An ambassador bearing bad news: the strange atmosphere between Chigi and the Farnesina

Some believe that Antonio Tajani’s main problem at the Farnesina is called Giorgia Meloni; others point the finger at Alfredo Mantovano; whilst others venture that the Foreign Minister’s main concern is quite simply the ambassadors. For Tajani and his entourage, the refrain is that “a diplomat must act like a diplomat – attending Italian food festivals if necessary – but politics is for the minister to deal with”. Yet the call for ambassadors to “stay in their place” is contested. “It’s anachronistic. It’s unthinkable today that the ministry could deal with everything,” explains one diplomat. Meanwhile, Tajani has decided – as has been known for some time – to entrust a man of the Church, Don Marco Malizia, his former spiritual guide, with an increasingly prominent role in the Farnesina’s activities. He is free to accompany the minister on trips abroad, send communications to ambassadors and recommend events to attend (such as the email with the subject line ‘the importance of gut microbiota’, revealed in these columns by Carmelo Caruso), and inaugurate new rooms. A comical situation, certainly. But one that also highlights a wider issue.

The atmosphere in certain corridors of the Farnesina – a situation that has been well known since the start of the Meloni government – goes beyond matters of principle and is by many traced back to the moment Elisabetta Belloni stepped down as Secretary-General. “There is a clear break with previous legislatures; this is obvious,” another veteran diplomat explains to Il Foglio. ‘In the past, the directorates-general of the Foreign Ministry carried weight; decisions were made in consultation with them. Now this happens less often; there is a centralisation which, moreover, is sometimes driven by political sympathies.’ In short, ‘ambassadors used to be protected’, it is claimed, with reference to the recent case of the Italian ambassador to Ethiopia, Sem Fabrizi. The diplomat’s return to Italy in August – having presented his credentials only last January – took place under circumstances that remain mysterious; it would appear to have been to prevent the Ethiopian government from expelling Fabrizi as a persona non grata, the ultimate diplomatic affront for a country. There is talk of Ethiopia’s displeasure at the diplomat’s decision to outsource the management of visa issuance to a private company; some even speculate that he paid excessive ‘attention’ to compliance with international law and human rights, as well as the rules on the arms embargo. Although Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed boasts the highest of honours – the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for ending the conflict with Eritrea – the leader in Addis Ababa is now spearheading a new offensive in Tigray and backing another in Sudan, alongside unsavoury characters such as Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as ‘Hemedti’, head of the Rapid Support Forces and accused of genocide by the United Nations.

And yet Abiy is – or was? – also the main backer of Giorgia Meloni’s ‘Mattei Plan’, of Italy’s renewed political drive in Africa, detached from European-style multilateral caution. It was precisely thanks to Abiy’s mediation that Meloni enjoyed such success last February, when African leaders were brought together by the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa with the Italian Prime Minister, as part of the second Italy-Africa summit. However, on that same occasion, as reported by Il Post, during a closed-door meeting between Meloni, Abiy and Fabrizi, the Ethiopian Prime Minister himself is said to have raised his voice, complaining to the Prime Minister about the ambassador present there. Moreover, diplomatic sources have explained to Il Foglio that, in the period immediately preceding Fabrizi’s removal, the Ethiopian ambassador in Rome visited the Farnesina on several occasions to complain about the Italian diplomat.

According to Giuseppe Mistretta, our ambassador to Ethiopia between 2014 and 2017, none of the reasons put forward so far can explain the gravity of the Italian government’s decision. “There have been significant tensions between Italy and Ethiopia in the past, but it would never have occurred to anyone to recall the ambassador”. For Mistretta, even the wording used by the Foreign Ministry to explain what happened does not hold water. “The fact that ‘there was no chemistry’ between Fabrizi and Abiy, as the ministry put it, is certainly a questionable and insufficient explanation. Abiy has been accustomed by our Prime Minister to getting what he wanted. From the Fabrizi affair, it is clear that Ethiopia dictated the agenda to us and we complied.” Il Foglio has learnt that the decision to recall the ambassador to Rome had been known for at least a month beforehand, since July, and that it was taken by the Prime Minister’s Office. “The Foreign Ministry merely took note of the decision,” explains an official who prefers to remain anonymous. According to official communications from the Foreign Ministry, Fabrizi has returned to be assigned to a new post; however, this post remains unknown as yet, partly because there are no internal vacancies advertised, as reported by Il Foglio. The post of ambassador to Addis Ababa therefore remains vacant, despite being one of the most coveted positions, typically assigned to those destined for a long and distinguished career. It should be noted that Ethiopia is not the only post still vacant in Italian diplomacy. There is also Paris, where Emanuela D’Alessandro has left her post to move to the Quirinale, to resume her role as diplomatic adviser to the President of the Republic. Although the post is a prestigious one, it has now been vacant for almost two months, and the name of Riccardo Guariglia, the current Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is being mentioned as her successor.

Of course, it is not in itself news that Palazzo Chigi makes its voice heard in the management of foreign policy, sometimes overstepping the remit of the Farnesina, but certainly, says Mistretta, “not with such brutality”. Il Foglio is aware of at least two other cases, which have so far remained confidential, in which Italian diplomats were sidelined on the instructions of the Prime Minister’s Office. These incidents, whilst of lesser political significance than the high-profile case involving Fabrizi, reveal a level of activism on the part of Palazzo Chigi that is deeply unwelcome amongst Farnesina staff. “This is how it happens: they ring the Foreign Ministry’s Human Resources Department directly. They say: ‘That one isn’t up to scratch.’ And straight away, he’s moved to another office or demoted.” This happened recently to the person in charge of Italy’s bid to host the new European Customs Authority – in the end, Lille won out over Rome – a failure that led to clearly displeased reactions from Chigi towards the diplomatic staff. In other cases, a statement deemed not entirely in line with the Prime Minister’s wishes has led to further direct intervention against the diplomat, again bypassing the Foreign Ministry, resulting in his demotion.

Then there are stories that have already appeared in the press. In 2023, the case of the accreditation of the new European Union ambassador to Libya was particularly telling. In that instance, it was the Presidency of the Council of Ministers itself that blocked the appointment of the Italian candidate – who was competing against a French candidate – because he was deemed unsuitable for the role. Also in Libya, the activities of the Italian secret services, led by General Giovanni Caravelli, are well known; on several occasions, he has bypassed the Italian ambassador in Tripoli, Gianluca Alberini, in the handling of sensitive matters, such as special relations with Khalifa Haftar in the east of the country. On several occasions, meetings with the Haftars – including those relating purely to economic matters – were attended exclusively by Caravelli and not by Alberini – “he’s always been like that; when he arrives in a country, he never gives any notice”, comments one ambassador – an anomaly also noted in September 2025, when Caravelli attended as the sole representative of the Italian government at the signing ceremony for the memorandum concluded between the San Donato Group, a leading Italian private healthcare company, and the Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund, the body controlled by the Haftar family that oversees tenders for investments in Cyrenaica. More recently, the competition to select the new EU ambassador to Kosovo has caused a stir. The Italian government had put forward its own candidate, an ambassador with extensive experience in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. However, his rival, the Slovenian Marko Macovec – who was considered the favourite – failed the psychological assessment, conducted by an independent third party. Instead of awarding the post to the Italian diplomat, the only one left in the running, the EU Commission incredibly decided to start from scratch and cancel the selection procedure. Even on that occasion, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared weak and awkward in defending one of its own diplomats, who was left the victim of a paradoxical situation (the current EU Ambassador to Kosovo, who took up his post a few days ago, is Dirk Schiebel).

But whilst some ambassadors do indeed ‘cause trouble’, others evidently cause less, at least in Meloni’s eyes, who, since the start of her term in office, has relied on the advice of Fabrizio Saggio, diplomatic adviser to the Prime Minister’s Office and coordinator of the Mattei Plan. Born in 1973, Saggio was appointed immediately after serving as ambassador to Tunis. Many would like to see him as the new Italian representative in Washington before the end of the parliamentary term – and despite his young age – replacing Marco Peronaci, who took up his post just a year ago. But for such an important position, the standard four-year term does not apply, given that the role of ambassador to the United States is a purely political appointment, as two diplomats explain to Il Foglio. Saggio is seen as the right mediator to ease the strained relations between Giorgia Meloni and Donald Trump. One morning in late June, the Prime Minister’s diplomatic adviser suddenly appeared in Washington alongside Massad Boulos, the US President’s father-in-law. While the White House envoy for Africa was busy introducing the Libyan deputy commander-in-chief of Benghazi, Saddam Haftar, to Secretary of State Marco Rubio as president-designate of the new Libya unified with the West, Fabrizio Saggio also appeared in some photographs. A surprising cameo appearance and, it is said, a way of establishing Saggio as a potential link between the United States and Rome in such difficult times.

However, it is in his role as coordinator of the Mattei Plan’s steering committee that Saggio is playing his trump cards. The flagship of Giorgia Meloni’s foreign policy has nonetheless sparked considerable jealousy regarding how resources are managed. By centralising the management of a significant portion of the funds earmarked for development cooperation—which were once administered by the Foreign Office—Chigi is accused by many of seeking to sideline the Foreign Office. And it is precisely from the Foreign Office that a fair share of criticism has emerged, given that the ministry, unlike the steering committee, must comply with strict reporting and approval regulations for its development projects. A caveat which, judging by the rather vague Annual Report on the implementation of the Mattei Plan presented by the government in July, does not seem to apply to the steering committee led by Saggio. “It looks more like an investment fund than a political instrument. And it’s all centred around Chigi; the Foreign Ministry has no say here,” explains a diplomat. “It is also thought-provoking that there is not a single Africa expert on the Mattei Plan’s staff. There is a clear governance issue,” observes Mistretta.

Above all, there is the issue of money, because the steering committee embodies a structure which, for some, represents an innovation designed to boost efficiency, whilst for others it is an anomaly: a purely technical body that finds itself managing a vast amount of money. According to the latest government report presented to Parliament on the state of implementation, there are 76 projects in 18 countries involving 5.5 billion euros, of which 2.5 billion went to AICS, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation. “No one knows where these 2.5 billion euros allocated to AICS have ended up, or how they have been spent, at least judging by the government’s latest report on the Mattei Plan,” argued Vincenzo Amendola, former Minister for European Affairs, on 22 July during Saggio’s hearing before the Chamber of Deputies’ Foreign Affairs Committee. Certainly, 1.2 billion comes from the Climate Fund. “Of this, almost 500 million is channelled through multilateral agreements, a portion of which, in some cases, is also allocated to private companies.” In the committee, Amendola had complained that none of the bilateral agreements provided for in the Mattei Plan specifies a timetable, an implementing body or a timeframe. “For every euro of direct state funding – that is, 1.2 billion euros – spent outside multilateral channels, you must explain to us who is using it and how, and when the programmes will be launched and implemented.” To finance the construction of the Lobito corridor – a railway project intended to link the mining regions of Central Africa – the Mattei Plan sets aside as much as 250 million euros for a financial institution, the Africa Finance Corporation. “But Parliament has not been informed of this expenditure, even though it involves public money. Who is responsible for its implementation? When will work begin? There are no project-by-project details,” Amendola asked Saggio. These questions remained unanswered during the hearing.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary finds himself in the awkward position of having to explain how the Mattei Plan works without ever having managed a single euro of it. This happened last Sunday, for example, when Tajani attended a conference entitled ‘Il piano Mattei a due anni dal lancio. Cosa cambia per la cooperazione e gli investimenti’, kindly hosted by the Chilli Pepper Trade Fair in Rieti.