Trump’s political strategy regarding Iran and the risk of the end of American deterrence

On 18 August, eight Israeli bombs struck the Abu al-Duhur airbase in the Syrian province of Idlib. According to the Israeli account, the target was the Turkish military deployment at an airport whose runway had recently been rebuilt. The most significant reaction, however, came not from Damascus or Ankara but from Washington: Tom Barrack, the US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy for Syria, accused Israel of an unnecessary escalation that undermines regional stability, adding two details that may not have been well received in Jerusalem: Israel had not informed the United States in advance, and the operation may have been intended to provoke the Turks for the sake of domestic political calculations. There is no shortage of tactical explanations. Israel has a structural interest in preventing Turkey from establishing a permanent air presence in Syria, and the ‘red line’ regarding the deployment of Turkish assets had been communicated to Damascus. But the fact that it was a representative of the Trump administration who pointed to the Israeli election campaign as a possible motive suggests more than just a tactical divergence.

Israel goes to the polls on 27 October, the United States on 3 November. Seven days separate the two elections, which impose opposing political imperatives on the two leaders. Netanyahu goes into the election at a disadvantage and with a vulnerability: the massacre of 7 October 2023 took place under his watch, and his refusal to set up a commission of inquiry into it has alienated a section of his own electorate. The showdown hangs like the sword of Damocles, and in such circumstances an open conflict is not a cost but an asset, because it shifts the public debate from the budget to the casualty figures. Political survival does not require strategic victories as long as tactical successes are being racked up and an atmosphere of emergency persists. This does not mean that every Israeli operation is driven by electoral calculations, and it would be an analytical error to claim otherwise. But the incentive to delay stabilisation does exist, and it has been noted in Washington. Trump needs exactly the opposite. His approval rating has fallen to 33 per cent, the lowest of his second term, and support for a war with Iran is dwindling. With petrol prices and inflation taking their toll, and with just over two months to go until the mid-term elections, the president has no interest in opening new fronts but rather in closing them – first and foremost the Iranian one – and in being able to present this as a victory.

Given that victory still seems a long way off, Trump has chosen to declare it. On 18 August, the same day as the Israeli raid and just a few hours after Tehran had confirmed the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the President published a map on Truth declaring the Strait ‘new American territory’. On 24 August, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced Operation Economic Outcast, promising to cut off every source of economic support for the regime and warning that no one, including China, is beyond the reach of American sanctions. Officially, this is the most extensive financial offensive ever waged against a country. In reality, the sanctions have not yet been imposed: the Treasury has announced that it will send individual capitals deadlines by which to cease the identified activities. By threatening secondary sanctions against third parties who are highly likely to ignore them, Trump is making a serious miscalculation. Threats not backed up by consequences erode credibility in two ways. Towards adversaries, because they teach that the rational way to deal with US deterrence is to wait for the political mood to change. Towards allies, because they teach that US protection is conditional, intermittent and revocable. Neither of these lessons is forgotten once the election campaign is over.

Ukraine provides the most instructive precedent for how this mechanism works. After two years of sporadic American support, Kyiv has reduced its dependence on US supplies and developed autonomous expertise in 21st-century warfare, starting with drones. Europe has ceased to regard Washington as a constant in its projections of expenditure and capabilities. The result is measurable and paradoxical: Trump now has less leverage over the war in Ukraine than he did two years ago, because the other players have learnt to minimise his influence in their respective calculations. If Trump considered it essential to bring the Iranian issue to a close with a clear victory, the logical course of action would be to follow up his threats with credible military action. He does not do so because, in an unpopular war, seventy days before the election, the domestic political cost would be prohibitive. The choice, however, is not between a cost and no cost, but between an immediate and tangible cost to his Administration and a deferred and widespread cost to his country: the erosion of the United States’ position in the Middle East and of American deterrence worldwide.