Replacing the PD? The battle for the party’s soul is still wide open

A shift to the left that has been a long time coming. Reformists are anxious, but have few cards to play. And Schlein is cementing her position at the helm of the party
19 OCT 26
Last updated: 05:44
Translated by AI
Image of Replacing the PD? The battle for the party’s soul is still wide open
Although I am, by nature and on principle, averse to ‘conspiracy theories’, I have long been coming round to the view that something is afoot which could indeed be defined as a conspiracy, but which could also be regarded as a normal and legitimate political strategy. However, it is being carried out using weapons and methods that are often undeclared – something which, after all, is not unusual, particularly in certain political traditions: conspiracies and plots were the natural tools of the early nationalist movements, and the Bolsheviks long described themselves as a ‘konspiracija’. The aim of this political plot-scheme seems to me to be twofold. On the one hand, it aims at the de facto destruction and perhaps even the dissolution of the reformist, optimistic, reasonable, pro-Western and – at least in its aspirations – even more decidedly pro-European PD, brought together by Veltroni’s PDS – which was not D’Alema’s – and by Prodi and Franceschini’s Margherita. On the other hand, there is its possible replacement – perhaps retaining the name but, I would say, changing it if possible – with a new and different political entity, one that is at once more left-wing and more ‘populist’, that is to say – at least according to the ‘conspirators’ – better suited to the new times in which we live. The first objective, which appears to have been largely achieved, has found its leading figure in Elly Schlein, who yesterday formalised her bid for the premiership, securing her position within the PD by getting the party assembly to vote for a one-year extension of her term of office and setting out in writing that no other PD candidates may stand in any primaries, should they ever take place (Schlein said yesterday that she is ready to compete, not that she is ready to stand come what may).
Schlein, as has been noted, put forward from the outset an agenda closer to that of the Green-Left than to that of the Prodi-Veltroni and later Renzi-led PD, which she had, after all, opposed. If one considers her actions and her political line, and bears in mind that Schlein – who left the party in 2015 after having been a key figure in its internal dissent – was imposed on the PD by two former members of La Margherita (Franceschini and Letta), who opened the primaries to non-members with a candidate who had herself only just re-registered with the party – and for whom many Five Star Movement activists and Landini’s supporters voted – one cannot help but be astonished by their political blindness, given that it is hard to believe they wanted to destroy their own PD. Rather, they deluded themselves into thinking they could pull it out of the mess it had got itself into by using a young, energetic woman whom they hoped to control.
Not least because those troubles were very real, Schlein has, on the other hand, had an easy time of it in largely changing the nature and direction of the party, playing a leading role made possible in part by the difficulties faced by the old and formerly dominant ‘reformist’ wing, which has so far been unable to come to terms with the new reality, preferring instead (and it is understandable why, given that it is an unpleasant reality) the old habits and old ideas, which were – and still are – largely ‘hollow’.
It was Schlein’s moment of glory, though she has recently found herself potentially caught up in a new political shift, which has seen political leaders – who from the outset had legitimately doubted the validity of the move that led to the formation of the PD and had subsequently left the party, gradually aligning themselves with the Five Star Movement – step more decisively into the fray. They recognised its limitations but, alongside Bersani, immediately regarded it as an offshoot of the left, even paying a personal price for this stance – a position subsequently reinforced by D’Alema and Bettini’s rapprochement with Conte, particularly following the manoeuvre that led to Grillo’s marginalisation.
Having stripped the old PD of its soul and scattered some of its leaders, Schlein – who does not come from the old PCI-PDS – has thus, paradoxically, found herself becoming the champion of the simulacrum that still survives from it, a position that first led her to forge an alliance with Renzi and now sees her defending herself against the attacks and manoeuvres of Conte and his supporters in a contest that will be resolved by the primaries, unless the anti-Schlein manoeuvre succeeds first.
We are entering a future open to many possibilities, although it seems likely that – barring the unexpected twists and turns that are always possible in a situation such as the one we are currently experiencing – Schlein may win the primaries (bear in mind that the Five Star Movement is of little significance in the centre-north and that it seems unlikely the old PDS will command large numbers of voters), only to perhaps lose the general election due to a lack of support from part of the Five Star Movement and the Green-Left, or from part of the PD’s old guard if it decides to chase after them.
It is easier – and indeed more interesting – to reflect on the roots, causes and, shall we say, material, ideological and human reasons – understood as people and political forces – behind this situation. First and foremost is a bitter conclusion, yet one that seems to me difficult to dispute and from which we must begin. For a long time—from Aristotle and Aristophanes to Montesquieu, so to speak—the model of democracy has foundered on the rocks of demagoguery in societies that grew little, and sometimes not at all, and were therefore unable to ‘deliver’ but could only make promises, and thus disappoint and give rise to demagogic backlashes and crises. Then, in Europe and its settlement colonies – such as the future United States – came the age of progress and thus of growing resources, which did not prevent conflict but transformed it into a struggle over their distribution and the principles that should govern it. We then entered, at least in the privileged part of the world, the era of democracy, which was triumphant in its own way, albeit amidst a myriad of difficulties, contradictions and resistance.
The crisis of the age of progress, the origins of which in Europe can be traced back to the 1970s, and which became apparent in Italy in the 1990s and across the continent after 2008 – but which still persists (albeit with its limitations becoming apparent) in the United States – has led everywhere to growing difficulties for democratic political systems built around complex and commendable welfare systems, the costs of which have begun to rise due to an ageing population. This has inevitably generated unease and discontent, exacerbated by what appears to be a betrayal (but is rather the product of a new reality) of the ideals of equality upon which democracy is founded. Failing to understand the reasons behind this, it has become natural to interpret the situation by seeking ‘culprits’, devising conspiracy theories, and harbouring growing anger and resentment, which in turn underpin the right-wing and left-wing populist movements that risk overwhelming our liberal democracies – democracies also threatened by the need for immigration, which, whilst generated by our own behaviour, is undermining the identity of a substantial, often elderly and male (though not exclusively so) section of the population.
This, I believe, explains the success of populism even within the centre-left, where a new left is emerging that is in some ways linked to the confrontational left of the past (which, however, could boast successes that seemed destined to last) and which, above all, has abandoned the idea of being able to make a significant contribution – even in terms of ideals – to the rational governance of a reality that has become difficult. It thus becomes a left characterised by ‘unrealistic’ protests – though no less genuine or heartfelt for that, as they are fuelled by real difficulties – and therefore, precisely, populism. It seems possible to argue that, in this new form, it first fully manifested itself with Grillo’s ‘vaffanculo’ in 2007, immediately followed by the decisive crisis that began in 2008, and was first embodied in the unexpected success of the Five Star Movement in 2013 – when this new populism became, albeit briefly, Italy’s largest party – and then in the populist triumph of 2018, complemented on the right by that of Salvini’s ‘National League’.
As the frantic and failed negotiations conducted by Bersani with the Five Star Movement in 2013 remind us, even then a section of the PD leadership – which had suffered the dissolution of the PDS and the formation of the PD championed by Veltroni and Prodi in 2007 – received initial confirmation that this had been a serious mistake, especially in light of a ‘Western’ society that was no longer the one believed to have triumphed in the 1990s, when Bersani was pushing through liberalisation measures and Prime Minister D’Alema was collaborating with Clinton in the Balkans. These same leaders were then becoming convinced that they had been wrong, that new models were needed (D’Alema found them in China), that the PD had been a mistake, and that something else was required. Following a somewhat different path and the deceptive footsteps of his mentor, the former Ingrao supporter Bettini, on the other hand, saw in the Five Star Movement and populist movements a manifestation of the ‘vitality’ of a civil society with which it was essential to engage. It is in these conclusions and convictions that the roots of the political conspiracy-manoeuvre lie, facilitated by the serious error committed by Letta and Franceschini, soon followed by the return of Bersani and his ‘Articolo 1’ to the PD.
Undoubtedly, the analysis on which these arguments are based captures part of the reality, but does not fully grasp it. Above all, the solution it proposes – embracing populism in order to steer it – is extremely dangerous because it risks accelerating the already serious crisis facing our societies, unless this is regarded as a necessary step towards a new statist and authoritarian political model inspired by the Chinese one.
Unfortunately, the ‘reformist’ wing of the old PD, which was the driving force behind Veltroni and Prodi’s project, seems even less capable of recognising the new reality in which we live than those factions which perceive part of the crisis and respond to it in a tragically misguided and dangerous manner. It continues to declare itself reformist without realising what ‘reforms’ need to be carried out alongside those – certainly necessary but unpopular – that Amato, first, and then Monti and Fornero fifteen years later, had the courage to implement to save the country. The Catholic left and religion more generally also appear to be in crisis, and this in a country and a Europe at war, which are ageing and risk losing further ground on the world stage.
The situation therefore requires a major intellectual and political effort, grounded in realism, to understand what is both right and feasible – in demographic, social, economic and fiscal terms, as well as in the areas of security and, above all, reassuring fragile nations, and in international politics – while accepting the challenges that the present poses to us. Here, matters are already quite clear and require not the abandonment of national identities and cultures, but a definitive understanding of the limits of nationalism and the need to build a multinational state in Europe as soon as possible, if we do not want the situation to worsen. More difficult is the task of formulating a discourse capable of addressing multiple truths – those of young people, the elderly, men, women (who have been the most dynamic force in recent decades), immigrant communities, and so on – starting with their recognition, which is the first indispensable step towards reintegrating legitimate and often objectively conflicting diversities into the system and charting the course towards a better shared future. The hope is that politics will begin to do this, because only good politics – and not the replacement of a Democratic Party (PD), which has certainly proved incapable of governing a world different from the one it dreamt of, with a new, aggressively populist and unrealistic political force – can help us navigate the future.