Dear Meloni, the electoral law needs a run-off. Appeal by Pera

The remark made during the hearing by Chairwoman Anna Finocchiaro may be somewhat inelegant, but it is particularly useful: ‘Nobody is a virgin!’. This is a two-fold invitation which I interpret as follows: nobody should forget today, for reasons of expediency, what they supported yesterday – even with official documents; and nobody should use objections based on political expediency as grounds for constitutional illegitimacy. The points that have so far given rise to debate and objections are: the size of the majority bonus; the national bonus in the Senate; micro-lists; the nomination of the Prime Minister; and preferential votes.

I will address this promptly because I am more interested in another point: the run-off.

Regarding the size of the bonus. It falls within the parameters set by the Court and no errors must be made in the calculation: a share – at least 42 per cent – of the 70 and 35 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, respectively, allocated as a bonus, would in any case be due to the winning coalition if they were distributed proportionally.

On the national bonus in the Senate. The Constitutional Court (judgement 35/2017, paragraph 15.2) ‘requires’ that the electoral systems for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate ‘must not hinder the formation of homogeneous parliamentary majorities’. Since the Court itself considers a system for the Chamber of Deputies, involving a bonus of 55 per cent of seats with a 40 per cent vote threshold, to be legitimate, it follows that a national bonus in the Senate is not unlawful, given that its very purpose is the formation of a homogeneous majority.

On micro-lists. This is a political choice not unlike others, e.g. the Rosato law, aimed at preventing fragmented coalitions. The principle established by the Letta government’s commission applies: “if a government is formed on the basis of the seats won, it would be consistent to consider only those votes that have secured seats as valid votes”.

As indicated by the Prime Minister. This is a measure designed to ensure transparency for voters, who are informed in advance of the name of the Prime Minister that the coalitions will propose to the Head of State. It was provided for in Thesis No. 1 of the Ulivo in 1996. It was contained in a bill tabled by Mr Soda of the PD in 1996. And it was considered in the report by Mr Mattarella in 1998, which gave shape to the agreement reached in the D’Alema Bicameral Commission.

As for the preferences, these are necessary because the draft bill under consideration provides for two closed lists. For this reason, I accept them, even though I have been strongly opposed to them for thirty years.

And now the run-off. It was included in the original bill but then disappeared for reasons that remain unclear. I note:

– In the context of a bicameral system with equal powers, which has now become a constitutional monster feared by all, to the extent that it is now circumvented by actually voting on even the budget bill in a single chamber;

– given, furthermore, that there are two main coalitions with almost equal numbers of votes, but neither of which is capable on its own of forming a governing majority;

– given, finally, the risk of an uncertain election result that would turn Parliament into a forum for post-election bargaining, horse-trading and manoeuvring to form a governing majority, which would in any case be fragile,

A run-off vote offers at least the following advantages:

1. A run-off is the enemy of political deadlock. This inevitably arises when the election result fails to produce a clear and solid majority and the parliamentary groups are then forced to find one. Admittedly, it is true that, given the system of equal representation in both chambers, not even a run-off election guarantees the formation of a certain governing majority (no electoral law can do so), but it is equally true that a run-off election minimises the risk of ad hoc, heterogeneous majorities that are detrimental to the stability of government.

2. The run-off is transparent. It gives voters a say, makes them the arbiters, and makes them the effective and final decision-makers regarding the government. On the day of the run-off, voters know that who they will be governed by will depend on their vote, and that vote alone.

3. A run-off election is engaging. If voters know that their vote counts and is decisive, their tendency to abstain from voting because they feel marginalised and powerless will diminish, and they will have a reason to go to the polls. Abstention rises when voters feel they are merely going through the motions; it falls when they realise that they are the arbiters who deliver the verdict.

4. A run-off election reduces political blackmail. At present, the main coalitions, not feeling sufficiently strong, need to ‘broaden their base’ and, to do so, form alliances with one or other radical and extreme political force which, from a mathematical point of view, strengthens them. But arithmetic does not make for good politics. By allying themselves with the main coalitions, small extremist groups blackmail the incoming government and render it unstable. This is a disaster when, as is already the case, this instability affects a central aspect of government activity, namely foreign policy and our position on the international stage.

Finally, the provision for a run-off vote is set out as a joint proposal in the two most important official documents on the reform of our institutions: the D’Alema Bicameral Commission (signed by Mattarella, Berlusconi, Nania, Salvi, Cossutta, Pieroni, etc.), and the Letta government’s Commission of Experts (comprising 42 constitutional experts and specialists). It was a cross-party proposal.

So I’ll wrap up. Let’s leave the political newcomers to their inevitable fate. A run-off is possible; it offers the same advantages to everyone, so it should be held. That is, of course, if wisdom were to guide us.

The run-off I’m proposing works as follows:

1) The bonus is awarded in the first round if the leading coalition exceeds the threshold of 48 per cent of the votes (approximately 50 per cent of the seats) in both Houses. If this does not happen, a run-off is held between the two largest coalitions, provided that both have exceeded 38 per cent of the votes (approximately 40 per cent of the seats) in both Houses. In this case, the bonus is awarded to the coalition that obtained the most votes (in both Houses). No further alliances are permitted in the second round;

2) If the second coalition has not exceeded the 38 per cent threshold of the votes (and therefore a run-off cannot take place), the bonus is awarded in the first round to the first coalition, provided that it has exceeded 42 per cent of the votes in both Houses (as in the text approved by the Chamber of Deputies);

3) The total number of seats allocated to the winning coalition is 220 in the Chamber of Deputies and 113 in the Senate (excluding the overseas constituency).

If the conditions set out in points 1 and 2 are not met, all seats shall be allocated on a proportional basis.

Marcello Pera

a senator for Fratelli d’Italia and former President of the Senate