Ankara may be the most important stop in al-Zaidi’s foreign policy

Baghdad. At first glance, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara appeared to be a natural continuation of his diplomatic tour, which had already included Washington, Doha, and Tehran. A closer reading, however, suggests that Turkey is not merely another diplomatic stop, but may be the country where the success of the Iraqi government’s new strategic vision will be tested more than in any other capital.

In Washington, the objective was to redefine Iraq’s security and political relationship with the United States. In Tehran, Baghdad sought to reassure its most influential regional partner that its growing engagement with the West was not intended to undermine relations with Iran, but rather to reduce tensions while preserving Iraqi sovereignty. Ankara, however, presents a different challenge: whether Iraq can transform its geographical position into lasting economic influence.

For that reason, the official launch of the Development Road Project represents far more than an infrastructure initiative. The project aims to connect the Grand Faw Port with the Turkish border through a modern network of railways and highways, placing Iraq at the heart of trade routes linking the Gulf with Europe. If implemented as planned, it could fundamentally redefine Iraq’s economic role—from a country dependent on oil exports to one that controls one of the region’s most significant commercial corridors.

In the same context, the agreement to increase Iraqi oil exports to Turkey to one million barrels per day carries strategic implications that extend well beyond the energy market. Ankara seeks to consolidate its position as a regional energy hub, while Iraq is looking for a long-term economic partner that can connect it with European markets. This convergence of interests gives Iraqi-Turkish relations a degree of stability that exceeds partnerships based solely on political or security understandings.

Yet this vision faces a number of challenges, beginning with Iraq’s domestic security environment. The corridor intended to carry trade and investment passes through provinces that have witnessed the activity of extremist organizations over the past two decades, in addition to the presence of armed factions exercising varying degrees of influence along parts of the route. Even if these groups do not politically oppose the project, the continued existence of multiple centers of power and the state’s inability to fully monopolize the legitimate use of force remain significant concerns for investors, transport companies, and international insurers. For capital markets, political assurances alone are insufficient unless they are matched by a predictable and secure operating environment.

The second challenge concerns regional balances. The more deeply Iraq integrates into transportation and energy projects linking the Gulf with Turkey and Europe, the more strategically sensitive these corridors become for other regional powers. Baghdad will therefore have to carefully manage its relationships with Tehran, Washington, and Ankara simultaneously, ensuring that a strategic economic project is not interpreted as a geopolitical realignment in favor of one side against another.

Another challenge is entirely domestic. Successive Iraqi governments have repeatedly announced ambitious strategic projects, yet the gap between announcement and implementation has remained wide due to bureaucratic inertia, overlapping institutional authorities, political disputes, and the limited capacity of state institutions to execute mega-projects according to clear timelines.

In this context, Turkey-based political researcher Omar al-Janabi stated that one of the primary concerns among Turkish business leaders was obtaining greater access and facilitation to enter the Iraqi market, a point that was reflected in the statements of several Turkish businessmen. According to al-Janabi, the problem that plagued previous Iraqi governments was their inability to translate memoranda of understanding and bilateral agreements into tangible results, with implementation repeatedly postponed—an issue that Turkish officials themselves have consistently highlighted.

He added that Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has ultimately worked in favor of deeper economic cooperation between Iraq and Turkey, particularly given Iraq’s overwhelming dependence on oil exports as its primary source of state revenue. This, he argued, has pushed al-Zaidi’s government to seek export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz by activating three major oil corridors: the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline, in which Turkey will participate during part of the construction phase; the Basra–Aqaba pipeline, which is expected to be awarded to an Italian company with a planned capacity of two million barrels per day; and the expansion of exports through Turkey’s Ceyhan terminal to one million barrels per day. According to al-Janabi, these developments are likely to provoke strong objections from Iran, which is expected to exert various forms of pressure on al-Zaidi and his government in an effort to obstruct these projects.

Al-Janabi, who attended the joint press conference between al-Zaidi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, noted that the Development Road Project, as described by the Iraqi prime minister, would constitute a “third river” connecting Turkey and Iraq, serving as a strategic bridge between Iraq and Europe and delivering a major transformation to the Iraqi economy. He stressed, however, that the project will require substantial financial allocations. At the same time, he argued that it will significantly improve Iraq’s infrastructure by attracting companies whose owners, unlike those associated with Iran-backed armed influence, do not exercise armed coercion within the country.

Al-Janabi concluded by saying that he expects Iran to activate its political and security tools to obstruct al-Zaidi’s efforts, which, if successful, would gradually loosen Baghdad’s dependence on Tehran, a relationship that Iran has worked vigorously to preserve through what he described as an attempt to maintain its tutelage over Iraq. At the same time, he argued that the recent war has weakened Iran’s ability to sustain its influence in Iraq, particularly amid the Trump administration’s efforts to isolate the Iranian regime from its regional proxies while simultaneously strengthening both Turkey’s and Saudi Arabia’s regional roles.

Nevertheless, what distinguishes the Ankara visit is that it reflects a gradual shift in Iraq’s foreign policy priorities. Rather than focusing exclusively on border security and crisis management, Baghdad is increasingly discussing trade corridors, supply chains, energy, investment, and regional connectivity. These are precisely the issues that will determine the position of states within the regional order in the decades ahead.

The central question, however, is whether al-Zaidi’s government is capable of completing this transformation within Iraq itself. The challenge is no longer the absence of a strategic vision, but rather the state’s ability to enforce it. The more the government succeeds in consolidating the monopoly of official institutions over security decision-making, reducing the influence of armed actors operating outside the state’s chain of command, and establishing a stable legal environment for investors, the greater the likelihood that the Development Road Project will evolve from an ambitious vision into an economic reality capable of reshaping Iraq’s regional position.

For that reason, the success of the Ankara visit should not be measured by the number of agreements signed, but by Baghdad’s ability to transform geography into influence, the economy into an instrument of foreign policy, and the state into the sole guarantor of security and investment. If that is achieved, this visit may well represent the most significant turning point in Iraq’s regional repositioning since 2003.