A precarious balance. What will change in Iraq following al-Zaidi’s visit to Trump?

Backed by the US President but supported at home by figures close to the regime in Tehran, the young Iraqi leader is seeking an economic agreement with the US without fuelling tensions

17 JUL 26
Translated by AI
Image of A precarious balance. What will change in Iraq following al-Zaidi’s visit to Trump?

Al Zaidi and Trump at the White House (Getty image)

Istanbul. “We love Iraq,” said Donald Trump, responding to questions from journalists during the reception held on 14 July at the White House for Iraq’s new and youngest-ever prime minister, Ali al Zaidi. The visit was Zaidi’s first official one since taking office exactly two months earlier, and took place amidst ongoing hostilities between the United States, Israel and Iran. According to a statement released after the meeting, “the Iraqi Prime Minister emphasised that his visit aims to build a strong economic partnership. He stated that, following the end of the US military presence in Iraq – part of the International Coalition to defeat ISIS – an economic presence led by US companies would take its place, highlighting how social ties, rather than military ones, form the foundation of economic cooperation”, referring to the 30 September deadline set for the complete withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. On 16 June, a joint statement by Zaidi and the presidential special envoy Tom Barrack stated that the two had “commended the Iraqi decision to finalise the operating licence for Starlink; (...) to begin negotiations with Chevron on the development of the West Qurna-2 and Nassiriya oil fields; (...) to allow the US companies Hkn, Western Zagros and Hunt to resume operations with full security guarantees; and to proceed with a memorandum of understanding with TI Capital for the rehabilitation of the Kirkuk–Baniyas oil pipeline as a vital route for oil exports”.
Zaidi, a wealthy and successful businessman, is well aware that Trump’s support was a decisive factor in his appointment as prime minister. At the same time, he knows that his domestic supporters – the Shia Coordination Framework – are, for the most part, strongly anti-American and pro-Iranian. The balancing act to which he appears to have committed himself will not be easy, but it will be essential to prevent the Middle East from sinking into further violence. Many are wondering how much of the visit was for show and how much will actually translate into real change. Republican MP Joe Wilson commented on X that “Iraqi leaders come and go, but the system remains the same: an entire government apparatus based on a single objective – to serve Iran’s Supreme Leader and fund sectarian terrorist militias. It is the same formula that created ISIS from the outset, under former Prime Minister Maliki. Whether it is Prime Minister Zaidi (who ran a bank sanctioned for supporting Iran), his predecessor Sudani (who literally had a terrorist as his national security adviser) or their predecessors, the system is the same and the game of musical chairs is irrelevant”. Iraq’s bloated public sector – including, in particular, the huge number of personnel on the payroll of the armed and security forces – has long been the subject of criticism. However, previous prime ministers have continued to expand its size to meet electoral demands. Trust is sorely lacking both within Iraq and in relations between Iraq and the United States, and the fact that an international journalist was recently targeted in Baghdad only exacerbates this shortage. If a journalist who has been reporting from Iraq for over a decade – including from the front lines against Islamic State – and who had met numerous senior officials, is not safe on a central street in the capital – where there is a heavy police presence and where officials sometimes sit in open-air bars and cafés – how can one trust the information coming out of the country from local journalists who are under far greater pressure?
At the end of July, Zaidi stated that “most armed factions have already begun handing over their weapons to the state” and that “following the complete withdrawal of US forces (in September, ed.) there will no longer be any justification or need for any resistance in Iraq”. For some, his use of the term ‘resistance’ in reference to the Iranian-backed armed factions operating outside state control is already a negative sign; for others, it may simply be a necessary choice, given the complex context in which he finds himself operating. In either case, the little trust remaining between the two countries could soon grow rapidly or collapse abruptly: a summer of hope and talks, followed by an autumn that could turn fiery.