Science
BAD SCIENTISTS •
Being able to clearly distinguish between the responsibilities of science and politics
Scientists can estimate those consequences, within the limits of the available knowledge. Politicians must take responsibility for determining which collective risks are acceptable and what sacrifices may be required of citizens. The Covid Commission and six mistakes

Photo by Hans Reniers on Unsplash
The scientific community must be accountable for its claims, explain the evidence on which they are based, and accept that they may be challenged, even by those without specialist training, provided they possess the minimum knowledge necessary to formulate relevant questions that are capable of a verifiable answer. When a lack of preparation prevents one from even understanding the subject of the question, the enquiry loses its ability to ascertain the facts, because the very prerequisite for a rational discussion is lacking. The right to ask questions is universal, but the ability to conduct an investigation requires adequate preparation, all the more so when the enquirer holds institutional powers and must draw conclusions that are bound to have public consequences.
In discussions about the pandemic, certain errors in reasoning continue to resurface, making it difficult for the scientific community to engage with those who dispute its conclusions. These errors are common in many public controversies, but they become particularly serious when they feature in a parliamentary inquiry, as they can compromise the establishment of the facts and the determination of responsibility.
One of the most common errors is to attribute positions to speakers that they have never held. It is often claimed that scientists seek to evade questions or expect to be believed simply because they hold an academic title, in accordance with the ‘ipse dixit’ principle. Yet the scientific method requires that anyone’s claims be subjected to verification, regardless of their position. Scientific authority stems from a track record of verifiable results and constitutes a reason to take testimony seriously, without exempting it from verification. Even when the scientific community calls for respect for the expertise and dignity of the experts called upon to testify – as was the case in the recent letter to the Speakers of the Houses of Parliament – it is making a request that is perfectly compatible with the rigorous scrutiny of their statements.
To challenge a claim, one must first quote it correctly. If a scientist explains the reasons behind a decision by referring to specific studies, the person questioning them may challenge those studies, highlight their limitations or present evidence to the contrary. If, on the other hand, they ignore the explanation and continue to attribute a different position to the scientist, the discussion becomes a succession of accusations to which the other party cannot respond effectively, because every answer is replaced by a new interpretation of their words. The problem becomes even more apparent when a question contains scientifically false premises or presupposes causal relationships that have never been proven. In such cases, responding first requires correcting the question itself – an action that may be mistaken for an attempt to evade it by those who lack the necessary knowledge to understand its flaw.
A second mistake is to regard all areas of expertise as equivalent, on the grounds that no expert is infallible. This leads one to ask who has the right to determine what expertise is required to discuss a particular issue, as if its assessment were dependent on some arbitrary appointment. Yet expertise can be ascertained through relevant training, documented experience and the quality of the results achieved. When evaluating a statement, what counts above all is the evidence supporting it, the possibility of verifying it independently and the transparency of the expert’s interests.
Everyone has the right to express an opinion, whilst the scientific weight of a statement depends on the available evidence. The principle of equality amongst citizens does not imply that every judgement has the same epistemic value. If that were the case, we would have no reason to prefer a reproducible experimental result to a conjecture, or an assessment based on epidemiological data to a mere impression. Those conducting an investigation must be able to distinguish between these situations, because simply bringing together people with differing opinions does not in itself guarantee a scientifically balanced debate. Balance is measured by the quality of the evaluation of the evidence, not by the number of opposing viewpoints that are given a voice.
The third error concerns the way in which past decisions are judged. During the pandemic, decisions had to be made under conditions of uncertainty, often with incomplete and rapidly changing information. Today we know many facts that were unknown in 2020, and it would be unreasonable to expect those who made the decisions at the time to have taken them into account. A decision must be assessed by reconstructing the knowledge available at the time it was made, the degree of reliability of that knowledge, and the alternatives that were realistically feasible.
This criterion makes it possible to identify actual errors, distinguishing between a reasonable decision that produced disappointing results and a decision taken whilst ignoring evidence that was already available. It is also necessary to check whether measures were updated when new data altered the justification for them. The ability to correct decisions is part of their quality, especially when the initial uncertainty is high. Assessing the actions of institutions retrospectively therefore requires reconstructing the chronological sequence of knowledge, whilst avoiding attributing to the past what we have only learnt subsequently.
Furthermore, in an emergency, waiting for absolute certainty has consequences of its own. Refraining from taking action whilst an epidemic is spreading is tantamount to choosing to accept the foreseeable consequences of inaction. Any retrospective assessment must therefore compare what was decided with what might have happened had realistic alternatives been adopted, including the option of not taking action. This comparison also requires consideration of the effects a decision may have on people other than those immediately involved.
This gives rise to a fourth error, which consists of confusing the two factors that contribute to determining a public decision: the interests to be safeguarded and the knowledge required to foresee the consequences of the various options.
Interests refer to the assets a society seeks to protect and the weight it attaches to each. During a pandemic, the protection of public health may necessitate restrictions on certain individual freedoms, in accordance with the principle of proportionality and based on actual risks. Determining the extent to which a restriction is justified involves a political judgement, subject to constitutional constraints and the responsibilities of those in government.
Knowledge, on the other hand, concerns what one can reasonably expect to happen by adopting one measure rather than another. Empirical data is required to determine whether a face mask reduces the risk of transmission, to what extent a vaccination might affect the circulation of the virus, or what consequences the closure of certain businesses might have. Conclusions may change as the available evidence changes, and this possibility of revision is an integral part of scientific knowledge.
Confusing these two levels leads to particularly serious errors. The provisional nature of knowledge is sometimes used to deny the very legitimacy of a collective decision, going so far as to argue that everyone should be able to decide solely for themselves. In this regard, reference is made to the idea that knowledge is dispersed amongst individuals and that no central authority can gather it in its entirety. This observation describes a real problem, but does not resolve the issue of the consequences of individual choices on others.
During an epidemic, anyone who chooses to expose themselves to a risk may contribute to transmitting it to people who did not share in that choice. It may also have consequences for the functioning of healthcare services and for others’ ability to receive treatment. Local and individual knowledge alone is not sufficient to assess these collective effects. Leaving all decisions to individuals does not eliminate the problem of balancing interests, because the consequences of their choices continue to affect people who do not have the opportunity to choose.
Science can estimate these consequences, within the limits of available knowledge. Politics must take responsibility for determining which collective risks are acceptable and what sacrifices may be required of citizens. Any error on the part of a scientific adviser concerns the quality of the information and opinions they have provided; any error on the part of a policy-maker also encompasses the way in which they have used that information to balance competing interests. Attributing responsibility to scientists for decisions they have not taken therefore prevents the chain of responsibility from being correctly reconstructed.
This misunderstanding becomes particularly dangerous when one attempts to assess the management of an emergency solely through the lens of scientific controversies. The presence of uncertainty regarding the consequences of a measure does not, on its own, allow us to determine whether that measure was politically justified. To reach a conclusion, one must also be aware of the interests that were intended to be protected, the risks that were sought to be avoided, and the available alternatives. The assessment of the evidence is a matter for scientific debate, whilst judgement on the balancing of interests must be directed at those responsible for the decisions.
A fifth mistake is to jump to conclusions before all the facts have been gathered. This occurs when a sentence is taken out of context from a document, an internal communication or a set of minutes and presented as conclusive proof of liability. A sentence may provide the starting point for an investigation, but its meaning depends on the circumstances in which it was uttered and the information available to those involved.
The assessment of a controversial health decision must be carried out on two levels. The first concerns the scientific evidence, namely how robust the evidence regarding the efficacy and safety of the available alternatives was at the time of the decision. The second concerns the decision-making process, in which it is necessary to ascertain whether the interests involved were properly represented, whether certain information was overlooked, and whether any pressure may have altered the weight given to the protection of public health.
A decision may be scientifically sound yet have been adopted through an irregular administrative procedure. Alternatively, it may be scientifically unfounded even in the absence of interference. These are possibilities that an investigation must keep open until the evidence allows them to be ruled out. An isolated statement, however surprising it may seem, does not allow us to distinguish between these situations. It is necessary to reconstruct the context in which it was produced and ascertain what role it actually played in the decision-making process.
Even within parliamentary institutions, the need to prevent the content of hearings from being presented publicly as already established before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation has sometimes been recognised. This principle concerns the very function of an inquiry: when conclusions are announced before the collection of evidence has been completed, evidence subsequently obtained risks being assessed solely on the basis of its ability to confirm a judgement that has already been formed. An inquiry must, instead, be able to revise its initial hypotheses, even to the point of abandoning them when the facts contradict them.
The sixth error consists of attempting to discredit the speaker by replacing a discussion of their claims with a judgement on their character. Attributing personal ambitions, image-related interests or emotional reactions to scientists does not allow for an assessment of any of the evidence they have presented. The focus is shifted from verifiable claims to the alleged psychological motivations of those making them. Even if a personal motivation were actually documented, it would still be necessary to assess the accuracy of the claims separately.
This approach is often accompanied by an attempt to portray the scientific community as just one faction amongst others, keen to defend its own positions and leading figures. The issue is particularly evident when a dispute between individual experts is confused with a position adopted by bodies representing the profession. The two situations have different implications, which must be recognised without automatically siding with one or the other.
Recent reactions to the procedures adopted by the Covid Commission during its hearings provide a clear illustration of this difference. Numerous scientific societies in the disciplines directly involved in managing the emergency have expressed concern about the method used. They have been joined by professional bodies and the National Federation of Orders of Surgeons and Dentists, whose governing body unanimously approved a motion on the dignity of the medical profession and respect for scientific expertise. These are institutional resolutions, adopted by bodies that exercise recognised representative or scientific functions, the significance of which cannot be reduced to the mere opinion of a group of professionals.
The involvement of these bodies does not prove that every objection raised with the Commission is valid, nor that all the professionals they represent personally agree with every statement. It does, however, demonstrate that concerns regarding the method of the hearings have an institutional weight that must be recognised for what it is. To describe them as the initiative of a vocal minority, whilst ignoring the official deliberations of the representative bodies, amounts to distorting the facts.
This same confusion can influence the weight given to testimonies. If the scientific community is presented as a faction opposed to others, it becomes possible to place the positions of professional bodies on the same footing as the opinions of consultants selected on the basis of criteria other than scientific expertise, without comparing the quality of their respective evidence. The selection of interviewees thus ends up determining the weight given to the opinions heard, regardless of their soundness.
A parliamentary committee has investigative powers that may enable it to obtain documents and testimonies that would otherwise be difficult to secure. It can reconstruct decisions, identify omissions and ascertain institutional accountability. To exercise these powers effectively, it must apply the same standards of scrutiny to its own reasoning as it demands of those being questioned, whilst remaining open to the possibility that the evidence may contradict the assumptions on which the investigation was based.
When a question contains false premises, the answer must be able to correct them. When an expert presents evidence contradicting a hypothesis, that evidence must be examined. When a decision is judged retrospectively, subsequent knowledge must be distinguished from that available at the time. And when a possible error emerges, it must be established whether it relates to scientific knowledge, the decision-making process or the political balancing of interests.
The application of different criteria can result in a methodologically flawed reconstruction, in which non-existent responsibilities are attributed whilst genuine ones are left unaddressed. The consequences would directly undermine the purpose of the inquiry, as recommendations for dealing with future health emergencies would end up being based on a misinterpretation of past decisions. It is hoped that clarifying these errors in reasoning will help to clear the field of fallacies that continue to recur both in Parliament and in public debate, and that it will no longer be necessary to revisit the issue. After all, as an ancient proverb warns, ‘To err is human, to persist is diabolical’.
