World
in the run-up to the elections •
Amidst the turmoil of the French centre-right, one name is emerging: Philippe
He has begun to receive significant backing, ranging from Wauquiez, leader of Les Républicains, to Justice Minister Darmanin, a key figure in the current government. And also from Sarkozy’s circles. Candidacies, temptations of revenge and friendly fire. Why the antidote to a Le Pen–Mélenchon run-off is not to be found on the left

Bruno Retailleau, Raphael Glucksmann, Marine Le Pen, Edouard Philippe, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Marine Tondelier and Gabriel Attal (Getty)
The French right remains characterised by a dichotomy between the traditional (or pro-government) right, ranging from centrist parties to the Gaullists, and the nationalist right, represented by the Rassemblement National (RN) and some of its allies, including the UDR movement led by Éric Ciotti, a dissident from Les Républicains. Despite some local agreements, the divide between the pro-government and nationalist camps held firm even in the most recent general election of 2024.
Although the RN has established itself as a highly attractive force (polls put Marine Le Pen at over 30 per cent), it has not yet managed to broaden its support base sufficiently to secure even a relative majority in Parliament. This limitation became clear in the 2017 and 2022 elections, when Marine Le Pen failed to turn her first-round success into an overall victory. Jordan Bardella might have been a more suitable candidate for broadening support, but Marine Le Pen decided not to step aside, despite her criminal convictions.
The RN’s voter base has expanded as the party has phased out pro-Frexit, anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric, in order to reassure those groups sensitive to the need for stability, thereby eroding the traditional right-wing electorate. However, inconsistencies may arise between the party’s protest-oriented wing and its conservative wing (which is necessary to broaden its support base). Consequently, an RN victory is by no means a foregone conclusion, despite the strong electoral appeal generated by opposition to Macron’s presidencies.
In the current climate, we are witnessing a trend towards polarisation between the two extreme candidates: Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who are leading the polls and are effectively shaping the race for the Élysée. Faced with these two poles, there are only two possible strategies: to compete to reach their level in the first round and find oneself among the two contenders in the run-off, or to develop a ‘satellite’ candidacy that can then forge a political pact with one of the two in the second round. In the past, this mechanism worked rather well within the context of a right-left bipolar system, but the multipolarisation of the political landscape has introduced different dynamics.
At the centre of the political landscape lies the centre-right – that is, the governing right – which currently supports the government in Parliament. This camp consists mainly of post-Macronists and their allies (François Bayrou’s MoDem, the ‘Macronist’ party Renaissance), Édouard Philippe’s Horizons party and Bruno Retailleau’s Les Républicains. These are factions that were once organised around the UDF (Giscard d’Estaing’s party) and the RPR (Jacques Chirac’s party), historically embodying the traditions of the moderate Orléanist right and the neo-Gaullist right. This political structure held more or less until 2017, when the open primary for the right and centre, led by Les Républicains, selected François Fillon as the unified candidate. However, his candidacy collapsed following revelations about the fictitious employment of his wife, Penelope. This moment proved to be a watershed, creating the political space into which Emmanuel Macron stepped, presenting himself as a centrist candidate capable of attracting a moderate electorate from both the right and the left, thereby breaking the traditional polarisation of French politics.
More recently, we have witnessed a proliferation of candidates that did not bode well for this political bloc’s ability to influence the presidential election. However, we can now observe a trend towards unification that favours former Prime Minister Édouard Philippe, a figure from the neo-Gaullist tradition who came up through the ranks alongside Alain Juppé, Chirac’s heir apparent who never quite managed to take that final step to win the presidential election.
Philippe has begun to receive some backing: that of Laurent Wauquiez, leader of Les Républicains in the National Assembly, who never fails to criticise his party’s leader, Bruno Retailleau, and, above all, that of Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin, a key figure in the current government. In June, Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, a former minister under Nicolas Sarkozy who had recently returned from a long period working in the United States, also threw her support behind Philippe’s candidacy.
Les Républicains find themselves in a very delicate position, not least because some might be tempted to cross the Rubicon to form a ‘union of the right’ with the RN, a move championed by the newspapers owned by the conservative businessman Vincent Bolloré. Éric Ciotti has already broken ranks to support Marine Le Pen, achieving a good result in the local elections in Nice – a victory which, however, reflects local dynamics rather than a national trend. Furthermore, if Les Républicains – a party that has always defended its Gaullist heritage – were to ally itself with the RN – a party that is, in some ways, the heir to Vichy France and French Algeria – it would be renouncing part of its ideological heritage, a risky move. Ultimately, it might be far more advantageous for Les Républicains to ally themselves with Horizons and the centre-right to ensure a degree of party continuity.
A key aspect is the current rivalry between Philippe and Gabriel Attal, a contest which, however, could pave the way for a second phase of candidate consolidation. Attal has lost ground following the confirmation of Marine Le Pen as the RN’s candidate. Faced with the young Bardella, Attal could have been seen as a rival of a similar age, but the current trend seems to favour more seasoned figures such as Philippe, not least to counter the multiple-time candidate Le Pen. In February, the two contenders met to draw up a pact – admittedly a fragile one – but it could prove very costly for Attal to maintain a candidacy that would effectively destroy his own camp’s chances.
We can therefore hypothesise a rallying effect around Philippe’s candidacy, the only one who, in the current polls, appears capable of competing with Mélenchon (both are polling at 16 per cent). There are further factors to consider: even if isolated, Macron still has certain levers at his disposal and might be tempted to mount a counter-offensive against Philippe, who is guilty of committing a crime of lese-majesty by criticising the decision to dissolve the National Assembly in 2024 and, above all, by calling for an early end to the presidential term. Institutional logic might prompt Macron to back the current Prime Minister, Sébastien Lecornu, as the establishment candidate to ensure continuity.
Incidentally, we have recently seen another survivor of the original ‘Macronism’, François Bayrou – who suffered a crushing defeat in the recent local elections – call for a united centre-right candidacy to act as a bulwark against the extremes, proposing the name of former European Commissioner Thierry Breton as the deus ex machina. However, these manoeuvres do not appear to have much traction. Sébastien Lecornu is handling the delicate task of leading a minority government in the current set-up well, but he will soon face the hurdle of securing approval for the budget – a situation that complicates his transition to a leadership bid. Furthermore, Lecornu has always had a good relationship with Philippe and is in no hurry to burn his bridges. Breton is an interesting prospect, not least because he is unaligned with the Macronist camp, but Bayrou is currently unable to repeat the ‘kingmaker’ role he played with Macron in the 2017 elections.
Ultimately, Philippe is reaping the full benefits of the ‘Mélenchon effect’, a bogeyman for moderates. Raphaël Glucksmann has announced his candidacy in an attempt to secure the centre-left ground, but he is unlikely to achieve a high enough share of the vote to pose a threat to Mélenchon. A section of the moderate left-wing electorate, which rejects Mélenchon’s anti-Semitic and pro-Russian stances and wishes to prevent Marine Le Pen from coming to power, may be tempted to cast a tactical vote as early as the first round, rallying behind a strong centre-right candidate, whilst remaining within the so-called ‘republican spectrum’.
The French presidential campaign still has a long way to go, and external events – including international ones – could influence its course. However, amidst the confusion surrounding the centre-right candidates, things are beginning to shift and a path forward for Philippe is starting to emerge.