It’s an American Serie A

Why are our clubs so popular with foreigners? Luciano Segreto, professor of the History of Italian Business at Bocconi University, and Pippo Russo, lecturer in Sociology at the University of Florence, offer their insights.
12 SEP 26
Translated by AI
Image of It’s an American Serie A

The owner of AC Milan, Gerry Cardinale (photo: LaPresse)

A league for foreigners. On the pitch and beyond. On the first matchday of Serie A, out of 319 players fielded, only 95 were Italian (compared with 99 last year). On the second matchday, it was even worse: only 61 Italians were on the pitch at kick-off. On the third matchday, the figures confirmed the trend: Italians account for less than 30 per cent of the total number of players fielded. This is hardly surprising when you consider that thirteen Serie A clubs are owned by foreign investors, and a full ten are owned by North American entrepreneurs and investment funds.
What remains entirely home-grown are the fans and their passion, which is a potential guarantee of business. This is one of the reasons that may explain why international financial groups and funds are flooding into Italian football.
Luciano Segreto, lecturer in the History of Italian Business at Bocconi University, emphasises: “The American world has always been drawn to the business of sport. In the United States, investment in sport has always been treated in the same way as any other economic activity. Not necessarily to win. The logic is diametrically opposed to that with which we have grown up in Italian football, where the aim is to win league titles and cups. Those who buy our clubs are not supporters, and their tenure at the club is limited in time. This is why accounting considerations almost exclusively prevail.”
As of today, the following clubs are under US ownership: Milan, Inter, Roma, Atalanta, Fiorentina, Parma, Frosinone, Venezia and Monza. Then there is the ‘Canadian’ Bologna, the ‘Romanian’ Genoa and the ‘Indonesian’ Como.
Pippo Russo, a lecturer in Sociology at the University of Florence, adds: “The invasion of American capitalism can be explained simply by the absence of Italian capitalism. The country no longer has the economic strength to support various sectors of the national economy, including the football industry.”
With the Berlusconis and the Morattis gone, Italian entrepreneurs no longer have the millions to invest in a world of football where costs are becoming increasingly exorbitant.
“Naively, the fans have remained stuck in the old ways of thinking. They’re still hoping that the next sheikh will turn up, invest in star players and lead the team to victory, but that’s not how it works, and sometimes even good intentions aren’t enough,” explains Russo. “The case of Commisso is telling: he arrived from New York laden with dollars and was greeted with enthusiasm in Florence following the much-criticised Della Valle era. One season that fell short of expectations was enough to spark protests. It is proof of a lack of maturity on the part of our fans and of superficial approaches by foreign management. The club must also represent a tradition and a local community, beyond mere results. These are two aspects that have been completely overlooked by the American owners.”
This aspect is less noticeable in large cities, but is more evident in the provinces. Take the case of Parma (Krause Group), where on-pitch results are not accompanied by any particular focus on community relations or fan loyalty.
According to Russo: “The Como case is the most emblematic. A powerful Indonesian family has arrived here and is buying up land as well as the football club. We are witnessing a sort of ‘soft colonisation’ of the exclusive Lake Como area in the shadow of football.”
Professor Segreto adds: “From a sports business perspective, Italian football still offers brands with international recognition at low cost. This is a combination that is impossible to find in leagues such as the Premier League, the Bundesliga or La Liga. To this day, there are still clubs that are attractive due to their reputation and fan bases: think of Lazio, Napoli, Torino and Bari.”
A key priority for all foreign owners is the idea of owning their own stadiums. Quite a problem. According to Russo: “Italy is the worst country in which to build sports facilities, as the events in Rome and Milan demonstrate. Even where new stadiums do exist, success is by no means guaranteed. Take the case of Reggiana’s Giglio Stadium, built in 1995 and sold off to Sassuolo (Mapei Stadium) for a mere 3 million in 2013”.
Another point that foreign investors have in common is a lack of empathy with the fans. In almost every club, relations between the supporters and the new owners are far from idyllic, to put it mildly. The cases of Milan and Fiorentina, with fierce protests directed at Cardinale and Commisso, are emblematic. Football in Italy, unlike in the United States (see the ‘Trumpian’ World Cup), is not just show business. Given the irrational passion of Italian supporters, even the managers of foreign investment funds face their own challenges.