Cavo Dragone: “Russia and Iran? Threats to Europe. Kyiv? Peace depends on deterrence”

Are we the ones defending Ukraine’s future, or is Ukraine also defending our future? You have by now come to know Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, and not just for his magnificent Risorgimento-style moustache. Cavo Dragone is the most senior Italian in NATO, the North Atlantic Alliance. Since January last year, he has been Chairman of the Military Committee; prior to that, he served as Chief of Defence Staff for three years, and in the past he was also Chief of the Naval Staff; and although he has taken on a role that compels him to wield the delicate weapon of diplomacy, he has the merit, when called upon, of not beating about the bush, of calling a spade a spade, without fear of shattering the algorithm of political correctness, which in times of war often translates into bogus pacifism. Cavo Dragone has agreed to give this lengthy and passionate interview to Il Foglio at a delicate moment, at a time when NATO allies are facing external threats – from Russia to Iran – and internal threats linked to the need to find a new balance within the Alliance, due to Donald Trump’s manoeuvres. Next Thursday, in Brussels, Cavo Dragone will take part in a meeting convened by the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s most important political decision-making body. Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s director of strategic policy and the man spearheading the review of the US military presence in Europe – estimated at around 80,000 troops – is also expected to attend. This is precisely the subject of our conversation with the admiral: how can we act today to promote peace through military means without running the risk of sparking new wars?

Admiral, to the pacifists who argue that without Western weapons the war on the eastern front of Europe would already be over, perhaps we should pose a very simple counterfactual question: would the war be over, or would Ukraine be over? ‘Stopping the slaughter is a goal I wholeheartedly support and one that anyone wearing this uniform would endorse without hesitation. The disagreement concerns the method, and your counterfactual question is the right one. In February 2022, the stated objective in Russian planning was to take Kyiv in three days. Military support has enabled an attacked state to continue to exist and, when the time comes for negotiations, to participate in them with something to offer. Conditions imposed on those with no alternatives have, historically, rarely produced lasting stability or peace.” Can you explain why, in practical terms, spending more on armaments does not mean wishing for war but, quite the opposite, actually reduces the likelihood of it? “I would speak of investment rather than expenditure, and of security rather than armaments. Security is the precondition for everything else: no economy grows, no healthcare system functions, no school opens in an environment that is not safe. It is worth looking at what the agreed objective actually entails.” 

“In addition to purely military capabilities, a significant part also concerns mobility and energy infrastructure, networks and cyber security, healthcare supplies and civil protection. Then there is the technological component: artificial intelligence, space, sensor technology and autonomous systems. These are areas that will shape European industrial competitiveness in the coming decades and involve universities and businesses. As for why this reduces the likelihood of a conflict, the logic of deterrence rests on three elements: actual capabilities, the credibility of the will to use them, and clarity in communicating them. An attack occurs when the aggressor believes they can carry it out quickly and at a low cost. Every investment made in peacetime affects that assessment, making it less favourable. There are also immediate and visible benefits, regardless of any particular scenario: the same infrastructure is needed in natural disasters, the same cyber security protects hospitals and banks, and the same industrial base generates skilled employment. An investment in security yields results even when the threat remains distant.”

It is common to hear statements such as these in public debate, in Italy and elsewhere: ‘NATO provoked Putin’, or ‘arming Kyiv will only prolong the war’, ‘Russia is simply defending itself against Western encirclement’. Are these merely debatable opinions, or recognisable elements of a Russian propaganda machine?

“Every opinion is legitimate. For my part, however, I would like to reiterate a few points. First and foremost, NATO is a defensive alliance. This is demonstrated not only by its founding documents, but by the facts. It is a defensive alliance that countries join of their own free will: most recently, Finland and Sweden have decided to join voluntarily after 2022. Secondly, to speak of encirclement is, to say the least, inaccurate, particularly from a factual point of view: even with Helsinki’s accession, NATO countries account for barely 10 per cent of Russia’s vast borders. Finally, let us not forget a fundamental fact: in 2022, it was Russia that invaded Ukraine, a country that was not part of the Alliance, and which is fighting for its sovereignty.”

Some Western media outlets have warned that, if it continues to rearm at this rate, Russia could be in a position within a few years to successfully attack a NATO country. To those who say this is psychological terrorism designed to justify increased military spending, what is Cavo Dragone’s response?

“NATO operates on the basis of military assessments. First and foremost, we are observing the evolution of a threat which, over the last two years, has required around 700 sorties by allied fighter jets – practically one a day – in response to Russian aircraft threatening or violating NATO airspace. Added to this are hybrid, cyber and disinformation activities which, as has also become apparent in recent days, demonstrate that competition is already underway below the threshold of open conflict. Furthermore, we must not view Russia in isolation. Moscow has adapted its economy to the demands of a protracted war and benefits from growing military, strategic and economic cooperation with North Korea, Iran and China. This makes the strategic picture more complex and requires us to avoid any underestimation of the threat. NATO is acting accordingly by adapting its deterrence capabilities. Russia must know that an attack on Allied territory would have devastating consequences and could not succeed. Our aim is not to prepare to fight an inevitable war, but to make it avoidable through credible deterrence. To those who claim this is ‘psychological terrorism’, I would therefore point out that it is necessary to study the facts more closely and gain a better understanding of military and operational matters, whilst avoiding the usual political exploitation, and to try to avoid becoming a willing or unwitting conduit for the disinformation at which Russia has clearly demonstrated itself to be highly capable and effective, all too often finding fertile ground.”

When we discuss Ukraine, we are almost afraid to use the word ‘victory’. What would it mean, militarily and politically, to win this war against Russia? And conversely: what would it mean to lose? Would a crippled but sovereign Ukraine be a defeat? Or would Russia’s true victory be to demonstrate that, in the 21st century, changing Europe’s borders by force ultimately pays off?

“I would be cautious about applying categories such as ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ – in their traditional sense – to this war. NATO is not a party to the conflict, and it will be the Ukrainians who decide what terms they can accept to bring it to an end. It is this capacity to choose – not a formula imposed from outside – that distinguishes a sustainable peace from a mere truce between two wars. NATO’s support for Ukraine was also reaffirmed at the Ankara summit and, in recent days, on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of Ukrainian independence. As your newspaper reported in recent days, NATO’s Military Committee will soon hold a working session in Kyiv. One point must be clear: a peace that rewarded aggression would have consequences extending far beyond Ukraine and Europe, as it would alter the strategic calculus of every revisionist actor in the international system. For this reason, both militarily and politically, the decisive strategic outcome is that Russia must not be allowed to achieve, through force, its objective of undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and its ability to make its own choices. A peace that leaves Ukraine sovereign, free to choose its own future and militarily capable of preventing further aggression is a sustainable peace.”

A few months ago, you made a striking remark: we are facing a power that strikes at civilian infrastructure, kills civilians, violates the borders of a sovereign state and deports children. Are we sure it is right to continue talking about a possible future Russian aggression against Europe? Or, in hybrid forms, has that aggression already begun?

“I would distinguish between two phenomena, both of which are real. The first concerns the territory of the allies, and is already underway. Damaged undersea cables in the Baltic and the North Sea, acts of sabotage against logistics and rail networks, GPS jamming affecting civil aviation, drone incursions into our airspace, and ongoing disinformation campaigns. Taken together, these events show a pattern and a direction, and are deliberately kept below a certain threshold. The second is the scenario of a conventional armed attack against an Alliance country. That is not currently underway, and our task is to help ensure that it does not happen. I am cautious with my words, because they have operational consequences. Legally speaking, we are not at war. The phrase I use is this: we are not at war, but we are no longer in a state of full peace. And this has been the case for some time now.”

Drones in NATO countries’ airspace, acts of sabotage, suspicious fires, cyberattacks, GPS jamming, disinformation campaigns, critical infrastructure under attack. But where exactly does the line between ‘hybrid warfare’ and conventional warfare lie today? And who decides when that line has been crossed?

“It is clear who makes the decisions: the Atlantic Council, that is, the thirty-two allies meeting on a case-by-case basis. It is a political decision, taken in part on the basis of the military advice provided by the Military Committee. Where exactly the line is drawn, however, is not set out anywhere, and this is a deliberate choice. If we were to indicate the line in advance, anyone wishing to test us would know precisely how far they could go without facing consequences. In practice, there are three difficulties. Identifying who is responsible. Recognising the overall strategy. Containing a cyber-attack or a drone incursion that unfolds in a matter of minutes, whilst a decision involving thirty-two parties takes time. This is why we have rules of engagement agreed in advance and a permanent presence on the eastern flank and in the Baltic, which enable us to react immediately. I would add that between Article 5 and inaction there is a crucial space: Article 4, which allows allies to consult one another whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of an ally is threatened. It has been invoked and it has worked. Ultimately, the fundamental response lies in making this sort of action less – or not at all – worthwhile: protected infrastructure, networks with backup options, faster deployment capabilities, and more resilient societies. Those who act in this way will stop when they cease to achieve results.”

Admiral, but how do you recognise a Russian propagandist? Where does the line lie between a legitimate opinion and the systematic repetition of narratives concocted by the Kremlin?

“The key is to distinguish between legitimate opinions – even those that are radically critical – and activities that are either purely informative or part of disinformation strategies. Criticising NATO, challenging Western policies or arguing for the need to negotiate with Moscow does not mean one is a Russian propagandist. Our democracies are strong precisely because they are based on the exchange of views, even when heated. The problem arises with the systematic reproduction of a narrative framework designed to manipulate the perception of facts. There is a distinction that I find useful. The commentator starts with the facts to reach a conclusion. The propagandist starts with the conclusion and selects the facts that suit them. The test, therefore, lies in asking: are only those facts systematically selected that are compatible with a particular narrative? Are those that contradict it ignored or distorted? There is also the risk of unwittingly becoming unwitting amplifiers of a narrative constructed by others. The real antidote is to enhance the ability of our societies – starting with the media – to distinguish between opinions, facts and manipulation. Disinformation campaigns necessitate constant verification of sources, of differing accounts and of recurring patterns, regardless of how the facts may change.”

On the subject of Ukraine’s future. All 32 member states of the Alliance have stated that Ukraine will become a member of NATO once the conditions are met and the allies agree. Is this still a genuine strategic commitment, or is it merely a diplomatic formula that is repeated without any longer having a specific political deadline?

“The political commitment made by the thirty-two allies at the 2024 Washington summit remains in force. Ukraine’s path to membership has been described as irreversible, but the process will begin once the conditions have been met and all allies have agreed. There is therefore no automatic deadline: membership requires a unanimous political decision. Let us look at Finland: when Helsinki decided to change its position, the accession process was completed in less than a year. The decisive factor is political will, both on the part of the candidate country and the allies. From a military perspective, our task is to ensure that, when that decision is taken, capabilities do not constitute an obstacle: Ukraine has developed a very high level of interoperability with NATO. As I have told our Ukrainian friends, the ultimate goal is a free, sovereign Ukraine capable of defending itself.”

If we broaden our perspective and try to look at the threats that exist around the world – for NATO and beyond – there is one detail that perhaps deserves attention: Russia, Iran and North Korea have learnt to collaborate in practical terms. They exchange weapons, drones, ammunition, technology, intelligence and political support, transforming seemingly disparate conflicts into cogs in the same machinery of promoting terror. Why is it that democracies seeking to counter terrorism, aggression and destabilisation are still far less able to coordinate their efforts than their adversaries? And what should they actually do to build a political, military and economic alliance that is more integrated than the one that exists today?

“Russia, Iran and North Korea can make decisions swiftly and through direct channels. Democracies coordinate in more complex ways: public opinion, parliaments, legal constraints, differing economic interests and political cycles. But for over seventy years we have shown that we can always find a way forward. This ability is one of the reasons for NATO’s strength and its longevity. Atlanticism can no longer be confined to the two shores of the Atlantic. Today we must look to friendly nations and partners who share our fundamental principles and security interests. My recent trip to New Zealand confirmed this to me. It is the same logic that guides NATO’s relationship with its Indo-Pacific partners, namely the so-called IP4: Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. And it is the same logic that underpins the growing dialogue with the Gulf states. My forthcoming meeting in Canada with the Chiefs of Staff and military representatives from the Indo-Pacific region should also be seen in this light. This must translate into a more integrated network encompassing security, industry, technology, energy and strategic raw materials. It is here that so-called ‘friendshoring’ becomes part of deterrence: it is not just what we are capable of producing that matters, but also with whom we produce it. Our adversaries are building a network based on strategic expediency; we must strengthen a network based on strategic trust. We must also have one final advantage: the ability to turn crises into opportunities to become stronger. In the 21st century, superiority will depend not only on how many resources we possess, but on the speed with which we are able to learn, adapt and transform experience into new capabilities.”

International public opinion tends to view Iran primarily as a Middle Eastern issue. Yet Tehran is making a tangible contribution to Russia’s war in Europe, is developing missiles with ever-greater ranges, and NATO has reported that certain Iranian capabilities already pose a threat to its allies. Is it wrong to say that, from a security perspective, Iran is now also a hostile power to Europe?

“NATO takes every threat to allied territory very seriously, and Iran can no longer be regarded solely as a Middle Eastern problem. Tehran is providing Russia with military capabilities for a war fought in Europe and is developing missile capabilities with ever-greater range. Iranian missiles have already reached NATO airspace, and threats against targets in Europe have recently been made. Added to this are hybrid activities carried out on allied territory. Cooperation between Russia, Iran, North Korea and China makes the picture even more complex and demonstrates just how interconnected the threats to Euro-Atlantic security are today. There is also a distinctly European dimension. Europe has also become one of the theatres of Iran’s transnational repression, which for years has targeted dissidents, journalists and opponents, going so far as to threaten people’s safety and influence public debate in our societies. In June 2026, twenty-four countries, including Italy, formally denounced plots and other hostile activities attributed to the Iranian security apparatus. We must assess Iran for what it is and claims to be: an actor capable of projecting instability and threats far beyond the Middle East.”

One may not approve of the war against Iran; one may consider it wrong, disproportionate or dangerous. But does that give one the right to ignore the Iranian issue? Can one be against the war against Iran without deluding oneself into thinking that Iran is not a threat to Europe?

“Not endorsing a particular military response is understandable. In my view, however, it makes no sense to use that assessment to dismiss the strategic problem that preceded it: the Iranian threat to the West and Europe. The confrontation with the Islamic Republic spans over four decades of strategic competition and, in recent years, has taken on dimensions that extend far beyond the Middle East. For the first time, we are witnessing a significant retreat in Iran’s sphere of influence, beginning with the weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the fall of the Assad regime, which has deprived Tehran of an essential pillar and its strategic link to Lebanon. Iran is now under unprecedented political, military and economic pressure, which is highly debilitating in the short and medium term. However, it is precisely during periods of strategic retreat that we must avoid two opposing errors: overestimating an adversary or convincing ourselves that it no longer poses a threat. A more isolated and pressured Iran is not necessarily a less dangerous Iran. NATO’s task is to assess that threat, protect its allies and maintain a credible deterrent, regardless of the political judgement that each individual may legitimately make regarding specific military operations.”

On the subject of attempts to strengthen deterrence. NATO has decided to increase defence and security spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035. Many Europeans describe this as the price imposed by Donald Trump. But if Trump were to cease to exist politically tomorrow, would the military reasons for spending those sums disappear, or would they remain exactly the same?

“For many years, Europeans have benefited from a security dividend. Today, that dividend no longer exists. The war in Ukraine, the Gulf crisis, growing strategic competition from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, and hybrid, cyber and cognitive attacks have brought Europe back to the centre of the international stage. And the United States is called upon to sustain an intensified and simultaneous confrontation on a global scale. The key element of the NATO summit in Ankara was the shift from the issue of spending to that of delivery. It is NATO’s so-called ‘capability targets’ that indicate what is needed. We must derive maximum operational capability from every euro invested: reducing duplication, cooperating more, and accelerating procurement and the circulation of technologies. In addition to the announcements regarding the amount of resources we declare we intend to spend, and the numerous investment programmes we have launched, we must demonstrate – in the face of threats – our ability to acquire the right capabilities: those that are available quickly and can be deployed rapidly, are interoperable amongst allies, and meet the technological standards required by NATO. Deterrence serves precisely this purpose: to build a credible force to make war unnecessary.”

During this Trump-dominated era, NATO – whether it likes it or not, as the saying goes – is becoming what you call ‘NATO 3.0’: more conventional responsibilities for Europeans, a new balance of command, with the United States adjusting part of its global presence, particularly in Europe. Are we sure this is a healthy rebalancing and not, as we fear, an American withdrawal that the Alliance is trying to elegantly pass off as a virtue? What is the red line beyond which this rebalancing would become disengagement?

“The transatlantic relationship is evolving towards a more balanced distribution of responsibilities. Europeans are taking on greater conventional responsibilities, and we are also seeing this process reflected in the command structure: the United Kingdom in Norfolk, Italy in Naples, whilst Germany and Poland will take turns at Brunssum. At the same time, Europeans are being asked to progressively make available greater conventional capabilities, intelligence, surveillance, logistics and operational support. The United States continues to hold key positions within NATO’s command structure (land, air, sea and SACEU – Supreme Allied Commander Europe), maintains a strong conventional presence in Europe and plays a central role in nuclear deterrence, which constitutes the ultimate guarantee of transatlantic security. We are therefore witnessing a process of rebalancing that had also been called for by previous US administrations. The red line is very clear: the loss of the US’s ability to contribute credibly to deterrence, command and control, and, above all, to nuclear deterrence. This is not what we are seeing today. The process currently underway is moving in the opposite direction: a stronger Alliance that is, on the whole, less dependent on a single ally.”

In the relationship between Trump and NATO, there is another huge elephant in the room: Greenland. To put it bluntly: how is NATO organising itself to ensure that deterrence is also directed at those NATO countries which, as the United States is doing with Greenland, are threatening in various ways to take action against a NATO country? And what would happen to NATO if the United States were to launch an offensive against a territory linked to a NATO country, such as Denmark?

“NATO has been the cornerstone of Atlantic security for over 75 years. One of the key reasons for this is that the Alliance functions as a veritable ‘cohesion factory’. Its foundation lies in the peaceful settlement of any disputes that may arise between allies, as laid down in Article 1 of the Washington Treaty, and it possesses a fully-fledged consultative framework: the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary-General, the Military Committee and a permanent network of bodies that also serve to resolve differences and prevent them from escalating into irreversible crises. I have been able to see for myself how Greenland serves as a good example. The tensions that have emerged in recent months have been placed, as far as NATO is concerned, within a broader framework: the security of the Arctic and the Far North. Last February, the Arctic Sentry initiative was launched, whilst the United States, Denmark and Greenland are separately conducting trilateral discussions on issues that directly concern Greenlandic territory. The real success, in such cases, is to ensure that the crisis does not recur.”

Our time with the admiral has come to an end, but at Cavo Dragone we request a non-diplomatic approach to discuss an issue that closely concerns our country. Is Italy doing enough to fulfil its NATO commitments, or would it be reasonable to expect more in terms of developing projects to strengthen defence, including in terms of spending? Furthermore, looking at the recent past, what does Italy’s trajectory in its relations with NATO tell us compared to what we have seen in recent years?

“For a comprehensive answer, the question should also be put to the Defence Staff. However, based on the data available from the Brussels observatory, I can confirm that Italy is on a path of increasing responsibility, which is recognised and appreciated by its NATO partners. With highly qualified personnel and air, naval and land assets, Italy is present in key missions, participates in the Alliance’s activities, contributes to deterrence on the eastern flank, plays a central role in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, and hosts a growing number of key facilities, from the Joint Force Command in Naples – which it is set to lead – to the NATO Defence College. Furthermore, in recent years, Italy’s defence investment has grown significantly. I therefore believe that the trajectory is positive and consistent with the role that Italy, a founding member of the Alliance, has traditionally played within NATO. European security has entered a new and more demanding phase, requiring all allies to make an additional effort. Our country, too, as it has always done, will have to shoulder an increasing share of the collective responsibility. The issue, however, is not merely how much we invest, but what we are able to translate into capabilities. We must continue to invest in programmes that produce credible, available and interoperable capabilities, thereby strengthening the readiness of our Armed Forces and the contribution that Italy can offer to the Alliance as a whole.”