Trump’s war with Iran “will define the legacy of his presidency”

Washington. “The President is in a difficult situation at the moment,” says Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA officer who dealt with Iranian targets and is now a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies in Washington. Five months into the war with Iran, Donald Trump has inflicted enormous damage on the Islamic Republic, but his main strategic lever – the Strait of Hormuz – remains an unresolved challenge. “The President’s calculations were, of course, that this would be a short war,” observes Gerecht. “They thought that the initial military strikes in February – the decapitation carried out by the Israelis – would bring about the collapse of the regime. This, clearly, did not happen. The President has struggled greatly to come to terms with this reality.”

Since then, Washington has struggled to turn its military success into a political agreement. A memorandum of understanding signed in June provided for the end of military operations, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and 60 days of negotiations for a permanent agreement. Trump declared the agreement terminated last month, resumed the bombing campaign – which lasted almost two weeks – and renewed the US naval blockade against ships bound for Iranian ports.

Oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has risen slightly from the slump recorded at the start of the war, but remains below pre-war levels and vulnerable to further disruptions. Daily passages have plummeted from a normal average of 130 vessels to just 8–13 per day. Iran insists that the strait will remain blocked until US sanctions are lifted, it regains access to its frozen assets and the US military campaign comes to an end.

“Much of the power of Iran’s threats in the Strait of Hormuz does not stem from military considerations,” explains Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior director of the Iran programme at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies. “It stems from economic considerations and the ability to manage the economic crisis should the war escalate or intensify.”

Trump faces a choice: to lead the campaign necessary to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz, to maintain the blockade until the Iranian economy collapses, or to let Tehran dictate the terms of passage. The first option would involve accepting losses at sea and perhaps deploying troops to the islands or the Iranian coast. Alternatively, the president could simply claim victory on Truth Social, without this changing the reality on the ground.

“I imagine the Pentagon told the President that to fight the Battle of Hormuz, they would have to expect to lose a few destroyers and perhaps have to deploy ground troops, at least on the islands in the strait and perhaps along the Iranian coastline,” says Gerecht. “I believe the President refused to do so.”

Gerecht refers to the Iran–Iraq War, the eight-year conflict that began with Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980, during which the United States intervened in 1987 to protect shipping, escorting oil tankers through those waters for over a year. An Iranian mine nearly sank the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts in April 1988, injuring ten sailors and triggering a massive American attack on the Iranian navy and offshore platforms. “It seems the president is not prepared to accept the same sort of casualties today,” says Gerecht. “It is difficult to imagine waging a real war without being prepared to suffer real war casualties.”

The naval blockade, on the other hand, offers a slower route. “They are testing the theory that they can strangle the Islamic Republic sufficiently to provoke a massive internal crisis,” says Gerecht. “For the blockade to be effective, it will have to be a very long-term endeavour, unless they are lucky enough to see the Islamic Republic collapse sooner than expected. They will have to rotate their troops frequently, and this will tie up a large part of the US Navy, because the US Navy is no longer as large as it used to be.”

Ammunition poses a further constraint. Reports that the Army has almost entirely exhausted certain stocks of long-range precision-guided missiles have reinforced the case for caution. “It is detrimental to US interests for news of ammunition shortages to be broadcast to the whole world,” argues Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran. “Our adversaries read the news just as we do.” Brodsky believes that the United States still possesses the military power required to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but that the real question is whether Trump is prepared to commit the necessary resources and accept the consequences. Such a campaign, he argues, would have “second- and third-order effects, particularly in Europe, with regard to Ukraine and Russia, and in the Indo-Pacific”.

Another constraint for the White House is the upcoming mid-term elections. A Reuters/Ipsos poll at the end of July found that 62 per cent of Americans opposed the attacks. Another poll, conducted around the same time, found that 61 per cent of Republicans nevertheless believed it was worth fighting. Republican approval of Trump’s handling of the Iran crisis has fallen from 71 per cent in June to 61 per cent. His party risks losing the House of Representatives – which is not unusual for an incumbent president – but the outlook in the Senate is more secure. After the elections, Trump may have greater political leeway to act more decisively. “It is possible that we will see a broader military campaign after the mid-term elections,” Brodsky believes. “Perhaps this is precisely the Trump administration’s strategy, especially if the Iranians continue to refuse to back down.”

Washington and Tehran are waiting to see whether the elections will ease political tensions. But the conflict has already highlighted a rift within Trump’s party, and the final decision – whether or not to escalate – rests with the president, as do the consequences. “If he loses this war,” notes Gerecht, “it will likely define Donald Trump’s legacy.”