory and populations are complemented by robust civil preparedness.”

For months, Europe has been asked to assume greater responsibility for conventional defence. In practice, however, Europe remains heavily dependent on critical American capabilities. Which functions would Europe currently be unable to replace without the United States? Intelligence? Satellites? Missile defence? Air-to-air refueling? Strategic lift? Long-range precision strikes?

“While the U.S. has stated it will continue to provide critical but more limited support, European Allies have largely filled the gaps left by U.S. reductions to the NATO Force Model. In fact, in certain areas we now have more forces assigned to the NATO Force Model than before. In those few areas where Europeans do not currently have a like capability to replace the U.S. reduction, we are looking at alternate capabilities with matching effect. It is the effect that matters most to me.”

Even before the drones carrying military explosives found at Leipzig airport—drones which, according to the German government, had been armed by Russian operatives—there had been other striking cases in Europe of hostile incursions attributable to Putin’s Russia. NATO, including General Grynkewich, expressed through Secretary General Mark Rutte its full solidarity with Germany and welcomed the response measures announced by the German government following the hostile incursion attributed to Russia.

A few weeks ago, to cite just one example, a Russian missile entered Polish airspace and later fell on Polish territory. In light of that incident, and of the events of recent days in Germany, one question is unavoidable, General: what did the incident reveal about NATO’s rules of engagement and state of readiness? Why, for example, was that missile not intercepted? Would the response to another violation be automatic, or would it still depend on a case-by-case political and military assessment?

“When NATO needs to respond, we can and will do so. We have demonstrated this time and time again. We can and have shot down both drones and missiles. But if we do not need to shoot something down, because for example it does not pose a risk, why would we? Of course, the safety of all in or under Allied airspace is paramount to us.”

General, when does a hybrid attack become an armed attack? Could a Russian sabotage operation that causes deaths trigger Article 5? What about the destruction of critical undersea infrastructure, or a large-scale blackout? To put it plainly: does NATO have sufficiently clear thresholds, or is there an ambiguity that risks encouraging Moscow?

“The primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted country. That is why Article 3, maintaining and developing an individual and collective capacity as a nation to resist armed attack, is so important. Article 3 helps to give NATO the means to fulfil its core tasks, particularly that of deterrence and defence. I’ll also note that triggering Article 5 is ultimately a political decision. Thus, while certain hybrid actions might trigger Article 5, the Secretary General’s comments on this are helpful. As he often says, we don’t want to make our adversary any wiser on how far they can go before meeting consequences. Our posture and our preparedness are meant to deter aggression.”

But if Russia attempted a very limited operation against a Baltic state, perhaps calculating that the ensuing defensive response could divide the Allies, could NATO stop it with the forces already deployed in Europe, before the arrival of any further major American reinforcements?

“Any attempt or contemplation of such an attempt would be a grave mistake. The Baltic states have significantly invested in their national defence capabilities. This strong foundation is further buttressed by NATO’s forward land forces, air defence forces, and more, all of which are forward not only in these three countries, but across the Eastern flank of the Alliance. We also have the Allied Reaction Force, NATO’s high-readiness, rapid response, multinational and multi-domain force, which could arrive to the region in days.”

General, does Article 5 unequivocally protect the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland, against an armed threat regardless of where that threat originates? And what would happen if the pressure or threat came from another NATO Ally?

“Article 5 is ironclad. All 32 NATO nations again restated their commitment to it in the Ankara Summit Declaration, which bears repeating: ‘We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Ankara to reaffirm our ironclad commitment to our collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond. An attack on one is an attack on all. Our unity, solidarity and collective strength remain the foundation of peace, security, and prosperity for the one billion citizens in our Alliance of free and democratic nations. We remain committed to our 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence.’”

Let us look to the future. What would constitute a genuinely credible security guarantee for Ukraine after a ceasefire? Would weapons, training and political commitments be enough, or would a credible guarantee require European troops, air-defence protection over Ukrainian territory and an automatic commitment to act if Russia attacked again?

“That is a question best answered by Ukraine, but a strong Ukrainian Armed Forces is of foundational importance. I would just add that NATO regularly joins meetings of the Coalition of the Willing to discuss how best to support and secure the future for Ukraine.”

Russian incursions in Europe are becoming increasingly frequent, increasingly threatening and increasingly commonplace. But the message from the most senior American in NATO is clear and powerful: NATO will not leave Europe at Russia’s mercy. And there is no better way to protect Europe from external threats than by protecting the countries bordering Russia and helping Ukraine defend itself with every means available.

Coming from NATO, that carries considerable weight. Coming from an American today, even more so.