What Ceuta tells us about births, immigrants and politics

Although it has its origins in Morocco’s struggle to reclaim cities it considers to be occupied by Spain – as demonstrated by the controversies between the European right and left – the Ceuta crisis has immediately reignited the tensions arising from the fundamental quadrilateral of life and the future of our countries. Its sides are the demographic crisis, which is far more severe and rapid than is generally realised and whose causes and dynamics have been evident for decades; the ageing population and the resulting socio-economic slowdown, which, fortunately, has so far been countered more effectively than might have been hoped for by technological progress as well as by the rapid development of countries once considered ‘backward’; the general dissatisfaction that stems from this, in a psychological – rather than ideological – climate, influenced by the older generation’s nostalgia for the past and the discontent of young people living in an era of diminishing expectations; and immigration, which is indispensable if we are to at least slow down – rather than halt – the decline caused by ageing and thus buy time to find solutions.

As the daily controversies in Italy remind us, but also phenomena such as the Front National, Farage, Vox, the AdF and now Vannacci, under these circumstances immigration has become a catalyst for discontent and extremely strong identity-based reactions. Whatever judgement one may pass on the matter, this is a reality that cannot be dispelled simply by denouncing its immorality, but must be addressed first culturally and psychologically, and then politically, because it is perhaps the factor most capable today of swaying votes and influencing the political debate. 

Underlying this is a demographic decline that first emerged in France and then in other European countries, taking the form of a fall in birth rates as early as the 19th century. This was subsequently compounded by the end of the peasant world (comprising peasant-entrepreneurs who wanted fewer children but needed labour), by the boom in salaried employment, and by the stronger role of the state and large companies which, for example through old-age pensions, have separated the issue of low fertility from personal survival without, however, changing its essence, because ultimately, without young people, society cannot survive.

As articles by intelligent people and reports in the most reputable press indicate, although the dynamics surrounding these issues have long been fairly clear, there is still a great deal of confusion, similar to yet distinct from that which accompanied their emergence some 150 years ago. For example, one still reads that the decline in birth rates has relatively recent origins, or that its causes are ‘economic’ – stemming from a lack of resources – thereby confusing perception (which certainly matters, and how) with reality. But that decline was already a cause for concern in France in the 1870s (it is therefore no coincidence that France is the country with the richest political experience in this area) and in the Anglo-Saxon world at the turn of the century. And whilst the French realised fairly early on that it was prosperity, not poverty, that was driving this trend, the latter were instead concerned with the behaviour of the ‘lower’ social classes and ‘inferior’ races, promoting eugenic policies at home and ‘whites only’ policies – that is, policies of exclusion from the outside world (a history worth remembering) – often linked to warnings of a ‘demographic bomb’ that would destroy the world. In Italy, the figure of 4.93 children per woman in 1862 had fallen to 4.5 by 1900 and to 3.4 by 1930, which helps to explain the influence that Corrado Gini managed to exert over Mussolini. Today, to put it in perspective, the figure stands at 1.14.

The demographic decline, evident between the two world wars (reflection on this was, for example, one of the roots of the emergence of the Scandinavian welfare state, which was specifically designed to protect a population that felt under threat), was subsequently halted – as we now know, only temporarily – by a strong baby boom, particularly in the US. In Europe, in fact, a significant proportion of population growth following the Second World War was already due to rising living standards: in Italy, the number of children per woman remained stable at around 2.4 throughout the ‘economic miracle’ years, only to begin falling rapidly – as in all developed countries – from the late 1960s, dropping from 1972 – more than 50 years ago! – below the replacement rate of 2.2.

It is precisely the rise in life expectancy that has further complicated our ability to recognise and address the challenges of ageing: at least initially, the decline in the number of children increased general well-being, reducing the number of children per worker without significantly increasing the number of elderly people unable to work. This initial ‘ideal’ phase, which peaked in Europe between 1945 and 1965 (and which is closely linked to the ‘economic miracles’), was, however, only temporary. It was precisely around 1965 that life expectancy in the West (though not in the socialist countries, reflecting their different and deeper crisis) began to rise unexpectedly and rapidly, soon exceeding 80 years. Over time – in Italy from the 1990s, when, not coincidentally, the ‘pension reforms’ began – the decline in the number of people entering the labour market, due to the falling number of young people, was further exacerbated by the increase in the number of older people who could no longer work until the age of 60–65, and subsequently by the growing number of those who were no longer self-sufficient.

This has created a gap between individual and collective interests: the decline in birth rates stemmed from the realisation that having fewer children and having them later meant (and still means) a higher income and more personal freedom – a truth that held true for several decades, even at a societal level, for societies needing to support fewer dependants. For more than 30 years, however, the rule that fewer children equals higher income and greater freedom – which continues to hold true at an individual level in the early stages of our lives – no longer applies at a general level, creating a fundamental contradiction. And the phenomenon is exacerbated in the case of women by the indisputable fact that those who have children will, on average, earn less than those who do not, the latter’s income – given the same level of education – having now caught up with that of men.

This contradiction could be overcome by recognising that, when viewed rationally, individual interests too are seriously undermined by the absence of children in lives that become funnels leading to loneliness and death and – if things were to continue as they are – also towards impoverishment. But understanding this requires time and a cultural as well as a material revolution, one that shifts resources, power and dignity towards young people and, above all, towards those who bear children – that is, women. Only individual understanding can, in fact, change powerful trends against which a few nurseries and a little extra money, however useful, are of little help; and authoritarianism, as well as serving no purpose, breeds monsters.

Immigration is one of the main ways of gaining this time, as are the drive to get more people to work harder and for longer – though this is not a popular solution – and science, which is the least problematic option. In ageing societies facing difficulties, immigration does indeed provoke strong reactions, a desire to return to the past and even conspiracy theories, which it is unwise simply to deny and combat. Rather, and perhaps above all, certain matters should be explained and other actions taken.

The first is to make it clear that it is also possible to choose not to ‘use’ immigration, as Japan, for example, has done for years, and as those who speak of remigration implicitly do. To do so, however, is tantamount to slowly ‘shutting ourselves off’ from the outside world, greatly accelerating our decline in the name of an impossible return to the past. It is therefore not a wise choice. In combating this, however, we must always remember that there are significant psychological difficulties in facing up to ageing – that is, to death. It is a form of denial that, in its own way, serves the peace of mind of individuals: we prefer instead to think of more pleasant things, and if we are indeed called upon to reflect on ageing, we try to view it in a positive light. Rejecting the idea that immigration is beneficial and necessary is therefore, in its own way, also a natural reaction, one that must be understood and overcome.

The second point that needs to be made clear is that immigration – which should not be confused with asylum and humanitarian reception – is a temporary solution, and should therefore be utilised to the full whilst it remains possible to do so. As proof that we all belong to the same species, economic growth and rising levels of income and education are, in fact, causing the same demographic crisis everywhere as prosperity spreads. China is already in a very serious crisis; India’s crisis is clearly on the horizon; and, in general, it seems fair to say that the ‘newly’ developed countries have experienced – and are likely to experience – periods of growth and prosperity that are much shorter than those in Europe. The same applies to Africa, which is now the continent of the future: in the post-war period it had less than half the population of Europe; today it has almost three times as many, and is expected to have more than six times as many by the end of this century, yet even now it is experiencing a decline in birth rates similar to that seen in Europe in the late nineteenth century – and at a faster rate.

The third point is that immigration, on the scale required today, means permanently embedding diverse elements into a social and human fabric that needs them; these elements must be integrated, but they provoke inevitable reactions, which must therefore be ‘managed’. This is all the more true in countries with ageing populations, such as those in Europe, where people over the age of sixty have lived through a history interwoven with nation-building and the achievement of a desired and sought-after ethno-cultural homogeneity, often achieved through violence. In Italy, for example, there are almost 15 million people aged over 65 – a quarter of the population – whilst those under 18 number fewer than nine million, accounting for 15 per cent of the population. A large proportion of Italians therefore grew up in a country that, over time, became increasingly ‘Italian’, moving beyond localism, and saw itself as a nation of emigrants. Today’s reality therefore seems to them to be that of a ‘world turned upside down’, and the unease this causes is heightened by the fact that older people’s ‘thresholds’ of tolerance for change are, on average, lower than those of young people, as demonstrated by the greater anxiety aroused by a decline in crime. Since perceptions are, as we have seen, at least as real as the reality they misinterpret, we need to understand what we are dealing with and what enormous human problems – including psychological ones – need to be addressed.

The fourth truth is a corollary of the third: if one decides to use the term ‘immigration’ – as would be desirable – then you must actively seek out the approach that provokes the least resistance, thereby pursuing an informed and proactive policy, based on best international practice, which identifies and invites people who, for many and varied reasons (cultural, religious, linguistic, educational, behavioural, etc.), will provoke the least resistance in the country where it is hoped they will choose to live. A policy that then supports and facilitates their arrival and integration, presenting them with a friendly face – one that cannot be limited to that of the police, who, however hard they try (and they do try), remain an apparatus of law and order.

The bottom line is that, in any case – given its temporary nature – even a sensible approach to immigration will, at best, merely serve to prolong and mitigate an inevitable decline unless a major cultural and psychological campaign is launched to make people understand that having children is in everyone’s interests, including those of individuals. There is no denying that those who have children will have less freedom and less time and money at their disposal, all the more so (though not exclusively) if they are women. However, we can demonstrate that alongside material wealth and a temporary increase in freedom, there are even greater and more enduring personal and emotional treasures: it is better to see grandchildren than to see parents in poor health and sometimes on their deathbeds; it is lovely to have life close at hand as one’s own draws to a close; and it is reassuring to know that there will be someone to secure our pensions or ensure our survival should the pension system collapse. These are things that, over time, our intelligence should be able to grasp because – as Louis C.K. recently noted in "Ridiculous" – it is certainly possible to have a good life as individuals for a while, but when that good life ends, there is another, long life awaiting us. However, the sooner we understand this, the less difficult the transition to a new model will be.

A serious and informed policy, which goes beyond slogans and mutual accusations, should therefore address the issue of how to identify more genuine immigrants, to pinpoint those who can most easily integrate into the specific community in which they will come to live, and to facilitate and support their arrival and integration, whilst at the same time clearly addressing the issues and benefits this entails, because it is possible to make it clear that the benefits far outweigh the problems, but only if it is explained that we are also aware of the existence of the problems and that every effort is being made to minimise them. To this end, immigration should definitely be entrusted to a major European agency, with national branches. In the absence of such an agency, an Italian one should be set up immediately, which should, in the meantime, push for the greatest possible European integration in this highly sensitive area.

To do so is to recognise that the policies pursued thus far have not been immigration policies, but in fact illusory policies for managing flows of guest workers, the necessity of whom was grudgingly acknowledged but which it was hoped would represent a temporary problem. These policies have, from time to time, been accompanied by considerations of public order or by idealistic policies of general hospitality – morally commendable, perhaps, but which – in the conditions prevailing in an ageing and fearful white world – objectively share responsibility for the rise in negative reactions that risk accelerating the collapse of civilisations that are already fragile and in need of care and attention.