The far right hates Melonism

To gain a better understanding of Giorgia Meloni’s political identity after four years in government, it may be useful to attempt a small experiment that is only seemingly counterintuitive: to understand the non-populist profile with which Meloni is celebrating her record-breaking tenure in government through the words of a far-right leader, accurately reported by a skilled journalist in an anti-Meloni daily newspaper firmly positioned on the left. The newspaper in question is *Repubblica*; the journalist in question is Tonia Mastrobuoni; the far-right leader is Ulrich Siegmund, a 35-year-old rising star in the AfD with a good chance of success in the upcoming regional elections in Saxony; and the quote to start with is the one reported yesterday by *Repubblica*, attributed to Siegmund’s entourage: “Melonisation is a dirty word”. The point is clear. If you wish to offer right-wing voters a proudly extremist platform, founded on radicalism rather than moderation, you have no choice but to promise voters – whether they be ‘brown’ or ‘red’ – that you are prepared to do anything to resist the siren call of Europeanism and to refuse to yield in any way to the culture of compromise. For a far-right leader, Meloni can only be a threat because she demonstrates that the once-far-right, in order to govern, cannot remain extreme and must inevitably seek to view Europe as a source of opportunities rather than problems. It is no coincidence that in October 2022, when Meloni came to power, Alice Weidel welcomed the formation of a centre-right government in Italy. Nor is it a coincidence that just two years later, on 24 May 2024, the co-chair of the AfD, Tino Chrupalla, completely reversed his assessment, highlighting Meloni’s excessive closeness to Ukraine, emphasising her strong ties with the EU, pointing out her non-extreme stance on immigration, and going so far as to say that here in the AfD, “this ‘Melonisation’ will not happen”.

Examining the assessment made by Europe’s far-right movements of the Meloni government can help us gain a better understanding of what was probably the truly surprising aspect of the Meloni era – a period dominated by caution, and at times by inaction, yet one in which the Meloni government, when faced with extremism, acted more as a bulwark than as an outlet. One might well ask why the German far right considers Meloni a model not to be followed. And one might well ask why, during these four years in government, the far right has come into conflict with a right wing that is no longer as extreme as that embodied by Giorgia Meloni. The conflictual relationship with Donald Trump, of course, is part of this story, and part of this journey. But alongside this story, there are others that deserve to be told. Marine Le Pen, who initially welcomed Meloni’s entry into government, has viewed Meloni with suspicion for years – ever since Meloni chose to embrace Ukraine with ever greater vigour and ever since Meloni chose to combat illegal immigration not by turning Europe into a target but by turning it into an ally. A similar story has unfolded in recent years in two other interesting political contests.

The first, and most delicate, issue was her relationship with Viktor Orbán. Meloni went to great lengths to defend Orbán, even going so far as to lend her image to help her friend Viktor during his election campaign; yet in reality, Meloni’s right-wing stance in Europe has been an alternative to Orbán’s, as demonstrated by the endless battles fought in Brussels over sanctions against Russia. The second story, evocative and subtle, concerns the relationship with Vox. Meloni has a personal friendship with the leader of Vox; in January, the Prime Minister was photographed in Spain driving a Mini alongside Santiago Abascal. However, the political fact that will stand out from these years in government is that in 2022, when Meloni was not yet in government, Fratelli d’Italia and Vox were part of the same European political group, the ECR; however, once Fratelli d’Italia’s rapprochement with Ursula von der Leyen became apparent, Vox seized the opportunity to distance itself politically from Meloni by joining another European group: the Patriots. In June 2024, Éric Zemmour, another leading figure of the nationalist right in France, said that Meloni was betraying her voters, that she was ‘playing the European to save the books’. In July 2025, one of the leading ideologues of the Austrian far right, Martin Sellner, accused Meloni of presenting herself as a fake right-wing leader acting in the interests of a ‘global migration agenda’. To all this, of course, we must add an internal factor – an Italian factor – which represents both a strength and a weakness in the process of moderating ‘Melonism’. That factor, naturally, is Roberto Vannacci.

For the right looking to the future, Vannacci is a key test to gauge just how far the non-extremist ruling right is prepared to go to try and avoid losing the next elections. For the right that looks to the recent past, however, Vannacci is a warning sign pointing to an issue that is hard to ignore. If it is true, as the polls suggest, that Vannacci has carved out a niche for himself on the right, it is because he has managed to fill a political vacuum left unguarded by the right-wing government. Yet while it is true that Vannacci, with his ‘tenth scum’, embodies everything the far-right has sown in the past, it is also true that Vannacci benefits from the presence on the public stage of a right-wing that could have been far-right but, whilst in government – as even the most extreme right-wingers themselves admit – has not been far-right on the issues closest to the hearts of the far-right: relations with Europe, the handling of immigration, support for Ukraine, and distancing from Putinism. The government has certainly made mistakes over these four years, and there have been many of them. But if one wishes to reflect on what Meloni has achieved, given the record for length of time in office that will be reached on 4 September, it might be worth listening for once to what the far right has to say about Meloni and focusing on the real issue: the mistakes made over these four years that stemmed from a lack of courage rather than from excessive extremism.