The future of Serbia’s choices: between divisions and glorification following Mladić’s death

Belgrade. At dawn on 11 July 1995, the town of Srebrenica, in the Republika Srpska of Bosnia (the Serb-majority entity covering around a third of Bosnian territory), had a population of around 40,000. More than 70 per cent of them were Bosniak Muslims. Eight days later, the town had been depopulated and, despite the presence of UN peacekeepers (who had declared the area a ‘safe area’), more than 8,000 people had died. Those responsible for the massacre were the troops commanded by General Ratko Mladić, who was in his early fifties at the time. On 27 August, 31 years after the genocide, Mladić died in The Hague (Netherlands). He had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 2017.

Despite this, Serbia, led by Aleksandar Vučić, has announced that it will grant him a state funeral. This decision comes as no surprise, given that the country is due to hold an election in October and the re-evaluation of war criminals has been a key factor in Vučić’s rise to power. “Mladić’s death is merely a biographical fact. It does not change society’s attitude towards him: Serbia is full of graffiti reading ‘Mladić hero’. A phenomenon sponsored by the state under the auspices of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the Socialists since 2012,” says Jovana Kolarić, a researcher at the Fund for Humanitarian Law, the only Serbian NGO working to secure justice for the victims of the Balkan wars. “In the absence of functioning institutions, the SNS offers citizens an ethno-nationalist interpretation of the past. Criminals are presented as ‘national pride’, within a narrative that allows for no alternatives.” A narrative that extends beyond Serbia’s borders, as explained by Tommaso Siviero, author of the Balkan Brew newsletter and a journalist for Birn. “On the evening of 27 August, huge crowds poured into the streets and churches to celebrate Mladić. I’ve been working in Bosnia for five years, I live in Sarajevo, and I used to think that Bosnian society was divided more along political than social lines,” he says. “Faced with such boisterous celebrations, even on social media, I’ve had to revise my view to some extent.” The policy of the governments of Serbia and Republika Srpska is based on portraying Serbs as victims. The narrative of Serbs as “the only victims of genocide in the Balkans” mirrors entirely that of President Slobodan Milošević during the 1990s.

Despite this, Kolarić believes that Vučić’s ‘electoral’ exploitation of Mladić could backfire: “It would be risky: the SNS would turn all its neighbouring states against it. Furthermore, it would spark a conflict with Brussels (which appears to be keen to open the third cluster for Belgrade’s accession to the EU) and would jeopardise very valuable financial resources”.

Then there is the issue of criminals who are still alive. “Mladić and Milošević were primarily responsible for Srebrenica. Despite this, Radovan Karadžić and Radislav Krstić remain alive. The former was, at the time, president of the Republika Srpska, whose army committed the worst war crimes in Bosnia,” says Siviero. “He is serving a life sentence in England. Krstić was the first to be charged with the Srebrenica genocide. Sentenced to 35 years in 2001, he is currently in prison in Estonia.” The UN War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia did not grant him any sentence reductions, but he could be released in 2036 at the age of 87. Kolarić points out, however, that many war criminals are living freely in Serbia. “Tomislav Kovac, Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Republika Srpska in 1995, lives here. There are no ongoing investigations into him. In 23 years, the Serbian war crimes prosecutor’s office has charged only five people in connection with Srebrenica, and none for genocide,” he states. “It is a political choice: criminals are not prosecuted and trials are delayed whenever possible. And no trial has ever been opened for Prijedor. This is the last chance to do so.”

Even the students who will be challenging Vučić in the elections have distanced themselves from Mladić only on an individual basis. “The pro-government tabloids have accused them of betraying the country. But in doing so, the students have revealed a weakness: they are very politically diverse,” says Siviero. “This diversity prevents them from taking clear stances on key issues such as Kosovo, Brussels or war crimes. This makes it easy for the SNS to attack them.” Despite this, Kolarić remains optimistic. “At the moment, a great many people either ignore or condone Mladić’s crimes. But we must remain hopeful: I don’t think it will be long before the younger generations come to feel ashamed of him. His crimes are documented and proven; ultimately, this is what will be remembered about him.”