“Better an imperfect agreement than nothing”. The Vatican and its complicated relationship with China

Rome. The agreement between the Holy See and China has “obvious shortcomings”, but an “imperfect” agreement is still better than nothing. These were the words of Monsignor Paul Richard Gallagher, Secretary for Relations with States, during a meeting with the foreign press in recent days. The Catholic Herald provided an extensive report on the conversation. The agreement to which the British diplomat was referring is the one signed in 2018 between the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China, which governs the appointment of bishops in the country. The terms of the agreement, renewed in 2020, 2022 and 2024 for a four-year period, remain secret to this day. The Vatican Secretariat of State’s position is clear, at least publicly: many things are amiss, and it is hoped that the situation will hold, but thanks to that signature, all the bishops in China are now in communion with the Pope, which “certainly represents an improvement on the previous situation”, emphasised Archbishop Gallagher, who three years ago pointed out that “this agreement is not the best possible one because of the other party”. 

A glass half full, in short, considering that the overall picture is far from rosy: the body that formally appoints bishops in China – and is responsible for identifying candidates for the episcopate – is the Patriotic Association, which is a direct offshoot of the Communist Party and does not recognise the Pope’s authority over the selection of bishops. The bishops identified and appointed are therefore men of proven loyalty to the regime, which – to emphasise how little it cares about the Vatican’s views – had no qualms about appointing two bishops during the 2025 papal vacancy. Whilst the Pope was dead. Two years earlier, there was the sensational case of the Bishop of Shanghai, China’s main diocese. In July, the Vatican Press Office announced that the Pope had appointed Monsignor Giuseppe Shen Bin to that see, transferring him from the see of Haimen. It was unfortunate that the prelate had already been installed in Shanghai for three months, that is, since the authorities had unilaterally decided to send him there. Spokesperson Matteo Bruni explained that the Vatican had only been informed a few days earlier. In short: Beijing ordered and Rome ratified the appointment of a prominent bishop – the president of the Chinese Catholic Bishops’ Conference – whom the Holy See does not recognise: because “it is governed by statutes containing elements incompatible with Catholic doctrine”, as stated in Benedict XVI’s Letter to the Chinese Catholics, written nineteen years ago. The fact that the Pope subsequently decided to remedy the situation for the ‘greater good’ of the Church in Shanghai makes little difference. It was clear confirmation of the spirit of the Agreement: the Pope has the final say on the Party’s decisions, and if he disagrees or fails to respond, the Party presses ahead regardless. Shen Bin went so far as to say in an interview with the diocesan magazine that the principle of ‘Sinicisation’ “is a red line that we must not cross”.

This, too, illustrates how the agreement is completely lopsided for one simple reason which, for obvious reasons on the other side of the Tiber, cannot be openly acknowledged: Xi Jinping could not care less about an agreement with the Catholic Church. One need only recall how the news of the death of Pope Francis – who always spoke highly of the Chinese people and expressed respect for their institutional bodies – was treated in Beijing: a few lines published very belatedly. Archbishop Gallagher acknowledged that criticism of the Agreement was to be expected ‘from day one’, given certain people’s ‘view of China’s history and the current government of mainland China’. Whether the reference was to Cardinal Joseph Zen – who is Chinese and knows the Chinese Communists well – or to the then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo – who urged Rome to abandon the agreement – remains unclear. It should be noted, however, that several human rights organisations have also complained that the agreement does nothing to improve the daily lives of local Catholics. As demonstrated in recent months by an extensive investigation by the French newspaper La Croix, in several Chinese regions minors are forbidden from entering churches during liturgical celebrations which, when permitted, take place at dawn in order to prevent large numbers of people from attending. Preferably with the windows blacked out (heaven forbid anyone might take a peek and be struck by what they see) and without singing.

This is one of the issues on which Taiwan (whose only embassy in Europe is, in fact, the one to the Holy See) is pressing most strongly: “Look at Hong Kong, look at Tibet, look at the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. There is no religious freedom in China,” a senior government official told Il Foglio a couple of weeks ago. The fear that Rome might opt for Beijing by abandoning Taipei, however, is currently a remote possibility. Gallagher himself drew a distinction between pastoral and diplomatic relations, making it clear that the issue of official relations with Communist China is not on the agenda. “The idea is to have a sort of cultural presence in Beijing, but there would be a price to pay which, at the moment, we are not prepared to pay.” What that price might be is unknown. Taiwan, perhaps?

Amidst all this discussion, there is one silent spectator: what does Leo XIV think? There is only one statement on the subject, dating back more than a year now and contained in Elise Ann Allen’s interview-based book. The Pope said at the time that he wished to examine the issue in greater depth, continuing for the time being along the path already charted, whilst listening to all sides, including those who have suffered – “the significant group of Chinese Catholics” restricted “in freely practising their faith”, a situation described by Prevost as “very difficult”. Archbishop Gallagher said that ‘probably’ China does not currently represent a ‘specific priority’ for the Pope, who wishes instead to focus on ‘the entire universal Church’ rather than on ‘particular areas’. It is unlikely that Leo XIV will revise the Holy See’s current approach in the short term: there is nothing to suggest he would, and diplomatic considerations advise against it. Until the negotiations for renewal in two years’ time, renouncing the path taken would mean giving Beijing the opportunity to denounce the Agreement and the irresponsibility of the other party, with consequences that are easy to imagine for the faithful. It is equally true, however, that in this early phase of his pontificate, the Augustinian Pontiff – as well as having consented, for the time being prudently, to the reorganisation of the local dioceses, abolishing some long-established ones and creating new ones more closely aligned with administrative boundaries, as per China’s peremptory demand – has appointed proportionally far more bishops than his predecessor did, who was, indeed, publicly enthusiastic about the agreement with Beijing. Leo XIV has in fact appointed seven bishops since the day of his election. Francis, from 2018 onwards, had appointed around ten. They are all young bishops, destined to lead their dioceses for decades. The latest, significant case is that of the new bishop of the diocese of Haimen, consecrated in mid-October: Bishop Ignatius Ding Zuyao is forty years old and is the youngest bishop in the Catholic Church. He was consecrated by his predecessor in that see, Bishop Joseph Shen Bin of Shanghai. Asia News noted that “if one looks at the dates of birth of the bishops appointed in China in 2026, as many as four out of five were born after 1980. By way of comparison: when this figure is set against the appointments made by the Catholic Church as a whole, it is evident that, worldwide, there are barely twenty bishops out of over 5,400 who were born after 1980”.

Meanwhile, next Thursday, a conference will be held at the Pontifical Urbaniana University to mark the centenary of the consecration of the first six Chinese bishops by Pius XI. Two bishops will also be attending: the Bishop of Beijing, Monsignor Giuseppe Li Shan, ordained in 2007 under the apostolic mandate of Benedict XVI and elected president of the Patriotic Association in 2022; and the aforementioned Bishop of Haimen, the young Ignatius Ding Zuyao, who has recently been appointed. Cardinals Pietro Parolin, Luis Antonio Tagle and Stephen Chow Sau-Yan, Bishop of Hong Kong, will also be present.