Justice
Editorials •
The prevalence of judicial errors
The magistrate who sought Busetto’s wrongful conviction says he would do it all again

Monica Busetto (Photo: Ansa)
In an interview with Alberto Zorzi in the Veneto edition of Corriere della Sera, Antonino Condorelli, the former Attorney General of Venice who sought and secured a life sentence for Monica Busetto – who was later found innocent and released after thirteen years in prison – whilst admitting that “it is very sad that an innocent person remained in prison”, maintains that “what had to be done was done”. In his account, he recalls all the circumstantial evidence pointing to the defendant’s guilt, which led first the prosecution and then the court to seek and hand down the sentence; yet not the slightest doubt is raised regarding the validity of a trial based on circumstantial evidence, or the fragility of the evidence which, in the end, proved to be flimsy. It is precisely the fact that ‘what had to be done’ was done that raises the question we must ask ourselves.
A trial based on circumstantial evidence is, by its very nature, open to question; the uncritical reliance on ‘scientific’ evidence such as DNA – without magistrates having the expertise to assess its reliability, a task which is therefore delegated to experts who often express differing opinions – highlights a problem within the justice system that should be tackled at its root. If even a confession by another person to having committed the crime is not considered reasonable doubt, it means that something is amiss, and it is striking that Condorelli still fails to recognise this. Underlying his reasoning is a rejection of the principle of due process, according to which it is better to let a guilty person go free than to convict an innocent one. For him, the opposite is true, and this view – even if not expressed with the same disarming clarity – is widespread within the public prosecution service. He is right to say that ‘we are not dealing with a conspiracy’, and this makes the ‘normality’ of such a serious miscarriage of justice (which, incidentally, Condorelli does not seem to recognise) all the more worrying. It is precisely this ‘normality’, rooted in an anti-due-process bias, that can lead to errors of such unacceptable gravity, and it is here that we must find a way to intervene.
